88 A.D. 147 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1903
This case cannot be distinguished from the case of Parker v. E., C. & N. R. R. Co. (27 App. Div. 383). Section 39 of the Rail-' road Law, under which this action is brought, provides that the penalty shall not be incurred if “ such overcharge was made through inadvertence or mistake, not amounting to gross negligence.” In the Parker case the plaintiff was suing for a penalty for an over
Following then our decision in the Parker case we must affirm the judgment of the Trial Term. It is perhaps unnecessary to give further reason unless to add one or two suggestions to the argument as then made. The rule that a party sued for a penalty has the benefit of every reasonable doubt in the construction of a statute will hardly be questioned. In Chase v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (26 N. Y. 525) Judge Marvin, in writing the opinion for the court, says: “ In statutes giving a penalty, if there be reasonable doubt of the case made upon the trial or in the pleadings coming within the statute, the party of whom the penalty is claimed is to have the benefit-of such doubt.” It is undoubtedly true that it is a general principle of law that ignorance of the law will not excuse. The application of this rule of law in many cases works a great hardship, although it can be seen tp be a necessary principle of the criminal law, for otherwise any criminal might escape by pleading his ignorance of the law and the criminal law would thereby become ineffective. It is generally a rule of law that is necessary in determining civil rights. I think, however, that this rule of law has never been applied where it will work a hardship, except under some general rules of necessity as above indicated. Moreover, it is
The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed, with costs.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. .