| Me. | Jun 11, 1878
The plaintiffs were tenants at will under the defendants (lessees under others) of a lot of land with a store upon it. They were themselves the owners of another building (personal property) situated on the same land, affixed to the rear of the store in such a manner that the two buildings could be used as one. They mortgaged their, own building to the defendants, describing it as personal property and as a <! building and appurtenances.”
A question arose at the trial, whether the word “ appurtenances ” carried with the title of the building such rights as the plaintiffs had as tenants at will of the store adjoining. The defendants do not set up that the store itself, being real property, could be regarded as appurtenant to the building mortgaged to them, but they contend that the plaintiffs’ right of occupancy as tenants at will of the store could be so regarded. We think not. Suppose that the plaintiffs had been the owners of the fee of all the land and the erections upon it, and had sold the building to the defendants outright as personal property, describing it as here described. What would have passed to the defendants under the
What does the word “ appurtenances ” mean as used in the mortgage ? The defendants say it must mean something. It may mean that the defendants (mortgagees) should for a reasonable time have reasonable modes of access to the building ; or it may have been designed to cover fixtures within it; or it may be a word, as is sometimes so, used without any definite purpose or meaning whatever. It would probably puzzle the person who drafted the instrument to decide what was intended by it. It is not required to ascertain the meaning of a word which had no meaning in the mind of the person expressing it. Upon this branch of the case see Warren v. Blake, 54 Maine, 276; and cases there cited.
It was not, however, admitted that the plaintiffs were tenants at will of the store. We have no doubt that they were. They were let into possession upon an agreement to pay rent while they remained. The occupancy was to be for an uncertain and indefinite time. Those elements most perfectly constitute an estate at will at the common law. It was to be a possession during the joint wills of the parties. It could be determined by the will of
The defendants seek to avoid the result that follows from the relation of a tenancy at will between the parties, upon another ground. They contend that a tenancy at will created by parol may be a conditional estate, to be determined after a time fixed and limited by agreement, or upon the happening of a certain event, so that the tenancy will come to an end without notice at the expiration of the time or the happening of the event. This has been so decided in Massachusetts and elsewhere. See 1 "Wash. Neal Prop, book 1, c. 11, § 41; and note. But whether it could be so held in this state, where the statute provides that tenancies at will may be determined by thirty days notice, “ and not otherwise except by mutual consent,” we do not consider ourselves called upon to determine, because the facts of this case cannot present such a question.
Exceptions overruled.