Gordon v. StateGordon v. State
Gordon was charged, tried, and convicted in the same criminal prosecution of murder in the second degree,1 DWI manslaughter,2 and leaving the scene of an accident with injuries.3 He received separate sentences for each crime.4 Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficiеnt to convict him of second degree murder, and the trial court erred in allowing him to be convicted and sentenced for two homicidеs when there was only one victim. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the jury‘s second degree murder verdict. However, we agree errоr was committed on the second point.
The record shows that both homicide charges arose out of the same factual occurrence. While intoxicated,5 Gordon drove his pickup truck at 2:00 p.m. on a multi-lane highway. He caused a chain reaction cоllision when he rammed into a Datsun automobile in front of his truck. Janet Hexham, the victim, was driving a Corvette in front of the Datsun.
After the Datsun hit her vehicle, Hexham exited her Corvette to assess the damage. Gordon pulled out of the blocked traffic lane into the open one, intending to flee the accident he had caused. Hexham stepped into the open lane and raised her arms as if to flag him down. But Gordоn
The rule in Florida has always been that when there is but one death, there can bе only one conviction for homicide. Brown v. State, 452 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter); Vela v. State, 450 So.2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide); Platt v. State, 449 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter); Johnson v. State, 419 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular manslaughter); Goss v. State, 398 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (premeditated murder and felony murder); Muszynski v. State, 392 So.2d 63 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (second degree murder and first degree murder); Ubelis v. State, 384 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide); Thomas v. State, 380 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (DWI manslaughter and manslaughter by culpable negligence); Brown v. State, 371 So.2d 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (DWI manslaughter and vehicular homicide); Miller v. State, 339 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (DWI manslaughter and manslaughter by culpable negligence); Stricklen v. State, 332 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (DWI manslaughter and manslaughter by culpable negligence); Phillips v. State, 289 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (DWI manslaughter and manslaughter by culpable negligence).
The rationale for the rule was that double jeopardy,
Apparently all we need to do in analyzing double jeopardy in this kind of case is look solely to the statutory elements of each crime. State v. Baker, 456 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1984); Bell v. State, 437 So.2d 1057 (Fla. 1983). If eaсh has a different element not required to prove the other, then there are two separate and distinct crimes for which multiple convictions may be imposed. Apparently it does not matter that both crimes are in fact proved by the same facts (in this case, thе death of the same homicide victim), or that one crime is an included (but not necessarily) lesser offense of the other (old Category IV, Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1968), or current Category II, see Baker).
Based on that analysis, the two crimes in this case are different, and double jeopardy does not bar convictions for both in the same criminal case. Second degree murder is defined as:
The unlawful killing of a human being when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, althоugh without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, shall be murder in the second degree and shall constitutе a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
If, however, damage to property or person of another, other than damage resulting in death of any person, is done by said intoxicated pеrson under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such extent as to deprive him of full possession of his normal faculties, by reason of the operation of any of said vehicles mentioned herein, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as providеd in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and if the death of any human being be caused by the operation of a motor
vehicle by any person while intoxicated, such рerson shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, and on conviction be punished as provided by existing law relating to manslaughter.
In the context of a single prosecution, the United States Constitution provides that these two crimes may be charged and convictions may be obtained for both. Ohio v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). However, it is still not clear whether separate sentences may be imposed for both crimes. The Court said in Johnson:
While the Double Jeopardy Clause may protect a defendant against cumulative punishments for convictions оn the same offense, the Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution.
___ U.S. at ____, 104 S.Ct. at 2541.
The Johnson Court also stated that double jeopardy should be employed by the courts “to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature.” Id. In this regard, our Florida Supreme Court recently held that section 775.021(4)7 only applies to necessarily lesser included offenses. Baker. Therefore, no sentеncing policy of this state would be violated if two sentences were imposed in this case.
Because of the weight of authority in Florida behind the rule barring double homicide convictions for the killing of one victim, and the logic of not allowing double punishment for a lesser (but not necessarily) included offense, Johnson, we hold that Gordon‘s conviction for DWI manslaughter should be vacated.8 However, in view of the need for further clarity of these issues, and their great public importance,
I. IS DWI MANSLAUGHTER A POSSIBLY LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER?
II. DOES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF FLORIDA‘S OR THE UNITED STATES’ CONSTITUTIONS BAR CONVICTIONS FOR BOTH OF THESE CRIMES IN A SINGLE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHERE THERE WAS ONLY ONE HOMICIDE VICTIM?
III. DOES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF FLORIDA‘S OR THE UNITED STATES’ CONSTITUTIONS BAR IMPOSITION OF SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF THESE TWO CRIMES RENDERED IN A SINGLE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, WHERE THERE WAS ONLY ONE HOMICIDE VICTIM?
ORFINGER, J., and BLOUNT, URIEL, Jr., Associate Judge, concur.