6 Rob. 450 | La. | 1844
The petition represents, that on the 21st of August, 1841, the defendant, Felix H. Hayden, agreed to sell to the plaintiff a tract of land, in the parish of Iberville, for a valuable consideration, and bound himself, at the same time, in a penal bond, in the sum of one thousand dollars, to make to the plaintiff a good and valid title to the tract, on or before the first of January, 1842, and more particularly to obtain the renunciation and relinquishment of all her rights from his wife, Domitilde Hayden : and in the event that the title to the land was not made, and the renunciation not obtained by the first of January, 1842, Hayden was to forfeit and pay to the plaintiff the sum of one thousand dollars. It is alleged that this bond, or obligation, was deposited withF. Dugué, Parish Judge of the parish of Jefferson, who lost,
A motion to dissolve the injunction upon the face of the petition, was sustained below, and the injunction was dissolved with damages. The plaintiff has appealed.
We are of opinion that the Judge, a quo, did not err. Considering as true- all the facts set forth in the petition, as we are bound to do on the trial- of a motion to dissolve upon the face of the papers, we cannot find in them any ground upon which to rest the petitioner’s claim for damages, or for a rescission.
It may well be doubted whether the obligation of the 21st of August, 1841, to sell the land to plaintiff for a valuable consideration, constituted either a sale, or a promise to sell, as no price had been fixed upon, and the contract was wanting in one of its essential requisites; and it is well settled that the nullity of the principal obligation involves that of the penal clause. Civil Code, arts. 1757, 2119, 2414, 2437, 2439. 1 Pothier, Oblig. No. 339.
But admitting that the obligation was of sufficient validity to bind the defendant on his bond, the plaintiff himself shows that on the 23d of December, 1841, a new and different contract was made, to which he himself became a party, which was a sale to himself, and to James J. Neilson, each for one undivided half of the same tract of land. By this new agreement, the execution of the first was rendered impossible, as Gorham could no longer buy, nor Hayden sell the whole land. Gorham, we think, may well be considered as having, by his own act, waived or discharged the penal bond. It is clear, that he made the second contract without any reference to that instrument; for he tells us, that after the parties had signed the act, and he had furnished his notes, it was stipulated that the renunciation of the vendor’s wife should be given on the next day, to wit, on the 24th of December, 1841, a different day from that stipulated in the first contract. No penal stipulation appears to have been alluded to, or thought of, by the parties at that time. There seems to have been remissness and neglect in completing the act on the part of the vendor ;
We have been called upon by the appellee, to amend the judgment of the District Court, by increasing the damages assessed, and, at the same time, to treat this appeal as a frivolous one, and to give him damages for the delay consequent thereon. We can do neither. He cannot have damages for the appeal, because he has availed himself of it, to ask for an amendment of the judgment he obtained below. Although a general injunction had issued in the case, it does not appear to us that the inferior Judge improperly limited the damages he allowed under the law of 1831, to the amount due by Gorham, who alone had enjoined the order of seizure and sale. We have often held, that this law, being one of great severity, should be strictly construed. In relation to the special damages, the Judge under whose eye the proceedings took place, was more competent than we can be to assess them.
Judgment affirmed.