Gordon v. Shields

7 Kan. 320 | Kan. | 1871

Lead Opinion

The following opinions were filed:

Brewer, L:

Only this one question is presented in the record: Is a buggy included in the term “ wagon,” as used in the Exemption Law ? The court below found that the vehicle in suit known as a buggy was “not adapted and designed for carrying commodities, but is a single-seated, covered vehicle adapted and designed for carrying persons only.” We think the term wagon a generic one, including as well vehicles for the carriage of persons, as those for the transportation of commodities, and broad enough properly to embrace such a vehicle as the buggy in controversy. But we are constrained to think, after a careful examination of the statute, as well as the decisions of other courts, that the term “wagon” is here used in a limited sense. The statute reads: “ also, “one wagon, cart, or dray; two plows, one drag, and “ other farming utensils, including harness and tackle “ for teams, not exceeding in value three hundred dol- “ lars.” This clause obviously was designed for the protection of the farmer, to secure to him his implements of husbandry. It is doubtless too narrow a construction, to hold tnat the use to which the articles named are-actually put at the time of seizure determines the question of exemption. Whether used on a farm or not, is immaterial. But that the articles should be adapted to the purposes of husbandry seems to be required. “ Other farming utensils,” is the language. “ Nosdiur a soeiis.” Only those wagons which are adapted to farm purposes are exempt. Now a vehicle which is in the language of *326the court below, “ adapted and designed for carrying persons only;” cannot in any true sense be called a “ farming utensil,” is not an implement of husbandry. 19 Wis., 582.

For these reasons the judgment should be affirmed.

Kingman, C. J., concurring.





Concurrence Opinion

Valentine, J.:

I concur with the court that the term “wagon” is a generic term, broad enough to include such a buggy as the one in controversy, and broad enough to include every other species of wagon by whatever other name the same may be called. And I also concur that the kind of wagon mentioned in the sixth subdivision of § 3, ch. 38, Gen. Stat., 1868, p. 474, must be a farming utensil. But I differ with the opinion of the court in this: I believe that the implements mentioned in said subdivision sixth, in order to be exempt from execution, must be actually used as farming implements; that a wagon, plow, etc., in the hands of a lawyer or hardware merchant, would not be exempt; while a wagon of any kind, even a buggy, if used by a farmer as a farming implement, would be exempt while so used. Grimes v. Bryne, 2 Minn., 90, 103, et seq.; Bevitt v. Crandall, 19 Wis., 581, 583.

I am also of the opinion that under subdivision eighth of the said section any teamster “ or other person,” even an insurance agent, as this plaintiff was, may hold a wagon exempt from execution if the same be “ used and kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business,”- as this buggy was. (Knapp v. Bartlett, 23 Wis., 68, explaining Bevitt v. Crandall, supra.) Possibly however the court is not required to examine this latter question, as it was not raised by counsel’s brief.

By the Court:

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.