268 A.D. 826 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1944
In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, in the nature of certiorari to review, a magistrate of the city of New York appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate a resettled order which annulled the summary commitment of the respondent by the appellant for a criminal contempt of court. Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Appellant contends that the Special Term was without jurisdiction to review the summary commitment and that such jurisdiction lies solely with the Appellate Division under sections 40 and 102-a of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. (L. 1910, eh. 659, as amd.) There is a marked difference between the review of a summary commitment, which is by certiorari, and the review of a determination made on a trial or hearing on which a record is made, which is by appeal. The reason for reviewing a summary determination by certiorari is that otherwise there would be nothing before the court to be reviewed. (Matter of Douglas v. Adel, 269 N. Y. 144, 148, 150.) See, also, Matter of Teitelbaum (84 App. Div. 351, mod. and affd. 185 N. Y. 540), discussed in Matter of Douglas v. Adel (supra). While section 751 of the Judiciary Law (second paragraph) provides that one guilty of criminal contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily, that does not mean that he must be so punished. The court may inflict punishment after notice aiid the taking of formal proofs, and an order entered on such formal proofs is reviewable by appeal. (People ex rel. Choate v. Barrett, 56 Hun 351, 355, 356, affd. 121 N. Y. 678.) Thus section 40 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act would apply to such a situation. Section 40 does not provide that the Appellate Division shall have exclusive power to review an order punishing for contempt made by a city magistrate, but that the Appellate Division shall have exclusive power to hear and deter