62 Iowa 221 | Iowa | 1883
Lead Opinion
I. In Goodnow v. Moulton, the taxes were paid by the Iowa Homestead Co., and at a time when that
The defendant contends that the 'case at bar differs from that case, becaiise the certification of the lands under which the plaintiff claims was suspended until April, 1863, and, the taxes paid being for the years 1861, 1862 and 1863, the plaintiff should not be heard to say that his assignor paid the taxes in good faith. The taxes, however, it appears, were not paid until after April, 1863. Possibly the defendant had in mind that the assessment of the taxes for 1861 and 1862, being made within the time the certification was suspended, were invalid, but he does not raise such point in his argument, and we do not, therefore, consider it. So far, then, as the circumstances are concerned under which the taxes were paid, we have to say that we see nothing in them to distinguish
II. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff is barred by a prior adjudication in an action in which the Iowa Homestead
It is, perhaps, not to be denied that, if the court correctly held in that case that the Iowa Homestead Co. was not entitled to recover for taxes paid, it would follow as a matter of law that the plaintiff in this case is not entitled to recover; but, since the decision in Goodnow v. Moulton, we cannot follow the decision in Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Navigation & R. R. Co. et al. as authority, nor, so far as the point is concerned which we are now considering, is it claimed that we should. The claim is that the taxes in question were actually covered by the adjudication in that case.
In our opinion, this claim cannot be sustained. > The taxes in question were not only no part of the taxes sought to be
The effect, however, of such notification would be only to bind the Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co. by the adjudication in respect.to title. In that case the Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co. was interested by reason of its deed of warranty, but it had no interest in the taxes sought to be recovered. So far as the issue was concerned involving a right of recovery for the taxes, it was in no possible sense a party. The adjudication in that case, then, does not operate as a bar in this.
III. The defendant pleads the statute of limitations. lie avers that he is a resident of the state of New York, and that
But in this case the cause of action arose in this state; and in 1870 the statute cited was amended so as to make it inapplicable where the cause of action arose in this state. Chap. 167 of the Laws of 1870. ’ Unless, then, the action became' barred before the amendment, it did not become barred under the statute relied upon. The payments appear to have been made December 9, 1863, January 20, 1864, and October 31, 1866, respectively. But we do not think that a cause of action accrued upon each payment at the time it was made, nor upon all at the time the last one was made. The implied
Such being our view, it appears to us that the cause of action did not accrue until 1873, which was after the amendment; and, the defendant being a non-resident, the action is not barred. We think that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amounts paid, with interest thereon from the time of payments respectively, and to have the same decreed a lien upon the land.
Reversed.
Rehearing
On Rehearing.
I. This cause has again been presented to us upon a petition for rehearing, and has also been orally argued by counsel for both parties.
II. It is insisted that the statement in the foregoing opinion, that the taxes for which recovery is sought in the case at bar are no part of the taxes which were sought to be recovered in the case of Homestead Co. v. The Valley R. R. Co., 17 Wall., 153, is erroneous.
Whether this be correct or not we think can make no difference upon the question of former adjudication, because, in our opinion, tho Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., the plaintiffs asssignor, was in no sense a party to that action, so far as the question of taxes is involved. We are content with what is said in the foregoing opinion upon that subject.
III. Lastly, it is again urged that the claim for taxes was barred by the statute of limitations when the action was commenced. In the foregoing opinion it is held that the right
It is claimed, however, that the question of title was finally decided in December, 1866, in the cases of Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., and Des Moines Co. v. Burr, 5 Wallace, 681 and 689. We think it is sufficient in regard to this feature of the case to repeat what was said of the Wolcott case in Goodnow v. Moulton, 51 Iowa, 555: “This action (the Wolcott case) was between parties, both of whom claimed under the river grant, and it was held that the title to such lands had passed thereunder. But, as no one claiming under the railroad grant was a party to the action, it cannot be said that the decision was of any bearing as to them.”
It is true that counsel of the Dubuque & S. C. R. R. Co. were allowed to appear and be heard in argument in the