Thе City of Atlanta by ordinance changed the name of Forrest Avenue and Forrest Road to Ralph McGill Boulevard. Goodman, et al., owners of businesses fronting this city thoroughfare, sought an order enjoining the city from changing street signs, from changing city recоrds, and from notifying the postal service of the name change pending resolution of the issue of whether the name chаnge was lawful. They appeal the denial of their motion for interlocutory injunction.
1. The business owners contend that the сity charter contains no provisions authorizing the naming and renaming of streets. The city admits that the charter does not exрressly give the city this power but contends that the power is to be implied from the city’s express power "in the interest of hеalth and general welfare, to accept by gift, acquire, construct, lease, own, regulate, operate, improve, open, close or extend public streets. . . .” Code Ann. § 69-312. No Georgia decision relating to the implied power of municipalities to name or rename streets has been found. However, it is clear that municipalities lawfully may exercise powers necessarily implied from powers expressly granted. Pharr Road Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta,
2. The power of the city to name or renamе streets is not without limitation. Any exercise of the power must be "in the interest of [the public] health and general welfare.” Code Ann. § 69-312. The city concedes that the power is not boundless by contending that "In the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness, this desire by the governing authority to honor Ralph McGill is not properly the subject of judicial review.” Thе trial court in deciding that the city had the inherent power to name (rename) streets held that the exercise of this legislative power "will not be disturbed [by the court] in the absence of malicious intent to injure another.”
No Georgia decision defining the limits of the power of municipalities to name or rename streets has been located. However, regarding the closely analogous power of municipalities to open and close streets, this court has held: "This power is broad
In determining whethеr or not an exception to the general rule exists in a given case, all facts and circumstances relating to thе renaming of the street must be given careful consideration. A line must be sharply drawn between those cases in which the offеnded citizen’s recourse is the municipal ballot box and those cases which present actionable wrongs. If the governing authorities of a hypothetical municipality were to change the name of "Main Street” to "Adolph Hitler Boulevard,” one would assume that serious legal issues, as well as eyebrows, would be raised. See, Augustus v. School Board of Escambia Cоunty, Florida, 507 F2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975); Smith v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 448 F2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971); and Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970). Persons complaining of such a name change would enter the courtroom with an inference of impropriety aiding their burden of proving the existence of an exception to the general rule. On the other hand, were the city fathers of that hypothetical municipality to change thе name of "Smith Street” to "Jones Street” (an action that probably would displease the Smith family as much as it would pleasе the Joneses) any person complaining of the name change would come to court unaided by any inferencе of improper municipal action. The present case (in which the name of a famous journalist is being substituted for that оf a famous Civil War general) is one in which the plaintiffs quite properly should be put to their proof unaided by any inferencе of impropriety.
3. The trial court denied the motion for interlocutory injunction but did not enter final judgment dismissing the complaint. Contrаst Kirk v. Hasty,
This court cannot hold that it would be impossible for the business owners to adduce testimony proving that the renaming of this city thoroughfare was аccomplished arbitrarily, capriciously, maliciously, or with intent to cause injury to all or some of the business owners or to the general public. Such a ruling in the circumstances of this case would be contrary to the spirit of Section 12 of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-112) because the complaint, construed (as we must) most favorably to the business owners, does not nеgate the existence of exceptions to the general rule allowing municipalities wide discretion in the naming or rеnaming of public thoroughfares. Fender v. Fender,
This court does not hold that any exception to the general rule is or is not present in this case. Rather, our holding is that the trial court did not err in denying the interlocutory injunction based on the evidence presented. The permanent injunction likewise should be denied unless the business owners establish by evidence the existence of an exception to the general rule.
Judgment affirmed.