8 Ala. 486 | Ala. | 1845
The case of Scott v. Jones, 5 Ala. Rep. 694, is an authority in point, that the defendant Likens was a competent witness. In that case, as in this, the witness was a party upon the record — there, as here, a judgment by default had been taken against him, and there as in this case, he was considered competent to prove that his co-defendant was not a partner, because, in establishing that fact, he was fixing a liability entirely upon himself, which otherwise.he would have divided with another. The case cited also shows, that in such an action as this, the evidence was admissible under the plea of non assumpsit.
It is also urged that Likens was an incompetent witness, because he had received from Morrow a sum of money’ to extinguish the liabilities of the latter for the firm debts, at the time of the dissolution, and that the testimony itself was incompetent evidence to go to the jury.
It is certainly incontrovertible, that one partner cannot, by any arrangement with his co-partners, shield himself from a liability to a creditor, created whilst he was a member of the firm. It is distinctly stated in the bill of exceptions, that a portion of the account was created whilst Morrow was a member of the firm, and for this amount he was certainly liable to the plaintifis. The proof that upon the dissolution, Morrow paid to the continuing partners $225 to cover his proportion of the liabilities of the firm, was wholly irrelevant, as he could not by such an act, prevent the creditors of the firm from holding on to his responsibility. Being irrelevant, it should have been excluded, as its tendency was to mislead the jury, and probably did mislead them, as we find they discharged him from all liability, though a part of the account was created before this arrangement was made. For the portion of thp account created previous to the dissolution, the plaintifis were clearly entitled to a verdict. t
We can perceive no objection to the introduction of the articles of co-partnership. They provided among other things, for the mode of dissolving the partnership, and of these articles, as well as the fact of the dissolution, it appears from the testimony, the plaintifis had notice.
These views being decisive of the case, it is unnecessary to consider the other questions argued at the bar. Let the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.
