No. 95-P-975 | Mass. App. Ct. | Aug 6, 1996
Victor Gonzalez was employed by LFE Corporation as a shipper and receiver from January, 1989, until May, 1990, when he was terminated for excessive absenteeism.
On July 20, 1990, Gonzalez filed a claim for temporary total disability benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 34, for the period of March 6, 1990, “to date and continuing,” and for the payment of medical expenses under G. L. c. 152, §§ 13 and 30. National Union Fire Insurance Company (National Union), the workers’ compensation insurer for LFE Corporation, denied the claim.
On April 22, 1991, pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 10A, a conference was held on the claim. The claim was denied and Gonzalez filed an appeal for a de novo hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 152, §§ 10A(3) and 11. After that hearing, the
Although the judge found that Gonzalez had suffered an industrial injury, he did not order compensation because Gonzalez did not lose any benefits as a result of the accident. In addition, the judge did not order the payment of medical expenses under § 13 and § 30 because Gonzalez did not offer any unpaid medical bills. The judge also did not order the payment of attorney fees. The judge did, however, order that Gonzalez’s rights under §§ 13, 30, and 36 be reserved.
Gonzalez appealed the administrative judge’s decision to the Reviewing Board (board) on the sole ground that he was entitled to the payment of his attorney’s fees. Applying the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions then in effect, G. L. c. 152, § 13A(3), and 452 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(4) (1988), the board ruled that Gonzalez was not entitled to attorney’s fees. As to such fees, generally, see Alliy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 688" court="Mass. App. Ct." date_filed="1996-01-24" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/alliy-v-travelers-insurance-6459520?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6459520">39 Mass. App. Ct. 688 (1996). The board’s decision was based on the ground that Gonzalez did not prevail at the hearing because he did not receive an award of benefits nor was a discontinuance of benefits prevented.
On appeal, Gonzalez claims that he is entitled to attorney’s fees because the judge’s finding that he sustained an industrial injury means he prevailed at the hearing, regardless of whether or not benefits were ordered. National Union argues that Gonzalez did not prevail because no benefits were paid.
This case turns on an interpretation of the language
“Ordinarily an agency’s interpretation of its own rule is entitled to great weight.” Finkelstein v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 370 Mass. 476" court="Mass." date_filed="1976-06-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/finkelstein-v-board-of-registration-in-optometry-2129333?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="2129333">370 Mass. 476, 478 (1976). “A court will overturn such an agency interpretation only if it is ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, or inconsistent with the plain terms of the rule itself.’ ” Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 380 Mass. 762" court="Mass." date_filed="1980-06-03" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/purity-supreme-inc-v-attorney-general-2054365?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="2054365">380 Mass. 762, 782 (1980), quoting from Finkelstein, supra. See also Canavan’s Case, 364 Mass. 762" court="Mass." date_filed="1974-03-08" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/canavans-case-2151784?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="2151784">364 Mass. 762, 764 (1974) (findings and decisions of the board “must be accepted as final unless wholly lacking evidential support or tainted by error of law”).
The statutory language ties the award of attorney’s fees to the concept of “prevail.”
Gonzalez asserts that his case is analogous to Federal civil rights claims. A plaintiff is a prevailing party for purposes of the Federal civil rights statute “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the most significant aspect of a claim is the payment of compensation. We decline to interpret the statute as providing attorney’s fees in cases where no workers’ compensation has been ordered at any stage of the statutory proceedings. Compare Connolly’s Case, ante 35, 37-38 (1996). To do so would be in contravention of the purpose of the entire workers’ compensation scheme. “The purpose of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act is to replace wages lost by reason of an employee’s inability to work because of an injury” (emphasis original). Chartier’s Case, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 7" court="Mass. App. Ct." date_filed="1984-11-23" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/chartiers-case-6457840?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6457840">19 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 9 n.4 (1984), quoting from Don Francisco’s Case, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 456" court="Mass. App. Ct." date_filed="1982-09-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/don-franciscos-case-2237634?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="2237634">14 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 469 (1982). Here, Gonzalez continued to work (with any time missed after the accident not proven to be attributable to the injury), and he collected, at first, his normal wages, and after he was fired, he collected unemployment benefits. Because Gonzalez did not lose any wages as a result of his injury, there was nothing to compensate. The fact that the administrative judge found that the insurer would have been liable to Gonzalez if he had lost wages, does not mean that he prevailed. Therefore, the board’s decision not to award Gonzalez any benefits means that Gonzalez did not prevail and is not entitled to any statutory attorney’s fees.
Decision affirmed.
A party may not receive disability payments and unemployment benefits at the same time. See G. L. c. 152, § 36B(1).
General Laws c. 152, § 13A, was revised by St. 1991, c. 398, §§ 35 & 103. The relevant regulations were rewritten in 1992. See Alliy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Mass. App. Ct. 688" court="Mass. App. Ct." date_filed="1996-01-24" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/alliy-v-travelers-insurance-6459520?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6459520">39 Mass. App. Ct. at 691. Both parties argue that the relevant statute and regulations are those in effect prior to the changes.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1188 (6th ed. 1990) defines prevail as “[t]o be or become effective or effectual, to be in force, to obtain” and defines prevailing party as “[t]he party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even though not necessarily to the extent of his original contention. The one whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered.”