108 Wis. 207 | Wis. | 1900
Our statute (sec. 1128a, Stats. 1898) prohibits, under penalty of a fine, the employment of a child under the age of fourteen years in any factory or workshop, except that, if a prescribed permit be obtained from the county judge, the employment of a child over twelve years of age is allowed. It appears by the complaint that the child who was injured in the present case was under twelve years of age, and received his injuries as the result of negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, and the question presented is whether the defendant’s policy of insurance covers the liability of the plaintiffs for such injuries.
There are but two clauses of the policy which are material to be considered upon this inquiry. They must, upon fa
In considering this question, it must be taken as certain .that the proviso as to the illegal employment of children was intended as a substantial limitation of the previous promise of indemnity, and not as an enlargement thereof. This is -self-evident. It is also unquestionable, as a legal proposition, that, in a case of a doubtful or ambiguous clause in a .contract, that construction should be given to it which will be in harmony with law, rather than a. construction which ■contemplates a violation thereof in order to give it effect. The clause in question is plainly an ambiguous one, and not happily expressed. In the popular and nontechnical sense, any injury happening to a boy under twelve years of age who is employed in a shop, or any injury happening to another employee on account of the boy’s negligence or youth, is an injury occasioned by the illegal employment of the boy. In other words the injury would not have resulted had the boy not been employed. But in the technical and strictly legal sense an injury happening to such a boy or to
With these principles in view, we can entertain no doubt that the meaning of the clause in question which was in
In this view of the case, it becomes unnecessary to consider the serious and perhaps doubtful question which was debated on the argument, namely, whether the clause in question would be void on the ground of public policy if given the construction claimed for it by appellants.
By the Court.— Judgment affirmed.