63 N.Y.S. 981 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1900
The action was brought to recover for work, labor and services duly performed by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant. The answer denies the allegations of the complaint. The complaint was dismissed at the end of the plaintiff’s testimony, to which dismissal the plaintiff excepted, and that exception brings up for review the question as to whether or not upon the plaintiff’s evidence there was any question to submit to the jury.
The plaintiff testified that a Mr. Megrue introduced him to the defendant, saying: “This is the gentleman that I spoke to you about some time ago, in case you might want some accounting work done I told you I would recommend to you. Now, he is here and wants to talk with you about it; ” that the work was in reference to some railroad account, “ and he told Mr. Eumsey that I was particularly well qualified to do that class of work.” The defendant then told the plaintiff “ that a Mr. Barse had advanced considerable sums of money to Mr. Haskell, who was in the office of Mr. Megrue;
The plaintiff, under this employment, continued this work until the twentieth day of September, when the work was stopped, because Haskell informed the plaintiff that the defendant and Haskell had agreed upon a settlement, and on the seventh day of October the defendant told the plaintiff that he need not proceed any further
At the end of the plaintiff’s testimony the court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that, the defendant was acting as attorney for Darse and that he was not liable. To that the defendant excepted. Ye think this was error. There was nothing to show that at any time the defendant represented either to the plaintiff or to any one else that he was acting as attorney for Darse, nor does it appear that he ever as a fact did act in that capacity. Subsequent to the performance of the work by the plaintiff the defendant told the plaintiff that he was acting as attorney for a Mrs. Le Fevre, who, it would appear, was a creditor of Darse; but there was nothing to show at the time of the employment that the defendant stated for whom he was acting, or that he was not acting in his own behalf in employing this plaintiff to perform the services to recover for which the action was brought. The services were not rendered in a pending action or to enforce a particular claim of which the plaintiff had notice. It is true that the defendant was an attorney
The rule is settled in this State that an agent makes himself liable if he contracts in his own name and without disclosing the name of his principal; and this is so, although the person contracting with the agent knew that he was acting as an agent, if the name of the principal is not disclosed. As was said by Chief Judge Church, in Cobb v. Knapp (71 N. Y. 352): “ It is not sufficient that the seller may have the means of ascertaining the name of the principal. If so, the neglect to inquire might be deemed sufficient. He must have actual knowledge. There is no hardship in the rule of liability against agents. They always have it in their own power to relieve themselves, and when they do not, it must be presumed that they intend to be liable.” And in Argersinger v. Macnaughton (114 N. Y. 539) the court affirm this principle and say: “When there is, in fact, a principal, the agent may ordinarily relieve himself from personal'liability upon a contract made in his behalf, by disclosing his name at the time of making it. Upon such disclosure, however, the party proceeding to deal with the agent may or may not, as he pleases, ei$er into contract upon the responsibility of the named principal, but to permit an agent to turn over to his customer an undisclosed and, to the latter, unknown principal, might have the effect to deny to the customer the benefit of any available or responsible means of. remedy or relief founded upon the contract. The rule is no less salutary than reasonable that an agent may be treated as the party to the contract made by him in his own name, unless he advises the other party to it of the name of the principal whom he assumes to represent in making it. where that is unknown to such party.”
There was in this case no disclosure of the fact that the defendant in employing the plaintiff acted as agent or attorney for any one, nor was the name of any principal for whom the defendant was acting disclosed to the plaintiff. The fact was disclosed that there were accounts between Haskell and Barse relating to the moneys advanced by Barse to Haskell, and that the defendant desired an accounting so as to ascertain what disposition Haskell had made of Barse’s money. Considering the nature of the employ
The admission by the defendant in his letter of May 18, 1898, that he was acting as attorney for a Mrs. Le Fevre, was a distinct admission that he was not acting as attorney for Barse in employing the plaintiff; and, even assuming that it could be held that from the information given by the defendant to the plaintiff at the time of the employment, the plaintiff was bound to infer that the defendant was acting as attorney for Barse, this distinct admission that he was acting for another client, and not for Barse, would justify a finding of the jury that the defendant did not disclose to the plaintiff the principal for whom he was in fact acting, and thus justify the jury in finding a verdict for the services rendered against the defendant. The defendant, having employed the plaintiff to perform this service, was primarily liable to him for the value of the services rendered under such an employment. To relieve himself from liability it must appear that, at the time of the employment, the defendant informed the plaintiff that he was acting as agent or attorney for some other person, and disclosed to the plaintiff the name of the person for whom he was actually acting. Upon this evidence the jury might find that the defendant was acting for this Mrs. Le Fevre, a creditor of Barse and his associates; but the evidence is distinct that the defendant never disclosed that fact to the plaintiff, nor were there any facts disclosed from which such an inference could be drawn.
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, O’Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.