Gordon v. GordonGordon v. Gordon
Plaintiff wife appeals from portions of a final judgment of the Chancery Division in a separate maintenancе action which ordered defendant husband to pay $25 a week for the support of the adopted infant son of the marriage and denied her counsel fees and costs. The opinion of the court is reported at 139 N.J. Super. 23 (1976).
Following commencement of the action seeking support and maintenance for herself and the infant child of the marriage, plaintiff moved for pendente lite support for herself and the child. The trial judge ordered defendant to pay plaintiff on account of support of the infant child the sum of $25 a week, which payment was to commence with defendаnt‘s receipt of unemployment compensation. The court also ordered defendant to notify plaintiff‘s attorney when defendant became employed, and entered the order without prejudice to an application for modification upon defendant‘s becoming employed. Several months after the entry of this order defendant became employed and notified plaintiff accordingly, submitting a wage fоrm indicating that he was receiving $500, apparently every two weeks. Plaintiff thereupon moved for an increase in child support pendente lite. The trial judge rеserved decision pending final hearing in the action which had been scheduled. However, he authorized plaintiff to spend from escrowed funds $50 а week for child
A final hearing was held, at the conclusion of which the judge ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to maintain an action for separate maintenance under
We find no merit in plaintiff‘s claim that the trial judge should have awarded her counsеl fees and costs. Accordingly,
However, we аre convinced from our study of the record that the award of $25 a week for the support of the infant child of the marriage, assessed against defendant, was inadequate and constituted a mistaken exercise of judicial discretion. At the outset, it is beyond question that the trial judge had jurisdiction to award support for the infant child of the marriage of plaintiff and defendant notwithstanding the fact that he held that plaintiff was not entitled to suрport and maintenance for herself. See Danzi v. Danzi, 142 N.J. Eq. 662, 671 (E. & A. 1948); Sermuks v. Sermuks, 127 N.J. Eq. 364, 365-366 (E. & A. 1940); Koch v. Koch, 95 N.J. Super. 546, 554 (App. Div. 1967); Mowery v. Mowery, 38 N.J. Super. 92, 99-100 (App. Div. 1955), certif. den. 20 N.J. 307 (1956); Rinker v. Rinker, 3 N.J. Super. 251, 255-256 (Ch. Div. 1949); Daly v. Daly, 39 N.J. Super. 117, 122 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1956), aff‘d, 21 N.J. 599 (1956). Note also, Parivash v. Yousef, 89 N.J. Super. 133, 137 (Ch. Div. 1965), aff‘d in part, rev‘d in part, 94 N.J. Super. 403, 408 (App. Div. 1967).
The trial judge should compel a parent to pay such support for his child as the circumstаnces of the parties and the nature of the case renders fit, reasonable and just. The amount of support obviously cannot be determined with absolute precision. Many factors should be taken into consideration in determining what is proper and reasonable for the support of the child. See Mowery v. Mowery, supra, 38 N.J. Super. at 100, 104-105; Krause v. Krause, 26 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (App. Div. 1953). The touchstone always is the welfare of the child.
Here the judge made no findings whatsoever as to what would be a proper and reasonable amount for the support of the infant. He merely ordered defendant to continue to pay the pendente lite award of $25 a week. Plaintiff claimed that she needed $570 a month fоr the infant‘s support. The proofs show that plaintiff was employed full-time
Counsel informed us at oral argument that the parties have filed amended pleadings in their divorce action and that а plenary hearing is presently scheduled in that matter. Consequently, we direct that the issues to be considered on remand be heard simultaneously with the plenary hearing on the divorce. We do not retain jurisdiction.
No counsel fees or costs are awarded to either party on this appeal.