Leon D. Gordon filed a professional negligence action against Dr. Evan Connell, a dentist. Gordon alleged that Connell negligently administered novocaine while performing a dental procedure, thereby injuring his facial and jaw muscles. The district court granted Connell’s motion for summary *771 judgment, finding that Gordon’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In My 1990, while an inmate at the Douglas County Correctional Center in Omaha, Nebraska, Gordon was evaluated by Connell for complaints related to an abscessed tooth on the lower right side of his mouth. Connell was the dentist employed on call with the correctional centеr. Initially, Connell attempted to treat the abscessed tooth with antibiotics, but this treatment failed to reduce the pain. On or about My 20, Connell performed a root canal on the abscessed tooth аnd also filled the tooth next to the abscessed tooth.
The following week, Gordon visited Connell and informed him that he was still having problems with the abscessed tooth. Connell gave Gordon the choice of having the tooth removed or waiting a week in order to see if the pain would subside. Gordon chose to wait a week. When the pain did not subside, Gordon returned to Connell to have the tooth pulled.
While attempting tо numb the gum area so Connell could pull the tooth, Connell administered a shot of novocaine into Gordon’s right jaw. Gordon claims that he immediately felt “something” in his right ear and that when asked if his lip was numb, he replied his liр was not numb, but his right ear, cheek, eye, and temple were numb.
After administering another shot of novocaine, Connell succeeded in numbing Gordon’s jaw and extracted the abscessed tooth, as well as the adjаcent tooth. According to Gordon, Connell explained the extraction of the adjacent tooth by saying that the tooth “looked bad too.”
After Gordon filed a grievance with the Douglas County Depаrtment of Corrections, a grievance hearing was held on August 10, 1990. At the grievance hearing, Gordon complained that he had not given Connell permission to remove the second tooth. Also, he stated that his еar still hurt from the shots that he received for the tooth extraction and that if his ear did not improve, he would seek legal action for both the ear and the tooth.
*772 Gordon filed his second formal grievance on January 16, 1991, in which he claimed that he was continuing to have problems with his ear and stated that he felt that he should have been taken to the hospital when this happened. Furthermore, he stated that “his eаr should’ve been healed by now.”
On August 10, 1992, Gordon filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska against Connell and various Douglas County corrections officials, claiming they violated his civil rights in their treatmеnt of his case. In his complaint, Gordon specifically alleged that Connell was negligent. However, the § 1983 action was subsequently dismissed for lack of proper service of process upon the defеndants.
Gordon was released from prison on October 23, 1992, and was treated by Dr. Michael McDermott on December 8. McDermott diagnosed Gordon as having nerve damage to the face and jaw caused by Connell’s negligent injection of novocaine in July 1990. Subsequently, on March 8, 1993, Gordon filed this action in the district court for Douglas County, alleging that Connell’s negligence caused the damage to his nerves and tissues in his face and ear and caused the resultant pain and suffering.
On April 5, 1994, Connell moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Gordon did not commence his cause of action within the statutory time limit set fоrth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1995) and that the statute was not tolled due to Gordon’s incarceration. The trial court dismissed Gordon’s action with prejudice. Gordon appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper only when the plеadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Zion Wheel Baptist Church
v.
Herzog, ante
p. 352,
In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing thе motion and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
Zion Wheel Baptist Church
v.
Herzog, supra; Kocsis v. Harrison, supra; Bogardi
v.
Bogardi, ante
p. 154,
ANALYSIS
In this appeal, we are asked to decide that either the fact of Gordon’s imprisonmеnt tolled the statute of limitations for professional negligence or the statute of limitations should be no bar, because Gordon alleges that he was unable to “discover” his injuries until such time as he left prison. We begin by noting that this appeal arises in the context of the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose thаt there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Zion Wheel Baptist Church v. Herzog, supra; John Markel Ford v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., supra; Kocsis v. Harrison, supra.
The limitations period for professional negligence actions is provided in § 25-222:
Any action to recover damages based on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering оr failure to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services providing the basis fоr such action; Provided, if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, then the action may be commenced within one year from the dаte of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier; and provided further, that in no event *774 may any action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action.
(Emphasis in original.)
Discovery Provisions of § 25-222
In medical malpractice cases, the period of limitations or repose begins to run when the treatment rendered аfter and relating to the allegedly wrongful act or omission is completed.
Healy v. Langdon,
In the context of statutes of limitations, discovery occurs when the party knows of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursuеd, would lead to the discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action.
Association of Commonwealth Claimants
v.
Moylan,
The point at which a statute of limitations begins to ran must be determined from the facts of each case, and the decision of
*775
the district court on the issue of the statute of limitations normally will not be set aside by an appellate court unless clearly wrong.
Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Universal Surety Co., supra; Central States Resources
v.
First Nat. Bank,
Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gordon, we conclude that the trial сourt was not clearly wrong in finding that Gordon had not filed within the statutorily imposed time limit.
Tolling of Statute Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-213 (Reissue 1995)
Although § 25-222 sets forth the statute of limitations for professional negligence actions, the limitations рeriod may be tolled as set forth in § 25-213 which provides:
Except as provided in sections 76-288 to 76-298, if a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this chapter ... is, at the time the cause of action accmed, within the age of twenty years, a person with a mental disorder, or imprisoned, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within the respective times limited by this chapter after such disability is removed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Gordon argues thаt the district court erred by finding that the statute of limitations set forth under § 25-222 was not tolled by § 25-213. However, this court has previously held that a
*776
showing of a recognizable legal disability, separate from the mere fact of imрrisonment, which prevents a person from protecting his or her rights is required to entitle a prisoner to have the statute of limitations tolled during imprisonment.
Cole
v.
Kilgore,
Gordon does not demonstrate any legal disability separate from the mere fact of his imprisonment. Under our previous holdings, this is insufficient to toll the statutе of limitations.
CONCLUSION
As the statute of limitations was not tolled during the period of Gordon’s incarceration and he did not file within the statutory time period required for professional negligence actions, we find that the district court was correct in concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in this action and that Connell was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Affirmed.