101 Tenn. 620 | Tenn. | 1899
The bill in this cause, involving a controversy as to the title of a tract of land in Overton County, was dismissed on the ground of res judicata, raised by demurrer. The averments of the bill, so far as they affect this defense, are that the complainant, Mary C. Gore, then Mary C. Max
The bill further avers that, after answer was filed in that cause, proof was taken and the case was tried, when a decree was entered by the Chancellor, in which it was adjudged that complainant, Mary C, Gore, acquired no title to this land by virtue of the decree for sale and purchase thereunder, heretofore referred to; that the proceedings in that cause were so imperfect “that they failed to divest the title, out of the heirs of said Maxwell and to vest it in” the purchaser; and that, upon
The bill avers that, since this decree of affirmance, and while that case was. pending in the Court below, on procedendo from this Court, complainant, Mary C. Gore, has obtained deed from all the heirs of J. S. Maxwell, deceased, and that, by virtue of these deeds, she is now the owner in fee of the land in question, and the present bill is filed to have established this title. The question then presented is, is she precluded from setting up this after-acquired title by the result of the former litigation? If so, then we will have this anomalous condition: that complainant was defeated in the former suit because she had no title, and is to be defeated now, by reason of the decree in that cause, when she presents, upon the averments of her bill, admitted to be true by demurrer, a paramount legal title, acquired by her since the termination of that cause.
We are aware of no case that would stand as authority for such a result. On the contrary, the rule is that a party will not be prejudiced by a judgment as to rights not then accrued. _ In the language of Mr. Freeman, in Vol. 1, Sec. 329, of his work on Judgments, “Under no circumstances will a judgment or decree take effect upon rights not then existing. If an action is brought to recover possession of real or personal property, the judgment
In Woodbridge v. Bamming, 14 Ohio St., 328, it was held that a devisee was not estopped by a former decree in a partition proceeding to which he was a party defendant, as heir, from setting up title as devisee under a will of the testator, which was revoked, but was afterward restored and admitted to probate, while in Hanley v. Simmons, 102 Ill., 115, it was ruled that a party who fails in an action of ejectment because he has only an equitable title, will not be precluded from a recovery when, having subsequently acquired the legal title to the property, he brings an action of ejectment against the same party for it.
In Barrows v. Kindred, 4 Wall., 399, ejectment was brought to recover land, the title to which was clearly deraigned by the plaintiff from a grant to a remote owner down to a deed to himself from the executor of the immediately preceding owner. This title was confessedly perfect, but the defendant resisted recovery by introducing a former record of an ejectment suit instituted by the same plaintiff against the privy in estate of the defendant, in
It follows that the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals must be reversed and the case will be remanded for an answer.