Case Information
*1 #27438, #27446-a-SLZ
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
* * * *
DAWN GORES, individually and
as conservator of HALEY GORES,
and HALEY GORES individually, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
LISA A. MILLER, M.D., and YANKTON
SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, P.C., Defendants and Appellees.
* * * *
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT YANKTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA * * * *
THE HONORABLE CHERYLE W. GERING
Judge
* * * *
TIMOTHY L. JAMES of
James & Larson Law
Yankton, South Dakota
and
DAN RASMUS of
Hovland & Rasmus, PLLC
Edina, Minnesota Attorneys for plaintiffs
and appellants.
MELISSA C. HINTON of
Evans Haigh & Hinton LLP
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendants
and appellees. * * * *
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON NOVEMBER 30, 2015 OPINION FILED 02/03/16 *2 ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] A minor child sustained physical injuries in an auto accident. The minor and her parent – conservator signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with the driver, insured, and insurer of the auto. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released all other claims that might develop from the accident. The minor and her parent subsequently filed a malpractice suit against the clinic and the physician who treated the injuries the minor sustained in the accident. The circuit court ruled that the release discharged the malpractice claims, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the medicаl providers. The parent and minor appeal. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] On July 28, 2010, fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a van driven by Steven Smith. Smith lost control of the van, and Haley suffered lacerations to her right arm. Dr. Lisa Miller debrided Haley’s wounds at the hospital. The next day, Dr. Miller performed an excisional debridement and closеd the lacerations. On August 13, Dr. Miller performed a second excisional debridement. Haley continued to see Dr. Miller for her care until October 21, 2010, when Dr. Miller determined that Haley’s arm had completely healed. Haley’s last contact with Dr. Miller was in December 2010.
[¶3.] In March 2011, a court appointed Haley’s mother, Dawn Gores, аs Haley’s conservator for the purpose of prosecuting and settling claims arising from the accident. In April 2011, Dawn asked the conservator court to approve a settlement with Smith’s insurer for the policy limit of $25,000 in exchange for Dawn *3 and Haley’s general release. 1 The conservator court approved thе settlement, and Dawn and Haley (Appellants) executed the release. 2
[¶4.] In April 2013, Haley and Dawn (in her individual capacity and as Haley’s conservator) sued Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller’s practice group. Appellants claimed that Haley received substandard medical care for the arm injury Haley suffered in the auto accident. More specifically, they alleged that Haley would have healed faster and required less treatment if Dr. Miller had done a skin graft and properly instructed Haley on how to dress her wounds.
[¶5.] Dr. Miller and YSA moved for summary judgment, contending that the release discharged Appellants’ claims against them. Aрpellants moved for additional time to conduct discovery to ascertain the intent of the parties to the release, including the intent of the judge who approved the settlement. The discovery motion was denied. The court determined that Appellants signed a general release that was unambiguous. The court furthеr determined that because the release was unambiguous, the release expressed the intent of the parties. Based on the language of the release, the court concluded that the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Miller and YSA.
1. Steven Smith was insured under his mother’s policy.
2. The court also approved a settlement with Appellants’ insurance company for
its $100,000-underinsured-motorist limit, less the liability limit paid by Smith’s carrier.
[¶6.] Appellants raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether the release was intended to discharge Appellants’ claims against Dr. Miller and YSA; (2) whether Dr. Miller and YSA were “independent tоrtfeasors,” who were beyond the scope of the release; (3) whether the circuit court should have allowed additional time for discovery to ascertain the intent of the parties; and (4) whether res judicata barred the release defense.
Decision
[¶7.] In their first issue, Appellants argue that the release was not intended to discharge the claims against Dr. Miller and YSA. Appellants point out that the release did not mention Dr. Miller and YSA and that Appellants were not fully compensated through the settlement. In their second issue, Appellants argue that the release did not apply to the medical providers because they were “independеnt tortfeasors” who caused injuries in addition to those caused by Smith. Because the scope of the release often controls the questions raised in these issues, the first two issues are discussed together.
[¶8.]
A release is a contract, and if a contract is unambiguous, we rely on
the language of the contract to asсertain and give effect to the parties’ intent.
Fenske Media Corp. v. Banta Corp.
,
[¶9.] The release in this case provided in relevant part:
[T]he undersigned hereby releases, and forever discharges Lori Smith and her heirs, executors, administrators, agents, insurers, and assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be liable , none of whom admit any liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever , and particularly on account of all injuries , known and unknown, both to person and property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an incident which occurred on or about the 28th Day of July, 2010 , at or near Springfield, South Dakota . . . .
The undersigned hereby represents that the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all claims , disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the aforesaid accident . . . .
(Emphasis added.) This language is broad and unambiguous. Under it, Appellants
released all “additional claims” of “any kind or nature whatsoever” against “all
other persons” for “all injuries” that had or might “result from,” “develop” from, or
“arise out of” the accident. Applying this language, we note that Dr. Miller treated
Haley for the injuries she sustained in the accident, and the damages Appellants
seek from this malpractice claim are for a suboptimal recovery from those same
injuries. Because the alleged malpractice damages developed from thе injuries
Haley sustained in the accident, the language of the release covers the malpractice
*6
claim. We have previously held that this type of broad language in general releases
discharges additional claims against third parties not named.
See Aggregate
Constr. Inc.
,
4. A Restatement illustration demonstrates the rule:
A’s negligence causes B serious harm. B is taken to a hospitаl. The surgeon improperly diagnoses his case and performs an unnecessary operation, or, after proper diagnosis, performs a necessary operation carelessly. A’s negligence is a legal cause of the additional harm which B sustains.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 illus. 1.
*7
Law of Torts
§ 47, at 309 (5th ed. 1984). Therefore, even if Dr. Miller and YSA are
“independent tortfeasors” who caused distinct injuries—a question we do not decide
in this case—the law regards all of these injuries as causally related to the accident
See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 cmt. a. 5 Because Smith is responsible for
both injuries as a matter of law, 6 Appellants have no argument that their claim
against Dr. Miller аnd YSA is not causally related to the auto accident. This result
is contemplated in such releases. As we have previously noted, “the defendant who
originally procures the release gains nothing if the plaintiff can [still] sue other joint or concurrent tortfeasors. In such a case, the original defendant is left open to
claims for contribution and/or indemnity and may wind up having to litigate the
case anyway.”
Flynn
,
The situation to which the rule stated in this Section is usually applicable is where the actor’s negligence is the legal cause of bodily harm for which, even if nothing more were suffered, the other could recover damages. These injuries require the other to submit to medical, surgical, and hospital services. The services are so rendered as to increase the harm or even to cause harm which is entirely different from that which the other had previously sustained . In such a case, the damages assessable agаinst the actor include not only the injury originally caused by the actor’s negligence but also the harm resulting from the manner in which the medical, surgical, or hospital services are rendered, irrespective of whether they are rendered in a mistaken or negligent manner, so long as the mistake or negligence is of the sort which is rеcognized as one of the risks which is inherent in the human fallibility of those who render such services.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 457 cmt. a (emphasis added). 6. Because causation is established as a matter of law, we need not address
Appellants’ argument that the joint-versus-independent-tortfeasor distinction is a question of fаct for the jury.
case. Although Smith obtained a full release, he would wind up having to litigate the accident and defend a contribution and indemnity claim by Dr. Miller and YSA. Appellants released all persons from all claims that developed from the accident. Because Haley’s malpractice damages developеd from the injuries sustained in the auto accident, we conclude that the release applied to the suboptimal recovery allegedly caused by the medical treatment of the accident injuries. The circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Appellants’ claims as a matter of contract. In light of our interpretation of the contract, Appellants’ other arguments need not be addressed. 7
7.
Appellants’ authorities from other jurisdictions are inapposite. In
Posey v.
Medical Center
–
West, Inc.
,
[¶13.] In their third issue, Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for a continuance to conduct additional discovery before ruling оn the motion for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded that the language of the release was unambiguous and, therefore, that there were no additional facts regarding the parties’ intent that were essential to discover in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. We agree.
[¶14.]
SDCL 15-6-56(f) authorizes a court to order а continuance to permit a
party opposing summary judgment to conduct discovery when necessary to oppose
the motion.
Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Cabela’s.com, Inc.
,
judge who approved the release in the conservatorship. Appellants sought to
discover those individuals’ subjective intent regarding who and what claims were to
be released. However, as already explained, this is a case of сontract
interpretation—a question of law that is based on the language used in the contract
rather than the parties’ subjective belief.
Fenske Media Corp
.,
[¶16.] In their fourth issue, Appellants argue that the conservator court determined the release was only a partial release. Appellants point out that a court approving a minor’s settlement is required to tend to the minor’s best interest. Accordingly, Appellants contend that we must assume the conservator court determined that the release did not apply to future claims. Appellants further contend that the conservator court’s future claim determination is res judicata, precluding the assertion of a release defense in this action. This argument is speculative at best. Courts routinely approve broad,
general releases in settlements not involving full compensation for all injuries sustained. Furthermore, the language of this release leaves no room for future claims. Finally, the circuit court noted that the conservator did not inform the conservator court that the monеy recovered in this settlement and the settlement with the underinsured carrier was not sufficient to fully compensate Appellants or that other defendants may have liability. Under these facts, we will not assume that there was a prior judicial determination barring a release defense.
[¶18.] We affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment. Because we affirm on that issue, we do not address Dr. Miller and YSA’s statute-of-limitations issue raised by notice of review. GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN,
Justices, concur.