*1 382 596
GORDON GROSSMAN BUILDING COMPANY v. ELLIOTT.
Opinion of the Court. Appeal 1. Review able —Failure to Raise a Questions Error — Question. question Ap-
Failure to raise a the trial eourt or Court of peals generally Supreme considering preeludes the Court from appeal. it on 2. Vendor and Purchaser —Land Contract —Foreclosure—Re- demption.
The vendee of a land eontraet whieh has been foreclosed has 3 premises months from the time of sale to redeem the entire by paying purchaser, executor, administrator, assigns, his or or purchaser, of deeds for benefit of the sum plus bid at the sale interest the time of sale at the rate per (MCLA 600.3140). cent borne the land contract § -Foreclosure—Redemption—Statutes. 3. Same — meaning The Court plain must follow the clear and pertaining statute a land from foreclosure of any eontraet absence unusual circumstance or addi- tional consideration not within the ambit of the statute (MCLA 600.3140). § Foreclosure—Redemption—Fraud—Equity. 4. Same — frequently court as Fraud is addressed to the conscience exception general right an to redeem under rule that [2-9] [4] [1] Redemption vendor’s lien contract after 55 Am 5 Am Jur 55 Am Jur, Jur, References rights 2d, Appeal Vendor Vendor and Purchaser or foreclosure sale or foreclosure decree rights, of vendee and Purchaser and Error for Points ALR2d defaulting § 545. in Headnotes § 672. § 461. under executory enforcing land sale Co. v. right legal is a which can neither be statute foreclosure however, courts; abridged to succeed as enlarged nor proved and con- defense, fraud must be clear equitable attorneys hence, parties’ evidence; where the come vincing *2 redemption negotiations for but no fraud is impasse in admits the issue of fraud record and defendant from the shown ease, is no act of fraud which part of his there a was never 600.3140). equity (MCLA of justify the intervention § would Bedemption Foreclosure—Eight of —Inaction—Belin- 5. Same — quishment. intentionally relin- from foreclosure is right redemption The of expiration a week before quished was aware where defendant statutory of period that unless one the redemption followed, right redemption to redemption was the of methods right nothing preserve the to expire, and defendant did would (MCLA 600.3140). redemption of § Dissenting Opinion.
Kelly JJ. and Bedemption—Stat- and Purchaser —Land Contract — 6. Vendor utes. claiming lawfully person vendee a land contract or of may premises entire sold him redeem the foreclosure from purchaser by paying or his suc- the within 3 months sale of the sum which deeds cessor in interest or of sale, payment and bid with interest the time after from of (MCLA 600.3140). the deed sale is void § of Same-Mortgage Foreclosure—Bedemption—Land Contract— — Legal Equitable Title. Title — legal mortgage redemption and causes the Foreclosure and aof mortgagor, equitable property be title to the to restored upon a land contract but and of foreclosure extinguished by equitable proceed- title is vendee’s foreclosure ings by purchaser upon redemption and a vendee the deed to legal void, title to at sale would be but foreclosure the vendor still stand in the name of extinguished contract, the land whose action has foreclosure becoming resulting merged equitable in the title vendee legal 600.3140). (MCLA with the title the vendor § 59(1. [Noy. Mic.ir. ' Foreclosure—Redemption—Warranty 'Contract —
8. Same —Land Equity. Deed — redeeming property Agreement sold on land as to method of subsequently where is established eontraet and foreclosed redemp- procedure attorney’s statement, that a vendees’ for agreed upori telephone in a .conversation the land was tion of by attorney, a letter is substantiated vendor’s from day attorney, attorney the same dated to vendor’s vendees’ warranty by pre- conversation, telephone attorney to vendor’s at- pared -vendees’ forwarded vendor, attorney torney where did vendor’s. execution for agreement deny immediately repudiate reached or the letter con- when he received conversation executed; thus, equity, warranty deed to be firmation warranty deed to the vendee. must execute a vendor ' Redemption—Equity—Jurisdiction—Specific Perform 9. Same — Agreement Execute Deed. ance of warranty deed, compel execute vendor to Vendees’ motion subsequent expiration period filed attorneys agreement sale, pursuant between foreclosure prior parties entered into respective which had been *3 proceeding redemption, expiration period as a is treated n - jurisdiction judge en- chancery had which the circuit 600.S140). agreement (MCLA § force 1. See Headnote Appeals,
Appeal H. 2,'J. Division Court McGregor, Fitzgerald'and JJ., J., P. Grillis, I.), (Halford affirming Sub- Clair, Streeter St. (Calendar May No. 16, No. Docket mitted 1969. 7, 52,086.) 1969. 3, Decided November App reversed. 620,
11 Micb Grossman.-Building(cid:127). by (cid:127)Complaint Com- Gordon corporation, against Michigan pany, Jeannine a land foreclosure' of F. Elliott for Elliott and John Judgment rendered of foreclosure .contract. Motion field. sale foreclosure defendant'Jean- requiring plaintiff to execute for order Elliott nine Building Grossman Go. v. compliance with the terms of contract. a deed appealed granted. to the Court Plaintiff Motion appeals. Appeals. Reversed Affirmed. Plaintiff of and remanded. Weingarten (Peter $
Hertsberg, Kennedy Jacob, plaintiff. counsel), for Nathan, of A. Mugan, Oppliger Simpson, for & de-
McIntosh, fendant. n plaintiff- May 1959, J. On T. M. Kavanagh, Company,
appellant as Gordon with defendants a land contract vendor, entered into husband, Elliott, her John Elliott and Jeannine township covering in the a house and lot vendees, county, Michigan, for the Clair Burtchville, of sale St. pay- price defaulted in Defendants $11,750. plaintiff foreclosure of the instituted ments and judgment A of fore- in circuit court. land contract finding 10, 1966, entered on November closure was plus on the land contract $8,591.63due a balance of ordering property be taxed and costs to be court commissioner. a circuit sold plaintiff 1966, and the December on was sold to February the trial court was confirmed sale appeal this order. The was taken from No 3, 1967. expired' statutory period on March ' .... 30, attorneys wrote 16, 1967, Mrs. Elliott’s March On stating: attorneys plaintiff’s “Confirming March conversation our warranty *4 you forwarding to 1967 we are representative proper be executed to you Company. Elliotts know, As property purchaser and loan. the approved for have found . Michigan Bank has National Opinion op the Court. will “However, we need the deed from Grossman to Elliott order to consummate this transaction. have received a title We commitment from the local company indicating title on a Association of Port that there is a balance due mortgage Savings at Citizens Federal & Loan Huron, wherein the Grossman Company mortgagor. is the copy requesting of this letter am “With Mr. George Michigan [sic] of LeVine National Bank they approved to confirm, letter, a loan purchasers, for the andMr. Mrs. Ritz, Robert A. you your and that the balance will forward to for client owing as a result of the foreclosure sale. your Pursuant to letter of March 9, 1967 the total amount due for as March 10, 1967 is per $9,299.91 day $1.51 interest due after that date. directly “Please forward the executed deed to Mr. [sic] LeVine at the bank with directions that he be pay directly authorized to the balance to Citizens discharge mortgage remit the balance you your [sic] client. Mr. LeVine will not deliver the deed until such time as he makes dis- you bursement to and Citizens. appreciate you “I expedite would it if
matter, know, the drawing problems Please any advise if there are near. con- cerning this matter.” mortgage department On March 1967, the Michigan plain- National Bank wrote a letter to attorneys stating: tiff’s response your “In Simp- letter from McIntosh, Oppliger Mugan
son, of March 16th, 1967, this Michigan is to confirm that the National Bank has approved the loan to Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. Ritz purchase John Jeannine Elliott located at 3293 Drive, Water Port Huron, Blue Michigan.” *5 Building 601 Co. v. Grossman op Opinion the Court. attorneys Jacob, of Mr. one 23,1967, Oil March Company plaintiff advised attorneys as follows: Elliott’s Jeannine defendant going send the deed. not to are clients “Our As we would. far as never said Mr. Nathan it.” that’s concerned, are period April of after the 7, 1967,
On expired, motion in circuit Elliott filed a had Mrs. seeking requiring plaintiff execute to an order court comply warranty all the terms deed with plaintiff require sought of the contract. She complete abstract title tax her deliver to conveyance. history to date of certified required saying it was answered, Plaintiff expiration place re- after the deed in escrow demption period. April an order court entered 17,1967,
On trial providing part: * * * plaintiff hereby “It ordered that warranty deed in fulfillment execute valid May 26, 1959, dated
terms of a certain land contract plaintiff comply all of said said terms and that para- provisions including contract, contained graph No. 7 in said contract. plaintiff “It is further ordered said execute provisions comply said deed and with all forthwith.” Appeals. appealed Plaintiff the Court of order affirmedin a trial court was unanimous opinion. App appeal to this Mich 620. Leave to plaintiff September granted 1968. Court 381 Mich 773.
The two in this are: issues Court (1) requiring trial court’s order "Was the warranty improper? vendor to execute a proceedings (2) be- void Were foreclosure description improper cause court of an in the circuit 382 op the Court. report of sale, commissioner’s notice deed, sale?
Disposing of the issue, latter the record discloses passed upon by the-issue was never raised or Appeals. trial court or the Court of The failure question precludes, to raise a in the lower court *6 general Supreme considering a- on the rule, Court
appeal. Young (1960), See v. Morrall 359 Mich 180, 187, See, also, and cases therein cited. Krautmer (1963), Kinsella 98, 100; v. v. General 369 Mich Therrian (1964), Laboratories, Inc. 487, 372 Mich Magreta (On 490; v. Ambassador Co. Steel Rehear ing, 1968), 380 Mich 513,
Turning only really to the Court, issue before this recognize pertaining redemption we the statute1 part: from foreclosure, which reads in “The vendee of a land contract, heirs, his execu- any person lawfully tors, administrators, or claim- ing may from him or under or them redeem the premises entire within 3 sold months from the time by paying purchaser, of the sale the executors, his assigns register administrators, or toor the deeds of deposited pro- in whose the deed sale is office of pur- vided the court rules, the benefit of chaser, the sum which was bid with interest per the time the sale at the rate cent borne of paid land contract. In case the sum is paid deeds the sum of shall $5.00 be to him as-a custody fee for care and of the money. paid After these sums have been the oí sale is void and of any no effect, but in case dis-' parcel tinct separately lot or sold is redeemed, leav- pp 259, 260. will be ment, MCLA 600,3101, pp 48, 49, the closure § 27A.3140]). 1 PA PA legal 1963,. 1961, treated as of a land distinction between No 240 No § Note tliat 236, equally applicable contract, (MCLA § to a and the authorities effective § foreclosure of a 600.3140 large Stat Ann 1962 to both. See Committee Com extent January 1, 1963, [Stat this statute Ann mortgage hereinafter Bev [1969] as amended [8] Cum eliminated and fore 27A.3101, Supp cited 603 1969] Co. op the Court. premises unredeemed, then the portion ing portion merely inoperative as to is sale deed of premises portions redeemed, are which or portions valid and it remains not redeemed added.) (Emphasis full effect.” specifically period set at 3 is redemp- procedure properly effect months and the clearly spelled period out. Absent tion within this consider- additional some unusual circumstances or this Court statute, not within the ambit of ations plain meaning the clear and must follow statute. right accept general to re- rule that the as a
We legal right present deem under statutes is abridged enlarged the courts. can neither be nor George (1933), Mich Detroit Trust Co. v. See (1929), Drysdale Christy Land Co. v. P. J. 362; Mich 184. (1919), 205 Mich In Wood v. Button redeeming mortgagor holding within Court, required statutory period reimburse was not *7 paid, purchaser for taxes at the foreclosure sale (p 703): stated opinion, presented my is not one “In the case general equities. upon of some notion determined
be
upon
parties
right
the law.
to stand
The
right
Dunlap (1918), Mich
The
v.
203
602.
Carlisle
legal right,
law a
to redeem
at
is
from foreclosure
enlarged
statute,
is
and can neither be
created
complete
abridged by courts. A
is
nor
ivhen one
proper
having
right
pays in
redeem
proper
(Emphasis added.)
person.”
time, to a
departure
general
Any
ad
rule must be
from this
which under
court,
dressed to the conscience of the
prior
prior practice
in
nature
and
statutes
McCreery
(1915),
equity.
of
in
v.
a bill
See
Roff
urged
ground
ex-
as an
The usual
In Marble Butter v. plaintiff, paid having over contract land 90% obligation, attempted by securing to redeem a mort- gage pay the entire and balance due tendered purchaser, upon the full sum to the latter’s deposited refusal the amount due with the clerk the court. The in Court Marble further noted, as original unusual circumstances, that one land the join executing contract vendees refused mortgage defendant-purchaser and that refused to provide disclose the amount still due and refused to property. Reversing abstract of the the lower plaintiff’s equity— court, which dismissed bill in day praying filed the last compel join court the executing mortgage the land contract vendee to court in Marble stated —this (pp 280) : frequently person “This court has relieved ready willing a harsh forfeiture where he is payment, very make and where there are un- full appeal usual circumstances which to the conscience party seeking the court, and where the to enforce everything will receive to which he forfeiture entitled, would have been under his contract had right there been no forfeiture. This to redeem, as sought supplemental in the amended or bill of complaint, rests the sound discretion of the court.” (Emphasis added.) supra, In Palmer Palmer, the facts of the case compelled opposite this Court to reach the con- *8 plaintiff-wife alleged clusion. There the de- that fendant-purchaser and defendant-husband, who Co. v. Court. conspired prevent mortgagor, her defaulting a dilatory by practicing redeeming and fraud from reviewing proofs, stated her Court, This tactics. 81): (pp justify the conclusion seem
“The authorities
to refrain
been induced
owner has
where the
that,
repre-
redeeming
and
conduct
fraudulent
interpose
grant
equity
relief.
will
sentations,
(7th ed),
Mortgages
pCyc,
1847; 2
See 27
p
is of that
Jones
(1887),
This
The defendant in us the instant case would have pleaded falling her view facts and circumstances as supra. Marble, within the decision in But we can- single not find the record before statement us alleges plaintiff practiced any which fraud. argument In defendant before this fact, oral candidly Court “never was admitted that the issue of fraud being part of this case nor was it argued before this Court.”
Granting every presumption integ- defendant rity good only we can view take of faith, negotiations the facts of this case is that the between parties’ impasse. attorneys an came to How- ever, this situation does not amount to act justify equity. fraud which would the intervention of e.g., (1942), Mich To Kaiser Weber See, *9 . 382 Míen
606 59G. op Opinion the Court. dangerous precedent hold otherwise would set deprive every pur- which would title to real estate finality security chased at foreclosure sale of the clearly intended under the statute.2 fully note, in addition,
We that defendant was expiration aware at least one week before the of the redemption period, that unless she followed of one statutory redemption of methods her nothing preserve would be lost. Yet she did her right expired. of until after it had Con cluding intentionally relinquished that defendant right redemption, regrettable her of we adhere, may precedential authority be, and reason ing Pappas (1922), of this Court Harr ah v. 221 463): (p Mich where it 460, was stated establishing any agree- “The record falls short of plaintiffs justifying paying ment or assurance no further attention to the .in , period redemption. against With the suits determined them and the right expire, plaintiffs about to should have tendered the amounts due the con- tracts.' The failure to make such tender is not ex- assumption cused that defendant would not rights. import insist on his strict We would into litigious the law an unsafe and element if we should perform, ability hold an offer to ac- so, do complishes purpose tender, of a or constitutes ground equitable for relief.” To summarize, we can find no element of fraud justify equitable in this case which relief granted by the trial court in the instant case. Pal- supra. mer equitable Palmer, v. Absent consider- plain operation ations, the intent and of the statute literally must be followed. Union Trust Co. v. § 600.3130 [2] PA [Stat No Ann 1962 236, § 3130, Rev effective §27A.3130]). January [1963] (MCLA v. Co. op the Coubt. Pappas (1928), 451; Co. Trust Detroit supra. Harrah, ques- not discuss above, we do of the
In view Appeals. upon the Court of relied tion tender Appeals Court of' the The decision reversed and the are judgment trial court entry trial court remanded to cause Plaintiff-appellant shall of dismissal. order *10 of this Court. costs and T. G. J.,C.
T. E. Dethmers Brennan, M. J. with T. JJ., Kavanagh, concurred Kavanagh, (dissenting). con- we are The statute Adams, J. (MCLA [Stat § 600.3140 in this case with cerned part Supp 27A.3140]), § reads in as Arm 1969 Cum follows: heirs, execu- contract, his of a land “The vendee lawfully any person claim- administrators, or tors, ing may the redeem him them or under or from premises the time 3 from within months sold entire purchaser, by paying executors, his the to the sale of assigns register of deeds or the administrators, or deposited pro- is ‘as deed of sale officethe whose the'pur- of rules, for the benefit in the court vided interest was bid with the sum which chaser, per cent borne the at the rate the sale time of * * * After these sums land contract.
the been paid effect, is and of no of sale void the deed any parcel separatély sold distinct lot or case but in is portion premises leaving un- of the redeemed, inoperative merely of sale is redeemed, then the premises portion portions which the or portions are redeemed it redeemed, not (Emphasis valid and full remains of effect.” added.) redemption— provides The of statute two methods * * * “by (2) (1) paying purchaser ,” the or paying of deeds.” The statute “to the Dissenting Opinion redemption upon first deals with foreclosure of a mortgage proceeds quoted and then with the above provision pertaining land con- attempts statute then tract foreclosure. The to deal legal property status the title to the the upon redemption by providing that the deed of sale consequence no is void and of effect. provision, upon foreclosure and of a mortgage, legal equitable would be to restore the property mortgagor. title back to the How- ever, vendee under land contract, position mortgagor. only same as a A vendee has equitable extinguished by title which is virtue of proceedings. pro- the foreclosure Under the above upon redemption by vision of statute, a vendee, purchaser the deed to the at foreclosure sale to legal would be void but the title , would still stand the name the vendor whose extinguished foreclosure action con- has land equitable resulting in tract title of the vendee becoming merged legal with the title vendor. strange legis- result This comes about because the separate legislation *11 lature failed to enact land contract foreclosures. attorneys hereinafter,
As will be seen the for the fully problem pre- parties cognizant of the were attempted deal sented the statute and to with it negotiations. in their hearing April 17, on the held 1967 before the
At compel judge plain- circuit on defendants’ motion to following colloquy the deed, tiff to execute took place: any telephone “The Court: Did calls attorneys?
with the Mugan: March “Mr. Yes. On 16th with Mr. in Nathan, witii Mr. courtroom, who is and on March 23d partners. one his Jacob, 1969] Co. Dissenting Nathan Mr. I informed 16th, March “On np a letter it followed transaction, entire read into like to 16th which March of record. age’s opinion for [See T. M. Ka Justice van 600.] pp 599, letter, confirming our 16th March letter of “After we had no 16th telephone of March conversation attorneys Mrs. Elliott contacted until from word they March anxious because were and said me approaching. date 30th you explain to them in Did “The Court: prior letter? to this conversation explained Mugan: Mr. Nathan Yes, “Mr. exactly the letter. contents of say? did he What “The Court: “Mr. Mugan: the deed down and said, He ‘Send say definitely get did not He will it executed.’ we he ‘I don’t effect, see but, it back would send ” problem.’ any April hearing 17,1967, At the conclusion judge observed: the circuit practice. “Everybody common business knows go on. The let that be fraudulent to
think it would first and it is the I forfeitures, favor court does not years my experience heard of 34 have ever time refusing anybody forward a deed to bank money available. It looks when have the faith.” a case of bad me like attorneys Upon argument Mugan Court, before this oral opportunity given were
Nathan of March their versions of conversation state quote argument rule oral not as a usual we do While opinions the attor- since, effect, of this Court neys engaged were allowed in this matter who professional toas to this Court statements make excerpts following pertinent place, the what took argument forth: are set the oral *12 Dissenting Opinion rep- My I Peter Nathan. name Nathan: “Mr. Company, which resent Gordon Grossman is appellant plaintiff this cause. in expiration days prior to the 20,1967,10 March “On redemption, plain- statutory period of of the being myself, attorney, a received letter tiff’s appellee’s attorney, whereby appellee’s at- pur- torney appellee a had found that the stated requested appellant premises and chaser for the warranty put it into escrow execute a deed and Michigan Bank. with the National you question ask a with “From Bench: Let me paragraph, Noting to that letter. the first reference ‘Confirming in it our tele- sentence, first phone indicates: forwarding March we conversation of are you warranty a a deed.’ Had he had you agree- had there been conversation regard ment between to it? “Mr. Honor, Nathan: Your we had had a tele- phone discussed, conversation. had I think, We
previous I him letter where had advised of the necessary pay amount off the land contract. I told them at that I time, and believe the conversa- tion of March we would submit a deed. that if he would tender the funds,
I had told them at that necessary time that I did not think a deed was Ibut problem way understand the foreclosure statute land contracts, statute, problem raised I will discuss, which and told him if he tendered funds would submit a deed although necessary. I did not think it was He then sent the letter which received on-March 20 and any just the letter did not have funds in it. It asked Michigan me to execute deed and send it to the National Bank. any agree-
“From The Bench: didn’t You putting there ment, then, about the deed trust or anything of that kind? “A. sir. No, *13 Co. v. Grossman Dissenting Opinion by J. you if he him that And told The Bench: “From only send the if he would funds, the send
would you the deed? forward that funds, right. is “A. That you not Nathan, did Bench: Mr. “From The attorney your for the that conversation know from way, expected this handle the matter Elliotts the proposed it? handle that he just that found said had No, he had “A. a purchaser. says: ‘Confirm- hut he "Well, “From The Bench: ing conversation, w.e forwarding are our warranty proper you to be executed the deed Company.’ representative What n you have that? did about conversation had had a conversation —I we remember, “A. As I stating previously the amount him a letter sent necessary called me and it. He had to redeem stated purchaser me to have and he wanted had a that he point maybe prepared at this can so a deed that — problem Of a here. On raise the one land foreclosure in land con of a contract, —as mortgage foreclo of a tract, as in regv deed voided and the the commissioner’s is sure, title makes a note in the chain of deeds ister beep.. grantor-grantee index that there has redemption. mortgage cases, In the 'there is no problem when the commissioner’s because deed—the ap is then the title voided, or sheriff’s deed mortgagor pears land contract In who has redeemed. vendor, situation, the title is in the and party redeeming is the who is the vendee when register of deeds, is made in the title the note appears back in vendor. This, to be think, was - representing of both counsel the confusion ;— exactly why Bench: That is “From The there has be a deed. to' Well, no, Honor, “A. Your that one is our
n arguments. argument that Our the notation- you is sufficient, the the of deeds and if- look at bases a— historical 382 by Adams, Dissenting Opinion let Nathan, “From Excuse Mr. me, Bench: interrupt you, may. if I in— me am interested say you you now were confused counsel for the other side confused about the mechanics. you Did discuss confusion, this this conversation? “A. I did, believe we Your Honor. right. “From The All And did Bench: suggested, understand that the mechanics that were namely, people the by your that a deed would be executed sent bank, and all business, purchaser, whatever rest of the letter, did *14 you understand not in this conversation that these proposed were the mechanics that were to handle closing? this “A. I don’t I did, believe Your Honor, because I only give at I told them that time that would a deed my previous when we received the funds as stated letter. you “From The Yes, Bench: but now were how going according to receive the funds the conver- you sation that had? way, Well, “A. I best think, would have been closing meeting you any to have a like put other situation. But I would not a deed into Appeals says, escrow. I think, as the Court of exigencies put business normal are to a deed in right. escrow. I don’t think that is I haven’t been long. years practicing law that But in the 3 that practicing I have been law and numerous,—
maybe a hundred transactions that I have handled put in the field, real estate I have a never deed into prior closing. meeting escrow at We would a closing and I would tender the deed when I sure, tendered funds and am but I will Mugan. it, not that I made swear this clear to Mr. thing disturbing The The “From Bench: that is suppose very and I me, obvious, that this looks sharp practice you much like where have a con- lawyer. you versation another He sends gather objection I letter which no was made—(cid:127) objection telephone. An “A. on the 1969] Co. Dissenting lay Subsequent to the letter? Bench: The “From sir. Yes, “A. him on the talked to You Bench: The “From letter?
phone he wrote after he called him or either I I think Yes, sir. “A. me and asked he called me I believe me. called I him that would I told was and where the deed in escrow. the deed submit expira- prior to the Was The Bench: “From redemption period? tion of Your Honor. was, it “A. I believe now the 21st of March Well, The Bench: “From you got Did ever talk from the bank. a letter at all? bank got I it Your Honor. 22d, No, I on “A. never— I it is dated Well, mean,
“From Bench: March 21; we received it was dated March Yes,
“A. talk with bank. As 22d; never did remember, I I had talked to the bank sub- didn’t. sequent to that. just goI back for “From The Bench: Could perplexed minute, Mr. am a little bit Nathan? why, you got of March 16 from when the letter *15 Simpson, of March McIntosh & with the other letter you why go along 21 from the refused to with bank, you did have for transaction. What reason objecting to it? mainly objected grounds I “A. that— Well, you “From The it because didn’t Bench: Was trust the bank? trusting No,
“A. it isn’t Your bank, Honor. question they long-*-in The how other is, words, purchaser, question they have a deal, have a and the suppose purchaser carry is, decides not through long sit the deal. How does the deed in the bank? 382 Míos 596. Dissenting Opinion by Adams, J. you very easily “From The Could have Bench:
protected yourself by a letter of transmittal to the bank? Yes, sir,
“A. I could’ve. “From The But if Bench: the bank has indicated you ready you it is close, sent the They apparently protected, over. were weren’t they? protected
“A. We could have ourselves— saying “From I The Bench: am had, the bank at ready saying they that moment; were were if you prior sent the deed over. That was redemption period, wasn’t it? “A. Yes. redemption “From The Bench: When did the
period expire? redemption period expired “A. . on March 30. guess I our we had conversations on the 16th, received this letter on the 20th, received the 22d, bank’s letter on the and think we had another phone conversation between 22d and the time equity very ran out. The statute is clear on how redeem, and told them do necessary, today not feel a deed was I still do not necessary. think that deed is I told them that if moneys paid, he would—if the were I would foi’ward a deed. says, ‘confirming
“From The Well, Bench: our conversation.’ That doesn’t sound like a con- firmation of a conversation. Maybe “A. misunderstandings, there was some n
but I don’t think so. you: “From The Bench: Let’s ask How do transfer that record title from the vendor to the if not vendee deed? “A. I think that the notation deeds is sufficient to transfer the title. In other words, when there is a there was no —if
n foreclosure, just pay-off if there was of the land requires contract and the land contract a transfer *16 Go. Dissenting forfeiture, has a been there Where deed. longer in existence. void. is no It’s contract land You You said forfeiture. The Bench: “From mean foreclosures? sorry. I’m When there foreclosure; I “A. meant longer no a land foreclosure, there is a has been purchaser at the foreclosure is There contract. property subject gets redemption who title sale given by equity which statute date from the of sale. months legal Bench: has the title.
“From The He legal gets title. “A. He right how now, All is that “From The Bench: conveyed equitable legal title holder? title redemption when there is a “A. deed is voided His because— n him, That the title to The Bench: reverts “From would not? vendor, Except has that there that is a notation “A. there agree, Your Honors, and I been a that the statute —if is a confusion. think there my change way, statute statute—rthe had I would require re- in the deed. Prior does' judicature no act, there was vised land contracts. foreclosure of closing you didn’t discuss “From Bench: But purely of a notation transaction basis office? of deeds agreed— had “A. INo, misunderstanding There is no “From The Bench: give going your but what the vendor mind
a deed? explained—
“A. Well, put money had If the been “From The Bench: your deed, been a there would have hands, into not? there given willing deed,
“A. We would be yes.
6Í6 382 Mich Dissenting Opinion by J. “From The Bench: You wouldn’t have asked that they accept register the notation in the office of the of deeds? say— I “A. would you? satisfaction, “From “A. would Bench: As would say satisfactory I that it is Ihut was give willing I to a deed because understood the problem legislature, raised the statute. The enacting judicature the revised act—I don’t know equitable reason, for what I but would assume for reasons—decided that there should be at least the equity you same that would have mortgage a in land because contracts are so common Michigan. they they repeated All did was wording mortgage foreclosure put statute and in almost a verbatim for re- statute demption from land contracts. IAnd think don’t they was pearance problem anticipated the that when the notation ap- the made of deeds the actual appear of the title would be back obviously which vendor, not what wanted. major problem This is to me the in the statute. any problem, “From The Bench: It wasn’t how- your Mugan far even, as Mr. discussion with was concerned, it? I “A. had No, told them that I understood the problem give paid but that I would a deed if he money. you repeat again “From The Bench: Would that you just get for me what said. I want to that in you give context. him You told that a deed. you Is that what said? my “A. I Yes, would have client execute a war- ranty upon payment of the funds. I told him necessary I did not feel it was Ibut would do it. Mugan: May please my “Mr. the Court, name Mugan. represent I ap- is G-erald Elliott, Mrs. pellee in this matter. position appellant “Our is that counsel for the narrowly. has stated the issue too The issue is not my whether letter constituted a but whether tender, Go. Dissenting by Adams, enclosing telephone call, the of our combination bank, whether that the letter deed, of the put together, legal in this mat- tender constituted it did. that ter. We submit regards conversation that “In place, me, had all, of Mrs. Elliott said first took get I said, back.’ do can I ‘What got pay March, 30th it in full ‘You’ve man, a real Mr. estate Rukowski, went to 1967.’ She Nathan, Mr. counsel, and called it, it, she sold listed prepare down, send it deed, and now there is said would mortgage Federal at Citizens you people send the deed have on this, *18 Federal their will send Citizens bank, money, how bank money. get your you tell us will Just and much was. He told me how it much it is. He will it and we send to bank ‘Send the deed said, you get had better me a letter from the I think but bank.’ So LaVigne George I Mr. and said, I called copy my I ‘cc’ed’ letter,’ a letter sent them letter ‘Send LaVigne LaVigne. Mr. a to Mr. money confirming there, that the was Mr. and Mrs. ready ready Mr. close, were Rukowski was Ritz to close. may, day, “If I the second conversation was day that 30th, or the before the Mr. Rukowski was get my neck to the deed. I called Mr.
down I Mr. and he wasn’t and talked to Nathan Jacob. sending a I said, deed.’ And Mr. Jacob ‘We’re you told me that a said, ‘Mr. Nathan would send you any- said, ‘Mr. Nathan never told deed.’ He thing I said, ‘Well, like And I I that.’ sure wish recorded the Mr. have conversation.’ Jacob record conversations I’ll said, ‘You cannot or the State Bar.’ before prepare ‘You case, said, “In Mr. Nathan get sign pre- it,’ I’ll deed and Grossman got pared it down. I a title the deed and sent com- my company which is in from the title file. mitment prepared going a from the Elliotts to the purchase property. going who were Ritzes 382 Mich 596. Dissenting by Adams, J. your copy of there a Bench: Was “From bank? letter copy my a letter to the bank. Yes, “A. sent George LaVigne. ‘cc’to Mr. I indicated says, Bench: the bank in re- “From The When your sponse referring to McIntosh, letter are you wrote? to the letter my They confirming what I letter, are said “A. Nathan and I Honor, of March Mr. never Your just said, the statute at all. He ‘Get the discussed get signed.’ down and we’ll deed and send it I think when Mr. it But got matter, into this then Jacob game. And I a different ball never talked and I think time, to Mr. Nathan has second that he memory faulty on that conversation.” ' .question place The critical is what took in the telephone conversation on March when 16, 1967, attorney, Mugan, plain- defendants’ E. called Gerald attorney, tiff’s A. Nathan. Peter substantiating Mugan’s As Mr. version of the 16, conversation of March we have plaintiff’s attorneys his letter of that date to plaintiff’s attorneys by also the letter sent to Michigan Bank National on March 1967. At- torney Mugan prepared also and forwarded for warranty Building Company, deed for company. significant execution that It is *19 immediately plaintiff’s attorneys repudiate did not deny agreement or the reached in the 16, of March when received conversation 1967 the letter of confirmation the same date. Seven days plaintiff’s Mugan again called when Mr. later, attorneys unable to reach Mr. he Nathan, and was agreement by a Mr. that no informed Jacob agreement and no would be honored. had been made agree Kavanagh T. M. am unable to with Justice I attorneys parties’ negotiations the that the between impasse. a valid case, to an As view came 619' Co. v. Elliott. Dissenting Opinion by Adams, J. agreement was consummated on March 16, 1967. agree upon parties and did could a method of problem eliminate the by passing is dealt with title which not the statute. parties agreed redemp- Since the a method the tion land contract and foreclosure transfer legal of do title from the vendor to the we vendee, have a situation where no was taken not the action by mortgagee or the vendor of a land contract. parties agreement no had for If been made delivery of a deed, defendant’s rights property in the would have on terminated agreement 30, However, March 1967. was made equity. in Mrs. Elliott, enforceable Jeannine appellee, at time in defendant and a divorce from John was involved
P. her de- Elliott, husband, purchase agreed had fendant. The Elliotts land into $11,750 contract entered April May 7, At the time the 26, judge, with the circuit the amount was filed motion foreclosure was $9,299.91. sale due under regard agreement into entered Since parties attorneys on March 1967 as a 16, for the redemp- legal agreement as to the manner valid property, the motion dated I would treat tion April compel plaintiff to execute a war- 1967 to compel ranty the answer to motion April warranty plaintiff deed dated to execute chancery. judge proceeding The circuit a equity parties jurisdiction to enforce had agreement. his action. I vote to affirm regard agree with T. M. with Justice Kavanagh disposition stated his of the second issue to his opinion. J., concurred
Kelly, did J., sit.
Black,