Thе question in this case is whether a state taxpayer has standing to bring a suit in federal court to enjoin a state, its governor, and other executive officers from expending state tax revenues for allegedly unconstitutional purposes. After considering cross-motions with supporting documents, and briefs and oral arguments of counsel, the district court entered judgment dismissing the taxpayer’s action without prejudice. Since we agree that the plaintiff lacks standing, we affirm.
I.
The facts arе not in dispute. During the administration of the defendant Martha Layne Collins, former Governor of Kentucky, Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota) determined to build a large automotive assembly plant in Scott County, Kentucky. As part of negotiations leading to this decision, Kentucky and Toyota entered into a contract by which the Commonwealth agreed to acquire land for the plant and to expend, or make available to Toyota, an amount not exceeding $20,000,000 for site preparation, engineering and improvements. The total cost to the Commonwealth was estimated at $35,000,000, and the improved site was to be conveyed to a designated affiliate of Toyota in fee simple at no cost. In return, Toyota agreed to construct an assembly plant at a cost of approximately $800,000,000 that would employ approximately 3,000 people.
The agreement provided that appropriate legislation would be submitted to thе Kentucky General Assembly authorizing financing of the site acquisition and improvements by the issuance of revenue bonds of the Commonwealth. The agreement contemplated that the revenue bonds would be retired from “incremental taxes,” defined as property taxes on the site, state corpo *914 rate income taxes, state income taxes on employees at the Toyota plant, and other revenues received by the Commonwealth that exceedеd taxes collected by the Commonwealth with respect to the project site in the fiscal year immediately preceding that in which construction of the facility commenced.
The required legislation was adopted by the General Assembly at its regular 1986 session, and the revenue bonds were issued and sold. The legislation provided as a condition precedent to the transfer of land to Toyota that the State Property and Buildings Commission make findings that the project was eсonomically feasible and desirable. This requirement was satisfied by a study which calculated the incremental taxes resulting from the Toyota plant at approximately $13,200,000 per year. Following conveyance of the improved real property, Toyota began construction of the assembly plant.
II.
The plaintiff is not a resident of Kentucky. However, he purchased land in the vicinity of the site in January 1986, when the general location of the Toyota plant was known, and in Mаrch and June 1986. He paid approximately $1200 in taxes on his Scott County property in 1986.
In his complaint, filed on August 17, 1986, plaintiff described the case as “a civil action arising under the Constitution of the United States,” and based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The complaint alleged that the legislation authorizing the financing of the Toyota land purchase and improvements through state revenue bonds “and certain appropriations made for the benefit of Toyota” are unconstitutional as violating Article I, Section 10, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the legislation and appropriations are unconstitutional “on their face,” and a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the legislation and expenditure of any appropriations to amortize or pay debt service on the Toyota revenue bonds.
In connection with the Toyota project the Commonwealth condemned a right of way through а portion of the plaintiffs land. However, the complaint made it clear that the plaintiff does not base this lawsuit on his status as a condemnee, but that he “brings the within action alleging the unconstitutionality of the exercise of the power of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its agencies and officers to tax and spend monies raised by taxation under specific federal constitutional prohibitions, as a taxpayer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.” Later in the comрlaint he identified the constitutional basis of his claim by alleging that the action of the Commonwealth and various officials of the executive branch “amount to the taking of private property through taxation for other than a public purpose.” At oral argument on the motions in the district court, counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that he could not show any actual economic injury in the form of past or probable future tax increases.
III.
Most of the case lаw pertains to standing of federal taxpayers, suing solely in that capacity, to seek injunctions against appropriations and expenditures of federal tax revenues. The seminal decision,
Frothingham v. Mellon,
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a jus-ticiable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law apрlicable to the controversy. It amounts to little more than the negative power to disregard an unconstitutional enactment, which otherwise would stand in the way *915 of the enforcement of a legal right. The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.
Id.
at 488,
The courthouse door remained tightly shut for federal taxpayer suits until the Supreme Court decided
Flast v. Cohen,
The
Flast
Court emphasized that the focus in a standing dispute is on the person seeking to sue in federal cоurt rather than on the issues that person seeks to litigate.
Id.
at 99,
Applying two aspects of a “nexus” test, the Court determined that a federal taxpayer seeking to prevent the expenditure of federal revenues for activities that violate the Establishment Clause does have standing. The first aspect of the nexus test requires the taxpayer to establish a “logical link” between the status of taxpayer and the type оf legislation he seeks to avoid. Under this test “a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taking and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.”
Id.
The second aspect requires the taxpayer to show that the challenged legislation exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed on the taxing and spending powers of Congress, “and not simply that the enactment is generally bеyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.”
Id.
at 103,
*916
Although
Flast v. Cohen
appears to create a fairly narrow exception to the
Froth-ingham
rule, and may apply only to Establishment Clause cases (see concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and Fortas,
More recently the Supreme Court has illustrated the narrowness of the
Flast
exception by finding that even a taxpayer who relied on an asserted violation of the Establishment Clause lacked standing. In
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
The Court then found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the first aspect of the
Flast
test because they attacked an action of the executive branch, not of Congress, and thus did not implicate the taxing and spending power. The Court also found that the plaintiffs had not alleged a sufficiently distinct and palpable injury to confer standing. The Court stated that the plaintiffs had not alleged “an
injury
of
any
kind, economic or otherwise, sufficient to confer standing,” and added that plaintiffs' “claim that the Government has violated the Establishment Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discoveries in federal court. The federal courts were simply not constituted as ombudsmen of the general welfare.”
Id.
at 486-87,
Although not a taxpayer suit,
Allen v. Wright,
Allen v. Wright echoes the concerns expressed by Justice Powell, concurring in United States v. Richardson:
Relaxation of standing requiremеnts is directly related to the expansion of judicial power. It seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter *917 the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. I also believe that repeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative branches of government will not, in the long run, be bеneficial to either. The public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the other branches.
IY.
There are very few decisions concerning standing of state taxpayers to sue in federal court where the Establishment Clause is not an issue. This is not the case with respect to municipal taxpayers. In
Froth-ingham
itself the Court stated thаt an injunction is appropriate to prevent misuse of municipal funds because the interest of a municipal taxpayer in the application of such funds is “direct and immediate.”
But the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in the moneys of the Treasury — partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources — is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.
The administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern. If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be questioned. The bare suggestion of such a result, with its attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain thе conclusion which we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot be maintained.
Id.
at 487,
This court has recognized municipal taxpayer standing in a variety of cases.
E.g., Hawley v. City of Cleveland,
Doremus v. Board of Education,
Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by taxpayer’s action to restrain unconstitutional acts which result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: “The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”
Id. at 434,
The Supreme Court decided one state taxpayer suit not involving the Establishment Clause between
Frothingham
and
Flast.
In
Williams v. Riley,
Frothingham v. Mellon, Sec’y of the Treasury,262 U.S. 447 , 487, 488 [43 S.Ct. 597 , 601,67 L.Ed. 1078 ], announces the applicable doctrine.
“The administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of taxpayers, the еxtent of whose several liability is indefinite and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public and not of inidividual concern.”
The federal courts have no power per se to review and annul acts of state legislatures upon the ground that they conflict with the federal or state constitutions. “That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act.”
Id.
at 80,
V.
We conclude that the requirements for federal taxpayer standing аnnounced in Frothingham control the issue of state taxpayer standing, at least in those cases where violation of the Establishment Clause is not alleged. The rule upholding municipal taxpayer standing appears to rest on the assumption that the relatively small number of taxpayers involved and the close relationship between residents of a municipality and their local government results in a direct and palpable injury whenever tax revenues are misused. Whatever the validity of that assumption with respect to the largest cities today, we believe it has no force when a state is the defendant and the plaintiffs sue as state taxpayers. In order to have standing, a state taxpayer must allege direct and palpable injury with sufficient specificity to meet the “good-faith pocketbook” requirement of Doremus.
We respectfully disagree with the court’s conclusion in
Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi,
We agree with the dissent in Hoohuli. As recent Supreme Court decisions have made clear, the restrictions on federal taxpayer standing prevent unwarranted intrusions by the courts into matters entrusted to the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. This separation of powers concern has a counterpoint which should be considered when a state taxpayer seeks to have a federal court enjoin the appropriation and spending activities of a state government. Considerations of federalism should signal the same caution in these circumstances as concern for preservation of the proper separation of powers in an “all federal” action. Judge Wallace stated our concern quite clearly in his dissenting opinion in Hoohuli:
Doremus requires a state taxpayer plaintiff to demonstrate “a good-faith pocketbook action,”342 U.S. at 434 ,72 S.Ct. at 397 , which appears to parallel the core article III injury-in-fact requirement. See Allen [v. Wright ] [468] U.S. [737] at [750], 104 S.Ct. [3315] at 3324 [82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)]. But when State taxpayers attack state spending in federal court, another major consideration operates: the integrity of our government’s federalist structure. Unnecessary or abstract decisions by federal courts in cases where there is no case or controversy could unduly constrict experimental state welfare legislation and undermine local self-determination.
In his complaint in the present case the plaintiff described the defendant, Commonwealth of Kentucky, as “a sovereign State оf the United States.” Congress has recognized that a state’s power of taxation is a basic attribute of sovereignty by enacting the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). A sovereign must have the authority to determine how tax revenues are to be spent, or the power to tax is illusory. Thus, state sovereignty extends to the total conduct of a state’s fiscal affairs. As the court stated in
Dawson v. Childs,
Under our federalist system, the state governments no less than the federal government possess certain unalienable рowers that the other may not encroach upon. See generally National League of Cities v. Usery,426 U.S. 833 ,96 S.Ct. 2465 ,49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). Of all such areas, the field of state taxation is perhaps the most important. The Supreme Court early recognized the need for judicial restraint in matters involving a state’s fiscal affairs. First National Bank v. Board of County Commissioners,264 U.S. 450 ,44 S.Ct. 385 ,68 L.Ed. 784 (1924).
In this case the plaintiff presented a generalized claim of injury, admitting that he was neither threatened with nor had suffered a direct and individual injury not shared by all taxpayers of Kentucky. His allegations were not sufficient to permit him to pursue a federal court injunction. Whatever the merits of his claim, and their justiciability in a state forum, he lacks standing to bring this action.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
