10 F. Cas. 678 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey | 1852
It is true that in England the chancellor will generally not grant a final and perpetual injunction in patent cases, when.the answer denies the validity of the patent, without sending the parties to law to have that question decided. But even there the rule is not absolute or universal; it is a practice founded more on convenience than necessity. It always rests on the sound discretion of the court. A trial at law is ordered by a chancellor to inform his conscience; not because either party may demand it as a right, or that a court of equity is incompetent to judge of questions of fact, or of legal titles. In the courts of the United States, the practice is by no means so general as in England, or as it would be here, if the trouble of trying issues at law devolved upon a different court.
Oases involving inquiries into the most complex and difficult questions of mechanics and philosophy; are becoming numerous in the courts. Often questions of originality, and infringement of patents, do not depend so much on the credibility of witnesses or the weight of oral testimony, as on the application of principles of science and law to admitted facts. It is true, that in matters of opinion, both mechanics and learned professors will differ widely. But still the question is not to be decided by the number, credibility, or respectability, of such witnesses; but by the force and weight of the reasons given for their respective opinions. It is no reflection on trial by jury to say, that cases frequently occur, in which ten out of twelve jurors do not understand the principles of science, mathematics, or philosophy, necessary to a correct judgment of the case. Besides, much of the time of the courts is lost, where twelve men will not agree upon any verdict; or when they have agreed, the conscience of the chancellor, instead of feeling enlightened, rejects it altogether.
A select or special jury of philosophers, if they could be got, would perhaps not prove more satisfactory or obviate the difficulty. In a late case involving the validity of Morse’s telegraph patents, which was heard in Philadelphia, a final injunction was decreed without a verdict to establish the patents; and many other .cases might be cited from other circuits, if necessary, in support of this practice, showing that the courts of the United States do not always consider it a proper exercise of their discretion to order such issues to be tried at law, before granting a final injunction.
In the present case there are many reasons why the court will not thus exercise their discretion: 1st. Because this case has been set down for final hearing on the exhibits and proofs, without any motion or order of the court for such an issue. 2d. After a patient hearing of very able counsel, and a careful consideration of the testimony, the court feel no doubt or difficulty on these questions, which would be removed or confirmed by a verdict. 3d. It would require three or four weeks at least, to try this case before a jury, if this library of testimony were read to-them; and at least as many months, if the witnesses were examined viva voce, as they probably would be; and, after all this expenditure of time and labour, it is even more than prouable, that from the confusion created by the great length of the testimony and argument in court, or the force and effect of those urged from without, no verdict would be obtained, and most certainly none that would alter the present conviction of the court.
Without requiring the aid of a jury, we shall therefore proceed to examine the questions both of fact and law, which affect the validity of the complainant’s patents.
(After doing this, THE COURT concluded with the following remarks.)
The testimony shows that many persons had made experiments — that they had used sulphur,. lead, and heat, before Goodyear’s patents, and probably, before his discovery. But to what purpose? Their experiments ended in discovering nothing, except, perhaps, that they had ruined themselves. The great difference between them and Goodyear is, that he persisted in his experiments, and
And yet when genius and patient perseverance have at length succeeded, in spite of •sneers and scoffs, in perfecting some valuable invention or discovery, how seldom is it followed by reward! Envy robs him of the honour, while speculators, swindlers, and pirates, rob him of the profits. Every unsuccessful experimenter who did, or did not, •come very near making the discovery, now claims it. Every one who can invent an improvement, or vary its form, claims a right to pirate the original discovery. We need not summon Morse, or Blanchard, or Wood-worth, to prove that this is the usual history ■of every great discovery or invention.
The present case adds another chapter to this long and uniform history. But notwithstanding the indomitable energy and perseverance with which this attempt to invalidate the patent has been pursued, the volumes of testimony with which it is oppressed, and the great ability with which it has been canvassed in the argument, we are of opinion that , the defendant has signally failed in the attempt to show that himself or any other person discovered and perfected the process of manufacturing vulcanized India rubber before Goodyear. We shall give therefore our decree of perpetual injunction.
[Patent No. 3,033 was granted to C. Goodyear. .Tune 1.1, 1844; reissued December 25, 1849 (No. 150). For other eases involving this patent, see note to Goodyear v. Central It. Co., Case No. 5,503.]