190 Iowa 728 | Iowa | 1921
— Under the allegations of the petition, the right of recovery is predicated upon two grounds:
(1) That the defendant purchased the entire stock of goods of the bankrupt debtor in violation of the Bulk Sales statute, Chapter 64, Acts of the Thirty-seventh General Assembly.
(2) That the purchase was made within four months prior to the adjudication of bankruptcy, and that it was void, as a preference, under the Federal bankruptcy law.
The verdict was directed on the first ground. Clearly, the evidence would not sustain a directed verdict on the second ground. We have need to deal, therefore, only with the first
The retail dealer in’this case was Angus. The plaintiff is his trustee in bankruptcy. Angus had operated a butcher shop in Anamosa for a period of ten months prior to the sale under attack. He rented his building from the defendant Hellberg. His capital was limited. His son and son-in-law started with him in the business. Hellberg signed a note with him for $500 for money borrowed for use in the business. On July 21, 1917, Angus advised Hellberg that he wanted to quit business, and proposed to sell Hellberg his stock for the purpose of paying his indebtedness to Hellberg, which consisted of $83 of rent due and the contingent liability of Hellberg as surety on the $500 note. The stock was taken by Hellberg at actual invoice price, with the agreement that the purchase price should be applied upon the indebtedness mentioned, and that the balance of the purchase price, if any, should be paid to the seller. The invoice totaled $611. There. was nothing in the circumstances surrounding the parties which could be said to charge Hellberg with notice of the insolvency of Angus. His reasons for wanting to quit business were plausible and substantial. His son-in-law had not remained in the business but a very brief time. In March preceding, his wife had died. Shortly before the sale, his son had enlisted in the army. Shortly prior to the sale, he had received $1,500 of life insurance, because of the death of his wife. Hellberg knew that fact. These are the circumstances which negative any cause of belief on the part of Hellberg that he was obtaining preference from an insolvent. The question now is whether, under the facts here stated, the transfer of such stock was a violation of our own Bulk Sales statute.
In Des Moines Packing Co. v. Uncaphor, 174 Iowa 39, we held that the then existing Bulk Sales statute did not operate to prevent a creditor from taking a transfer of stock from his debtor in payment of his debt. So far as that feature of the law is concerned, there is no distinction observable between the