Goode v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 251 F. 556

Goode v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co.

251 F. 556 | 2d Cir. | 1918

Lead Opinion

LEARNED HAND, District Judge

(alter stating the facts as above). We see no possible ground for negligence in this case, unless it be the act of Reilly, the seaman who helped the libelant into the boat. There was certainly no reason to have a seaman in the boat itself. The passengers were none of them decrepit or infirm; the step was an easy one, at most only 6 inches deep; the lifeboat had no motion, or substantially none; the libelant was a woman in the prime of life and vigor, apparently in no need of assistance. We cannot see that such a situation required more than the two men who were to help the passengers into the lifeboat. The situation is quite different from that of a boat in motion alongside a steamer.

[1] We accept the opinion of the District Judge that the person who helped the libelant in was Reilly, a seaman 30 years old, weighing about 170 pounds. He saw Reilly and the libelant, and his judgment is better than ours as to which is correct as to the identity of this seaman, and -whether lie was a young boy 16 years old or not. It is true that the District Judge tried the case in part upon depositions, but we cannot agree with the libelant’s position 1hat for that reason the finding' as to those witnesses whom he did see was not better than ours can be, who have only the written depositions as to all.

[2, SJ It is substantially conceded that the cause of the libelant’s misstep was Reilly’s failure to keep hold of her until her foot had actually reached the thwart, or until she had become firmly planted. But this does not seem to us sufficient evidence of negligence. The case turns precisely upon the question whether Reilly should have apprehended that the libelant would rely upon his support for so long' as she in fact did. It seems to us in common experience that, in steadying a woman who is making a step under these circumstances, one does not ordinarily keep the support until her foot actually reaches the lower step, particularly where the step, as here, was only 6 inches, no more than, if as much as, the ordinary riser of a staircase. The purpose is to insure the balance of the person assisted until the weight of the body has begun to leave the leg which remains on the *558higher step and has begun to fall, so as to be caught by the lower foot. Only in the case of decrepit persons, whose balance in landing is doubtful, do we think it necessary that the support should be kept until the foot has been steadied upon the lower step. We agree with the 'District Court that Reilly took the usual course with persons who are apparently strong and able to take care of themselves. There is no suggestion in the record that the libelant in appearance was unwieldy or incapable of managing her weight. It is trae this was considerably above the average, but that did not indicate that she could not control her balance as normal people ordinarily do. We think that, if her control was not that of the ordinary person, it was incumbent upon her to ask for 'the extra assistance, which was not otherwise indicated.

Finding no negligence, the decree will be affirmed, with costs.

Dissenting Opinion

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

I dissent. I agree that the only possible ground for negligence is in the act of Reilly, a seaman, employed by the defendant and stationed by it to help the libelant into the boat. The majority opinion concedes that the cause of the injury was Reilly’s failure to keep hold of the libelant until her foot had become firmly planted on the thwart or seat of the boat. In that I also concur. But I am not able to agree that Reilly was not guilty of negligence in withdrawing his assistance before the woman was securely established in the boat. If he had not undertaken to render any assistance, the libelant might have gotten along very well. But when he undertook to render assistance, he was under obligations not to withdraw it until she was safely within the boat. ' .

In Hanlon v. Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey, 187 N. Y. 73, 79 N. E. 846, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 411, 116 Am. St. Rep. 591, 10 Ann. Cas. 366, the facts were somewhat analogous to the case at bar. The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant’s railroad, had arrived at her destination, and while stepping from the car to the station platform was injured by falling to the ground. As she was in the act of descending the car steps, the train conductor reached out his hand to help her, taking her arm by the elbow. Before she had placed her foot on the platform he withdrew the support of his hand, and she fell between the platform and the car. She obtained a verdict, which the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed. The opinion, which was written by Judge Gray, states that:

“It [the railroad company] was not bound to furnish her any personal assistance in leaving the car; for she was, so far as the case shows, in the possession of her faculties and of good health, and was capable of moving about alone. There was nothing defective about the car platform or steps. The conductor of the train stood there, however, and voluntarily undertook to guide and to support her in descending from the ear. * * * I think we-must reach the conclusion that, while the defendant was under no obligation to supply the aid of a servant in assisting the plaintiff! to descend from the car, yet, as the conductor undertook to do so, she had the right to rely upon, that official's careful performance of his undertaking, and to hold the defendant responsible for any failure on his part to use reasonable care.”

*559The case at bar is a much stronger case than the one before the New York Court of Appeals, for certainly it was a much less hazardous enterprise for a woman to alight from the steps of a railroad car to the station platform than for'her to descend from a steamship into a lifeboat, the gunwale of which was a couple of inches above the platform. The lifeboat is described as big and wide and having seats on which four men could sit. The passengers were to be taken ashore in lifeboats; the boats being in the harbor of Havana and more or less disturbed by the ordinary roll of the sea. I am unable to distinguish Ibis case in principle from the New York case, and so I am of the opinion that the decree appealed from should be reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to enter a decree in favor of the libelant for such damages as this court should determine she is entitled to upon the record.