355 N.E.2d 886 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1976
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Akron Municipal Court ordering (1) the suspension of an order in aid of execution of a prior judgment taken against defendant Lettie Ann Speck, the appellee, and (2) the Municipal Court Clerk, to return sums already attached. The suspended order provided for the garnishment of an account held by defendant with the First National Bank of Akron. Defendant maintained a checking account and monies, in the amount of $150.12, were found therein, seized and paid over to the Clerk of the Akron Municipal Court.
The court found that the funds attached consisted solely of aid to families with dependent children payments deposited by defendant into her checking account. The court concluded that the attachment was improper. We affirm that judgment.
Plaintiff's single assignment of error states:
"The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that a checking account consisting of the proceeds of aid to dependent children is exempt from proceedings in aid of execution." *116
Determination of this case depends on the interpretation placed on R. C.
"Aid exempt from execution
"Aid under sections
The three key words in the statute are "aid," "inalienable," and "exempt." Plaintiff urges that monies actually in the hands of the aid recipient are not exempt because otherwise the monies become inalienable and unusable for their intended purpose. The fallacy of this interpretation is apparent when the statute is read in the context of the general statutory scheme of the welfare program and other exemption statutes passed by the Ohio legislature.
The purpose of the aid to dependent children program is to provide a transfer payment to families with needy dependent children as defined in R. C.
Under R. C.
The recipient of this aid is the parent or guardian of the child for whose benefit the aid is given. The federal statute provides for supervision of the recipients of aid and for the failure of these recipients to expend the aid for its alloted purpose. Title 42, Section 605, U.S. Code. To insure that the aid is expended for its proper purpose, Ohio has enacted the statute in question here, R. C.
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 1968) defines the word "inalienable" as:
"Not subject to alienation; the characteristic of those things which cannot be bought or sold or transferred from one person to another * * *."
As used in R. C.
The word "exempt" must be interpreted in the same manner. As long as the aid is applied in a manner conforming with the legislative intent of the aid to dependent children program, transfer payments of whatever nature are exempt under R. C.
At this point it is helpful to review analogous statutory exemptions granted by the state of Ohio. The Public Employees Retirement System Act, R. C.
We note the principle set out in Dennis v. Smith (1932),
"* * * [T]he rule is well-nigh universal that a liberal rule of interpretation should be applied. By `liberal construction' is not meant that words and phrases shall be given an unnatural meaning, or that the meaning shall be enlarged or expanded to meet a particular state of facts. A liberal construction must still be a fair and reasonable one, in an effort always to ascertain the legislative intent. Among other things, it must be inquired as to the object for which the law is framed; and that construction must be adopted which will promote its purpose. In applying the rule of liberal construction, all reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the statute being applicable to the particular case. Exemption statutes are in derogation of the common rights of creditors, and if no other elements are present such statutes should receive a strict construction. On the other hand, by reason of their being enacted for the public good, to effectuate beneficient purposes, the rule of liberal construction is almost universally held to apply. Numerous decisions of other states, holding the liberal rule applicable, could be cited, but it is not necessary to go beyond our own decisions. In State, ex rel. Coles, v. Shook,
To effectuate the purposes of the legislature in passing *119
the aid to dependent children program, we must interpret R. C.
We come finally to the case of First National Master Charge
v. Gilardi (1975),
For a further discussion of the public policy involved in welfare or transfer payment statutes, see, Philpott v. EssexCounty Welfare Board (1973),
Judgment affirmed.
VICTOR, P. J., concurs.
MAHONEY, J., dissents.
Dissenting Opinion
The issue raised appears to be of first impression in this state. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the broader subject of exemptions in general and the construction that has been given to them.
Although in derogation of the common law, statutes granting exemptions because of the humane purposes they seek to further have been construed liberally in favor of the debtor. See, e.g., Dennis v. Smith (1932),
The statute in controversy here, R. C.
"Aid under sections
The majority predicates its opinion upon the case of FirstNational Master Charge v. Gilardi (1975),
"No sum of money due, or to become due, to any pensioner shall be liable to attachment, levy or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, whether the same remains with the treasurer of the pension fund * * * or is in the course of transmission to the pensioner, but shall inure wholly to thebenefit of such pensioner." (Emphasis supplied.)
Three federal cases were cited as authority in Gilardi. While these cases are of little precedential value, they are indicative of a judicial expression of social policy.
Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board (1973),
Porter v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co. (1962),
Lawrence v. Shaw (1937),
While in each of these three cases the court alludes to the social policy underlying the grant of aid and the immunity of that aid from the claims of creditors, it is apparent that the ratio decidendi in each was the clear import of the statutory language that they be exempt after as well as before receipt.
An examination of some of the decisions rendered by the courts of other states indicates that judicial interpretation of exemptions has not expanded the exemption beyond the plain meaning of the statute. Miller v. Monrean (Alaska 1973),
R. C.
I see no reason to decide this case in a manner inconsistent with the rules of construction long followed in this state concerning exemptions. The majority's holding enlarges the scope of the exemption accorded by this statute beyond the plain import of the statutory grant. I am unwilling to engage in impermissible judicial legislation.
While allowing the attachment of these funds after receipt by the beneficiary may be viewed as thwarting the legislative intent behind the grant, Title 42, Section 602, U.S. Code, contains no language prohibiting the garnishment after payment. Moreover this statute clearly establishes procedures to be followed when it appears that aid is not inuring to the benefit of the child, including counseling of the mother or even making a child a ward of the state in extreme cases. The procedures thus established would better insure that the aid benefits the child than would the court's decision today. This is especially true where the debtor may well be one who previously furnished food, goods, or services on credit to the mother for the benefit of the children.
In short, my colleagues say the money in the checking account is exempt from attachment because it can be traced and is readily discernible and available for disbursement by the mother. Would they still follow the aid if it were put in jewelry? a used auto? a savings bond? a savings account? furniture? cash? or a payment on a house? I doubt it. If it is exempt, it is exempt for all purposes not just because it loses its identity and is commingled. Speaking of commingling and loss of identity, is a checking account anything other than a debtor-creditor relationship after a deposit is made? *123