[¶ 1] Patrick R. Gorham appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Andros-coggin County, Delahanty, J.) dismissing his due process and wrongful termination claims as untimely pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b). Gorham brought this action in response to his dismissal for cause from his employment as a county corrections officer pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 501(3)(A) (2010). Because we conclude that (1) Rule 80B(b)’s time limit for seeking review of a decision to dismiss an employee pursuant to section 501(3)(A) does not commence until the employee receives a written decision of the county commissioners or personnel board; and (2) on the motion to dismiss record, Gorham’s claim regarding a denial of his right to due process of law was independent of his administrative appeal, we vacate the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Except as noted, the following facts are taken from Gorham’s complaint.
See Persson v. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
[¶ 3] Patrick Gorham was employed as a corrections officer at the Androscoggin County Jail. While on duty in August and September of 2009, Gorham was involved in two incidents of horseplay.
[¶ 4] In late September 2009, the Androscoggin County Sheriff suspended Gorham without pay and requested that the County Commissioners terminate his employment. Gorham was present at a November 4 hearing, at which the Commissioners voted to approve the Sheriffs recommendation to dismiss Gorham for cause pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 501(3)(A). 1 On November 18, the Commissioners issued a two-page written decision to dismiss Gorham that included factual findings and the rationale for the decision.
[¶ 5] On December 18, 2009, Gorham filed a complaint in the Superior Court asserting a due process claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNexis 2002) and a wrongful termination claim pursuant to
[¶ 6] The court determined that Gor-ham’s due process claim was “merely an ‘alternate formulation’ of his wrongful termination claim,” and it treated Rule 80B as the exclusive means for judicial review. Based on its finding that Gorham was fully aware of the Commissioners’ decision when they voted and announced their decision on November 4, the court dismissed his complaint as untimely pursuant to Rule 80B, which requires an appeal to be filed “within 30 days after notice of any action or refusal to act of which review is sought.” M.R. Civ. P. 80B(b). After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Gorham appealed. 2
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 7] To address Gorham’s arguments on appeal, we consider (A) the meaning of “notice of any action,” as it is used in Rule 80B(b); and (B) whether Rule 80B provides adequate, and therefore exclusive, review of Gorham’s due process claim.
A. The Meaning of “Notice of Any Action” in Rule 80B(b)
[¶ 8] Gorham argues that his complaint was timely because the thirty-day time limit for seeking review pursuant to Rule 80B(b) did not begin to run until the Commissioners issued their written decision with them findings and rationale.
[¶ 9] We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo; however, when the motion to dismiss challenges the court’s jurisdiction, we make no inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
See Persson,
[¶ 10] In this case, the statute governing dismissal of a county employee, 30-A M.R.S. § 501(3)(A), is silent as to the time for seeking review: “An employee may be dismissed by a county officer or department head only for cause and only with the prior approval of the county commissioners or personnel board.... ” The question thus presented is: what constitutes “notice of any action” to trigger Rule 80B(b)’s default thirty-day time limit for filing an administrative appeal?
[¶ 11] Viewing the plain language of Rule 80B(b) in the context of the whole rule,
T & M Mortg. Solutions,
[¶ 12] Because “[t]he final judgment rule is equally applicable to appeals from administrative decisions,” it is implicit in Rule 80B(b) and the jurisdictional statute that “notice of any action” refers to an action that “fully decides and disposes of the whole cause leaving no further questions for ... future consideration and judgment....”
See Rockland Plaza Realty Corp. v. City of Rockland,
[¶ 13] Even considering the implicit requirement of finality, we conclude that the phrase “notice of any action” is ambiguous because it could refer to an agency’s final vote and decision announced at a public hearing, or it could refer to an agency’s subsequent issuance of a written decision that includes findings of fact and the rationale behind the decision.
[¶ 14] When construing an ambiguous rule of court, our aim is to give effect to the underlying intent of the rule.
Me. Sav. Bank v. DeCosta,
[¶ 15] Although the notes accompanying Rule 80B do not provide direct guidance to resolve the ambiguity of the phrase “notice of any action” in Rule 80B(b), the reporter’s notes discussing the filing of a complaint pursuant to Rule 80B(a) state that “[i]t seems reasonable that in all these proceedings the aggrieved party should be required to state his grievance” in the complaint whether required by statute or not. M.R. Civ. P. 80B Reporter’s Notes. An aggrieved party, however, cannot state a grievance without first understanding the basis for an agency’s decision. Indeed, a party might not recognize whether a grievance exists until an agency articulates its findings and rationale in a final written decision. Conversely, an agency’s findings and rationale might persuade the aggrieved party to accept the agency’s decision and forego judicial review.
[¶ 16] Other policy considerations and practical reasons expressed elsewhere in the Rules support construing “notice of any action” as referring to a final written agency decision that is supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law where a written decision with findings and/or conclusions is required by rule or statute. A decision to take an appeal should be informed.
See
M.R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring
[¶ 17] In this case, the Commissioners were required by statute to issue a written decision that explained the basis for their decision to dismiss Gorham.
See Quintal v. City of Hallowell,
Every agency shall make a written record of every decision involving the dismissal ... of any public ... employee.... The agency shall ... set forth in the record the reason or reasons for its decision and make findings of fact, in writing, sufficient to apprise the individual concerned and any interested member of the public of the basis for the decision. A written record or a copy thereof must be kept by the agency and made available to any interested member of the public who may wish to review it.
1 M.R.S. § 407(2) (2010).
[¶ 18] FOAA is silent as to whether an agency is required to send its written decision to the parties to the proceedings, but common sense and basic fairness suggest that agencies should be so required. In the analogous context of Rule 80C appeals, the Maine Administrative Procedure Act establishes more specific procedural requirements related to the time in which an appeal must be taken. See 5 M.R.S. § 9061 (2010) (requiring agency decision to be stated in the record or written, and to include “findings of fact sufficient to apprise the parties and any interested member of the public of the basis for the decision,” and requiring a copy of the decision to be delivered or mailed to the parties with written notice of the right to appeal); 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) (2010) (requiring a party to the proceeding to file a petition for review of agency action within thirty days after receipt of notice). For Rule 80B, there are no comparable administrative procedure statutes.
[¶ 19] “The purpose of Rule 80B is to provide ‘a uniform and simple procedure for all review of administrative action.’ ”
Sawin,
[¶ 20] In this case, the Commissioners voted and announced their decision on November 4, they issued their written decision with findings of fact on November 18, 4 and Gorham filed his complaint on December 18. Based on our construction of Rule 80B(b), Gorham filed his complaint within thirty days of the Commissioners’ notice of their action, and the court erred by dismissing it as untimely. 5
B. Section 1983 Claim
[¶ 21] Gorham also challenges the court’s conclusion that direct review pursuant to 80B provides adequate remedies for his § 1983 claim, and it is therefore the exclusive means for judicial review. Gorham argues that review of the Commissioners’ action cannot redress his independent claim that the Sheriff deprived him of a property interest without due process by suspending him without pay before the Commissioners conducted a hearing.
[¶ 22] With respect to independent claims that are not subject to Rule 80B, we have held that when direct review is available pursuant to Rule 80B, it provides the exclusive process for judicial review unless it is inadequate.
Colby v. York Cnty. Comm’rs,
[¶ 23] On the other hand, we have recognized that public employees who have a property right in continued employment are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before they can be deprived of that property right.
Moen v. Town of Fairfield,
[¶ 24] The record on the motion to dismiss in this case does not establish whether Gorham had an opportunity to address his suspension without pay at the Commissioners’ hearing,
see Moreau,
[¶ 25] In his complaint, Gorham alleges that the Sheriff suspended him without pay before he had an opportunity to be heard. Because this alleged deprivation of property occurred before the Commissioners’ administrative hearing, we cannot, on this record, conclude that direct review pursuant to Rule 80B would provide an adequate remedy for Gorham’s § 1983 claim. Accordingly, the court erred when it concluded that Gorham’s § 1983 claim was not independent of his administrative appeal and should be dismissed.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. This fact, relevant to determining the timeliness of Gorham's complaint, was stated in an affidavit attached to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. With respect to a motion challenging the court’s jurisdiction, we also consider materials outside the pleadings that are submitted by the moving party.
Davric Me. Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc.,
. Because the court dismissed Gorham’s complaint as untimely, it did not consider whether the Sheriff was a proper party. As a result, that issue is not a subject of this appeal.
. We have earlier suggested in dictum that “the 'notice' that starts the thirty-day time limit within which an appeal pursuant to Rule 80B must be taken need not be in writing.”
Woodward v. Town of Newfield,
. The record does not indicate the date on which Gorham received the Commissioners’ decision.
. Because we conclude that Gorham’s Rule 80B complaint was timely, it follows that the court erred when it dismissed his due process claim as untimely. As a result, we need not resolve whether Gorham’s claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (LexisNexis 2002) is subject to the thirty-day time period provided by Rule 80B(b).
Compare Colby v. York Cnty. Comm’rs,