16 Ga. 114 | Ga. | 1854
delivering the opinion.
The Court below instructed the Jury, that “ the testimony ■of the witnesses, Beadles and King, though serving to show whether or not the possession of the defendant was adverse, 'yet, could not be used to excuse the plaintiff from suing within the time prescribed by law, or to prolong the time within which the plaintiff must sue or be barred: nor can they be used to wipe out or obliterate any previous causes of action, which the plaintiff may have had: nor do they furnish a fresh starting point for the commencement of the Statute; for these purposes, these facts are nullities; they may show whether the possession was adverse or not. ”
We understand the testimony of these witnesses, as being introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant, in the Court below, Mrs. Goodwyn, at the time to which this evidence relates, (which was sometime in the year 1846 or 1847,) had acknowledged, in effect, that certain of the slaves in controversy, of which'the others are offspring and issue, belonged to her son, and for the purpose of relying thereupon, as evidence, that she was not then holding adversely to the plaintiff; and as a consequence, that his claim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Now the Court instructs the Jury, that this testimony was proper evidence to show the first of these things, viz: that the possession of Mrs. Goodwyn was not, at that time, adverse; but he also tells them, that though this were so, yet it could make no difference, as to the Statute of Limitations; that it could not excuse the plaintiff from suing within the time prescribed by law, if the Statute had previously commenced to run against him, nor prolong the time within which the plaintiff must sue or be barred, nor furnish a fresh starting point for the Statute. The plain English of all which simply is, that if the possession of Mrs. Goodwyn had been previously adverse, and the Statute had been running in her favor, these acknowledgments could not stop or suspend it, though they did show that she was not then holding adversely. ,
A correct illustration of this principle, is found in the case .(which was cited at the bar) of Oathout vs. Thompson, (20 John. 277.) That was an action for deceit, growing out of the purchase of a negro woman slave, in N. York. The cause of action originated in 1814, and six years or more (the statutory term of limitation in such a case, in that State,) had elapsed before suit commenced. The witness proved that in 1815, he .heard the plaintiff charge the defendant “ with cheating him in the sale of the wench, and the defendant did not deny it”. The Court very properly held, that this acknowledgment did .not take the case out of the Statute. It could not amount to a new tort, and therefore, could not interfere with the operation of the Statute.
Let us put a strong case. A takes the slave of B — claims him as his own, and so holds him for several years; but after-wards, goes to B, and says, or puts such declaration in writing over his sign-manual, “ I have done wrong in claiming this slave — he is yours — if I continue to hold him, it shall be for you.” Can it be doubted that this will effectually extinguish the operation of the Statute of Limitations, even if it had ran for the full time in favor of A? And that if A should subsequently take possession of the slave, in his own name, and again hold him adversely, the Statute would commence to run, necessarily, from the commencement of such subsequent or last ■adverse possession ?
It is true, that there was no such explicit acknowledgment in the case at bar, but if what was said by Mrs. Goodwyn did, in the opinion of the Jury, amount to an acknowledgment at all, that she did not then claim the slaves, but that they were the property of her son, the principle is precisely the same, and the same effect must be given to the acknowledgment.
Judgment reversed.