Lead Opinion
OPINION
Appellant, Gordon R. Goss, appeals the trial court’s grant of the plea to the jurisdiction filed by appellee, the City of Houston (“the City”). The appeal arises from the dismissal of Goss’s claims for violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), conspiracy to violate the TCHRA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In four issues, Goss argues the trial court erred by: (1) ordering the case to be dismissed when certain claims were still before the trial court; (2) granting more relief than requested by the City; (3) improperly dismissing his claims with prejudice; and (4) determining that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Background
Goss’s claims arise out of complaints he filed with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), one filed on April 13, 2006 and one filed on January 8, 2007 and amended on July 3, 2007. On April 13, 2009, the EEOC notified Goss and his attorney in two separate determinations that it believed the City had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The determinations made no refer
Goss filed suit on February 26, 2010, asserting claims under the TCHRA and intentional torts. He did not include any federal claims. After the City filed its plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, however, Goss filed an amended petition asserting federal claims under Title VII. He did not serve this petition on the City until July 21, 2010, over a month after the June 4, 2010 hearing on the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, and a month after the trial court’s June 21, 2010 order dismissing Goss’s suit with prejudice.
Statute of Limitations
In his third issue, Goss argues the trial court erred by granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on the statute of limitations because equitable tolling applies. The City responds that statutory requirements, including limitations periods, are jurisdictional in suits against the City and that the equitable tolling doctrine does not apply. We agree with the City.
The TCHRA provides that a plaintiff who seeks redress under that Act must file suit within two years of the date he filed his complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission. Tex. LaboR Code Ann. § 21.256 (Vernon 2006); see City of Houston v. Fletcher,
The City argues that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional in a suit against a governmental entity and, therefore, because Goss brought his TCHRA suit after limitations had run, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the suit with prejudice. To support its argument, the City relies on Government Code section 311.034, a Texas Supreme Court case, and an opinion from the El Paso Court of Appeals. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (Vernon Supp. 2012); In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
Prior to Prairie View A&M, the El Paso Court of Appeals had held that compliance with the statute of limitations in Labor Code section 21.256 was not only a mandatory statutory prerequisite to bringing suit under the TCHRA but was also jurisdictional when the defendant is a governmental entity. Alspini,
[w]hile the Legislature could make the Labor Code filing deadlines jurisdictional, as it has in cases involving statutory requirements relating to governmental entities, see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (providing that “statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity”), it has not done so here.
Id. at 308.
Citing the foregoing statement in United Services, the Alspini court held that compliance with the statute of limitations for an employment discrimination claim under the TCHRA set out in Labor Code section 21.256 was a mandatory statutory prerequisite to bringing suit under the TCHRA against a governmental entity and was jurisdictional. Alspini,
We agree with the Alspini court that, in United Services, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the TCHRA and Government Code section 311.034 were both intended by the Legislature to have effect and that the express intent of section 311.034 is to make statutory prerequisites to suit jurisdictional in suits brought against governmental entities, including the mandatory, but otherwise non-jurisdictional, statutory limita
In accordance with the foregoing authority, we hold that the TCHRA’s statutory limitations period is jurisdictional under Government Code section 311.034. Accordingly, we hold that compliance with the statute of limitations in the TCHRA is a statutory prerequisite to filing suit under that statute against a governmental entity. Goss filed this litigation well outside the statutory limitations period. Failure to comply with a jurisdictional requirement for suit against a government entity deprives the trial court of power to act, other than to determine that it lacks jurisdiction. Little v. Tex. Bd. of Law Examiners,
Equitable Tolling
In his fourth issue, Goss argues that the trial court erred by granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction based on the statute of limitations because equitable tolling applies to toll both his claims under the TCHRA, which are subject to the two-year statute of limitations set out in Labor Code section 21.256, and under Title VII. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 21.256. Goss asserts two bases for equitable tolling: (1) the EEOC’s failure to process the charge within the limitations period and (2) misrepresentations from an EEOC agent that Goss had to wait for the right to sue letter before filing suit. He argues that the TCHRA is analogous to Title VII, which provides for equitable tolling when a complainant has, as here, filed a “defective pleading” or filed in the wrong forum.
1. TCHRA Claims
Goss’s arguments are based on federal opinions interpreting federal law, namely Title VII. See N. Metal Co. v. United States,
In addition, Title VII lacks a limitations provision parallel to the TCHRA’s provision requiring that suit be filed within two years of the date the claimant filed the administrative complaint. Statutes of limitations, like that in the TCHRA,
operate to prevent the litigation of stale claims; they “afford plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims and protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witness, fading memories, disappearance of document or otherwise. The purpose of a statute of limitation is to establish a point of repose.... ”
Kerlin v. Sauceda,
Thus, while the federal courts have found equitable tolling in certain cases brought under Title VII, the considerations that support such claims in those suits are not present in TCHRA suits. Rather, construing the TCHRA as permitting equitable tolling would contradict the express purpose of Texas’s statutes of limitations and the jurisdictional bar to suit such statutes impose when governmental entities are sued in Texas state courts. Application of the doctrine of equitable tolling in such a case would also undermine the carefully articulated scheme set out by the Legislature for the equitable resolution of employment discrimination claims. Accordingly, we hold that the equitable tolling doctrine does not apply to claims brought against governmental entities under the TCHRA.
2. Title VII Claims
Goss also asserts that he was “misled” by the EEOC and that, therefore, under federal law, his Title VII claims “relate back” to the date he filed his TCHRA claims. We disagree.
Texas’s “relation back” doctrine is set out in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.068, which provides:
If a filed pleading relates to a cause of action, cross action, counterclaim, or defense that is not subject to a plea of limitation when the pleading is filed, a subsequent amendment or supplement to the pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment or supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.068 (Vernon 2008). Texas courts apply a two-pronged test to determine whether an
Under section 16.068, a claim asserted in an amended petition which is related to the same transaction that is the subject of an original petition is time-barred if the claim made in the original petition is itself time-barred. See SJW Prop. Commerce, Inc. v. Sw. Pinnacle Props., Inc.,
We hold that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both Goss’s TCHRA claim and his Title VII claim.
Dismissal with Prejudice
In his third issue, Goss argues that the City’s plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted without prejudice. “A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Harris Cnty. v. Sykes,
Here, the evidence establishes that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Goss’s claims because the statute of limitations in Labor Code section 21.256 barred his TCHRA claims; Government Code section 311.034 made the statute of limitations jurisdictional as to Goss’s claims against the City, a governmental entity; and Goss’s Title VII claim did not relate back to the original date of filing of Goss’s TCHRA time-barred suit so as to create jurisdiction where none otherwise existed. Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing Goss’s suit with prejudice.
We overrule Goss’s third issue.
Granting Greater Relief
In his first two issues, Goss argues that, by dismissing his Title VII claims, the trial court erroneously granted greater relief than the City had requested. He alleges, “The City’s plea to the jurisdiction does not defeat Goss’ federal claims because the City failed to seek such relief in its April 30, 2010 filing.” He contends, “It is axiomatic that a party may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding.”
Goss confuses a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment. Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of the courts to decide a case. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
To establish subject matter jurisdiction, a party must allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause of action. Miranda,
We have held, on the basis of the pleadings, that, because Goss failed to comply with a jurisdictional requirement for filing this suit against the City under the TCHRA, the trial court had no power to act other than to determine that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that claim. See Little,
Thus, the trial court could not properly have taken any action on Goss’s suit other than to enter its final order of dismissal with prejudice.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order granting the City of Houston’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case with prejudice.
HIGLEY, J., dissenting.
Notes
. Goss identifies two issues in his statement of the issues. In his argument section, Goss identifies four sub-issues for the first issue. Goss’s second issue re-argues matters raised in his first issue. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion, we treat the four sub-issues in his first issue as the issues to consider on appeal.
. The dissent also addresses the issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to show that Goss did not timely serve his amended petition containing the Title VII claim. We need not resolve this issue, as we have already concluded that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In his first two issues, Goss argues that the trial court erred by granting the City of Houston greater relief than it had requested by dismissing his Title VII claims. Because the trial court improperly disposed of Goss’s federal claims, I respectfully dissent.
The parties dispute whether the trial court disposed of Goss’s federal Title VII claims in the June 21 order or in the August 25 order. The City of Houston’s plea to the jurisdiction was set for a hearing on June 4, 2010. At the time that the City of Houston filed its plea to the jurisdiction, Goss had only asserted his state TCHRA claims. Accordingly, the City of Houston only sought dismissal of those claims.
Seven days before the June 4 hearing, Goss filed an amended petition, asserting new claims under Title VII. The June 21 order recognized that the City of Houston’s plea to the jurisdiction was based on Goss’s original petition, which only asserted the TCHRA claims. It ordered, however, “that ... Goss’[s] suit against Defendant City of Houston, and each and every claim asserted in the Original Petition is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
Focusing on the fact that the order only specifically dismissed his claims asserted in his original petition, which did not include his Title VII claims, Goss argued in his motion for reconsideration that the trial court had not dismissed his Title VII claims. Accordingly, Goss argued, the “Court record” had improperly designated the entire case as dismissed. He also argued in his motion that the TCHRA claims should be reinstated.
A hearing on the motion for reconsideration was set for August 16. Four days (two business days) before the hearing, the City of Houston filed its response. The City of Houston argued that the amended petition had no effect because it had never been served a copy of the pleading. It also included in its response a new plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) Goss’s amended petition asserting Title VII claims was not filed within 90 days of his right to sue letter; (2) the amended petition does not relate back to the original petition; (3) tolling does not apply; and (4) the City of Houston was immune from suit for intentional torts.
There is no indication that the City of Houston attempted to set its motions for the August 16 hearing date secured by Goss. Nevertheless, it did submit proposed orders to the trial court (1) denying Goss’s motion for reconsideration, (2) granting its
On August 25, the trial court signed only one of those proposed orders: the order denying Goss’s motion for reconsideration. It explicitly stated that the motion for reconsideration was denied. It also ordered “that ... Goss’[s] suit against Defendant City of Houston, and each and every claim asserted in this cause, is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
It is not necessary to resolve which order disposed of Goss’s Title VII claims because I would hold that it was error to have dismissed them regardless of which order actually dismissed them.
The City of Houston’s original plea to the jurisdiction only sought dismissal of Goss’s TCHRA claims. Assuming without deciding that the June 21 order also disposed of the Title VII claims, the trial court gave the City of Houston greater relief than what it sought. It is reversible error for a trial court to grant the moving party more relief than it is entitled to. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.,
Neither do we have to decide whether the Aug. 25 order disposed of the Title VII claims, because the error remains. The City of Houston argues that Goss, in his motion for reconsideration, “expressly asked the trial court to consider the new claims asserted in the Amended Petition.” I disagree. Goss simply explained in his motion that his Title VII claims had not been adjudicated. Nowhere in his motion, however, did he actually ask the trial court to dispose of them. His prayer for relief only asked the trial court to reinstate the claims it had previously dismissed.
While the City of Houston included in its response to Goss’s motion for reconsideration another plea to the jurisdiction as well a motion for summary judgment on Goss’s Title VII claims, it never set these for consideration for the hearing that was two business days away or for any other hearing. Indeed, trying to set them for the hearing two business days away would have been improper. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 21 (requiring motions and notices of hearings to be served on opposing party not less than three days before hearing), 166a(c) (requiring motion for summary judgment to be served on opposing party at least 21 days before hearing). Moreover, the trial court only signed the order denying Goss’s motion for reconsideration without ruling on the City of Houston’s second plea to the jurisdiction or motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the record indicates that no motion or other plea was properly before the trial court to allow it to rule on the propriety of Goss’s Title VII claims.
The City of Houston argues on appeal that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Title VII claims and, accordingly, could consider the issue sua sponte. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape,
Finally, the City of Houston argues that, because it never received notice of the amended petition, the amended petition was not properly filed with the trial court at least seven days before the June 4 hearing on its first motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the City of Houston argues, the live petition at the time of the June 21 order was the original petition, and the June 21 order disposed of all claims and parties. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 63 (prohibiting amendment of pleading within seven days of trial); Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
There is no evidence in the record, however, showing that the City of Houston was not served. “A certificate by ... an attorney of record ... showing service of a notice shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of service.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 21a. This rule sets up a presumption that notice was duly received by the addressee. Cliff v. Huggins,
Goss included a certificate of service with his amended petition, stating that the City of Houston had been served with a copy of the amended petition. The City of Houston did not present any offer of proof, however, to establish that it was not served with the amended petition. As a result, the presumption stands. See id. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record to show that the amended pleading was not properly filed or that it did not supersede the original petition.
The conclusion from this analysis is that the trial court erred by dismissing Goss’s Title VII claims when the claims were never properly before the trial court. I would sustain Goss’s first two issues.
. To be clear, because the viability of Goss's Title VII claims was never before the trial court, it cannot be considered on appeal. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
. Section 311.034 of the Texas Government Code does not apply in this circumstance, because it does not apply to federal statutes. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann § 311.002 (Vernon 2005) (applying chapter 311 to certain codes, statutes, and rules adopted under codes that were enacted by Texas Legislature).
. The City of Houston filed a motion for summary judgment along with its first plea to the jurisdiction, raising the same arguments in each filing.