Wе face two questions regarding liability following an accident between a tandem truck
Cuahutemoc (“Tim”) Gonzalez, the owner and sole proprietor of Gonzalez Farms, agreed to harvest Chester Farms’ silage
On October 5, 2009, Garcia brought to the farm several trucks he had previously used to transport the silage, along with a tandem truck and a new driver, Raymond' Ramirez. On the tandem truck’s first trip to the feed yard, a tire blew out, causing Ramirez to lose control and careen into oncoming traffic, colliding with the car in which Tammy Jackson and her fourteen-year-old daughter, Rexee Jo, wеre traveling. The collision tragically killed all three.
Samuel Lee Jackson — Rexee Jo’s father and Tammy’s former husband — filed suit in his individual capacity, as representative of Rexee Jo’s estate, and as next friend of his minor son against Garcia and Gonzalez. As to Gonzalez, Jackson asserted direct claims for negligent overloading and negligent hiring and also sought to hold him vicariously liable for the actions of Garcia and Ramirez based on Gonzalez’s alleged status as a motor carrier under both the Federal and Texas Regulations.
The Ramirezes later nonsuited their claims against Garcia. The trial court sev
The court of appeals affirmed as to Jackson’s negligent overloading claim, but a divided court reversed as to the no-evidence summary judgment on Jackson’s claim under the Texas Regulations and on the Ramirezes’ negligence claims based on retained control, concluding that the plaintiffs had raised fact issues as to these claims.
We first address whether Gonzalez can be held liable as a motor carrier for Jackson’s damages. The Federal Regulations impose various duties on motor carriers who classify their drivers as independent contractors in order to avoid liability for the drivers’ negligence. Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc.,
trade, traffic, or transportation in the United States—
(1) Between a place in a State and a place outside of such State (including a place outside of the United States);
(2) Between two places in a State through another Stаte or a place outside the United States; or
(3) Between two places in a State as part of trade, traffic, or transportation originating or terminating outside the State or the United States.
49 C.F.R. § 390.5.
Jackson alternatively argues that Gonzalez is liable as a motor carrier and employer under thе Texas Regulations.
The court of appeals held that fact issues exist as to Gonzalez’s status as a motor carrier and employer under the Texas Regulations, as to Garcia’s and Ramirez’s status as employees under the same, and, consequently, as to Gonzalez’s vicarious liability for Garcia’s negligence.
As an initial matter, we note that this line of cases has inadvertently confused federal and state law. Martinez relied on Morris and Sharpless v. Sim,
Martinez cited Morris’s general ' proposition,
However, Jackson alternatively argued in the trial court and court of appeals that Gonzalez breached duties imposed on motor carriers by parts of the Federal Regulations that, unlike Part 376, have been adopted in Texas.
We review the evidence presented by a no-evidence motion for summary judgment and response “in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding cоntrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez,
As discussed above, Gonzalez was a “motor carrier” under the Texas Regulations if he “controlled], operate[d], or direct[ed]” the operation of the truck. Tex. Transp. Code § 643.001(6). In analyzing whether a defendant is a motor carrier, we focus on the specific transaction at issue. See Camp v. TNT Logistics Corp.,
In Martinez, Hays controlled the work-site and was ultimately responsible for hauling the dirt, but exercised no control over the route drivers took or which driver operated a particular truck.
In Castillo, the court reached the opposite conclusion.
Here, in holding that the evidence presented a fact issue as to Gonzalez’s motor-carrier status, the court of appeals focused on the evidence that Gonzalez told the drivers where to pick up and deliver the silage, loaded the trucks and signaled when done, had the right to refuse to load a truck, and was “ultimatеly responsible” for getting the silage to the feed yard under his agreement with Chester Farms.
Like the defendant in Martinez, Gonzalez controlled the loading site, was ultimately responsible for the hauling as part of an underlying agreement, and loaded the trucks, but did not control what driver operated a particular truсk or what route the drivers took. Unlike Martinez, however, Gonzalez had nothing to do with verifying drivers’ insurance and licenses or providing hauling permits, nor did he establish the manner or method of the drivers’ payment. Thus, the facts that directly implicated control of the actual transportation of the property in Martinez are notably absent here.
Although the district court in Velichkov analyzed motor-carrier status under the Federal Regulations, we find the reasoning in that case instructive. There, FedEx contracted for transportation services with Fresh Start, which in turn hired Velichkov to drive the truck. Id. at 973.- The court held that the plaintiffs’ attempt to “ ‘bootstrap’ FedEx into ‘motor carrier’ status by stretching the regulatory language fails because the definitions of motor carrier and employer ... describe precisely the role assumed by Fresh Start in this instance as an independent contractor.” Id. at 980. Because Fresh Start assumed the pertinent motor-carrier duties, the plaintiffs were not deprived of their remedy. Id. The court declined to burden FedEx with the regulatory duties to conduct road tests and retain records for drivers with whom it had no relationship just because it had the ability to act as a motor carrier.
Under the circumstances presented here, where Jackson has shown only that Gonzalez told Garcia where to pick up and deliver — which any hauler would need to know
We turn next to the Ramirezes’ claim that Gonzalez breached common-law duties he owed Ramirez as the employee of an independent contractor. Generally, an owner or general contractor does not owe a duty to its independent сontractor’s employees to ensure that they safely perform their work. Koch Ref. Co. v. Chapa,
[A] general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations ... does not mean that the [independent] contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervisiоn that the [independent] contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.
In limiting liability in this way, we have explained that imposing liability on owners and general contractors who stop work perceived as unsafe “would deter [thеm] from setting even minimal safety standards.” Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright,
Here, the Ramirezes point to the following evidence to show Gonzalez’s control over Garcia’s work:
• Garcia’s testimony that “[Gonzalez] told me to take those particular trucks.... That particular truck, he told me.” But Garcia explained that this was “the only time that [Gonzalez] ever told me to bring the tandem trucks,” and that Gonzalez said: “ ‘If you want to bring your tandem trucks when we get started back again, if you ivant to bring your tandem trucks, bring them because ... the field that we are about to get into is really sandy and we are going to need your tandems.’ And that’s when he told me to bring them.” (Emphasis added).
• Garcia’s testimony that 3R/Gareia was obedient to Gonzalez’s suggestions, which needed to be followed: “We would just bring whatever he told us.... They are the bosses, you know, so we will do what they say.”
• Garcia’s affidavit stating that (i) he and Gonzalez have to agree about what trucks to use, (ii) thеy both approved the use of the tandem truck, and (iii) Gonzalez had more control over the cutting operations, while Garcia’ had more control with respect to the hauling operations.
• Gonzalez’s testimony that (i) he makes the decision whether to load a truck; (ii) the trucks looked up-to-date from a distance, and Gonzalez would not hire someone with unsafe trucks; (iii) in Gonzalez’s absence, his brother Javier takes over his responsibilities and authority; and (iv) had he seen the сondition of the truck on the date of the incident, he would not have loaded the truck because he “would have recognized the condition of the tandem as being dangerous.”
• Javier’s testimony that Gonzalez approves only safe trucks.
Even with every reasonable inference in favor of the Ramirezes, al] this evidence shows is that Gonzalez could refuse to load a truck, that he knew about the tandem truck’s condition only after the accident, that Garcia exercised more control over the transportation of the silage, that Gonzalez suggested but did not require that Garcia bring tandem trucks in light of the conditions at Chester Farms,
If the fact that the general contractor is the “boss” of a subcontractor were enough to create liability, the requirement of control would be obsolete.
We hold that the court of appeals erred in partially reversing the trial court’s no-evidence summary judgment. We grant the petition for review, and, without hearing oral argument, we (1) reverse the court of appeals’ judgment in part, (2) render judgment for Gonzalez on the Ramirezes’ claims and on Jackson’s claims asserted under the Federal and Texas Regulations, and (3) remand this case to the court of appeals to consider only Jackson’s negligent-hiring claim.
Notes
. The tandem truck is described as weighing 16,400 pounds and having a twenty-twо-foot bed, three axles, and ten tires.
. "Silage” is used to feed livestock and includes grass, corn, clover, and sorghum (which is the type of silage Gonzalez harvested for Chester Farms). Webster’s Third New Int'l Dictionary 2116 (2002).
. Jackson’s petition is not entirely clear as to negligent hiring. The cause of action is labeled as a common-law claim, but Jackson cites the Federal and Texas Regulations as support for the claim. We liberally construe Jackson’s petition to include a common-law negligent-hiring claim.
. Mrs. Ramirez sued individually, as representative of her husband’s estate, and as next friend of her five minor children.
. The Ramirezes later attempted to amend their petition to bring additional causes of action, including the same claims brought by Jackson under the Federal and Texas Regulations. But the court of appeals held that the amendment was untimely, and that holding has not been challenged here.
. The court of appeals did not address Jackson’s negligent-hiring claim or Gоnzalez’s traditional motion for summary judgment as to the Ramirezes’ claims. Id. at 154, 156.
. Gonzalez also claims that the court erred in not addressing Gonzalez’s traditional motion for summary judgment as to the Ramirezes’ claims. Because both of Gonzalez’s motions turn on the issue of retained control, and we conclude that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s grant of Gonzalez’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, we need not address this issue. See Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc.,
.In addition, “intrastate commerce” is defined as "any trade, traffic, or transportation in any State which is not described in the term ‘interstate commerce.’ ” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.
. The Texas Regulations define- "interstate commerce" to include "all movements by motor vehicle, both interstate and intrastate, over the streets and highways of this state.” ■37 Tex. Admin. Code § 4.11(b)(3).
. Accordingly, we look to federal case law for guidance. R.R. St. & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc.,
. In light of our holding that Gonzalez is not a "motor carrier” for purposes of these events, we need not address whether the truck at issue was a "commercial motor vehicle,” whether Gonzalez meets the statutory definition of "employer,” or whether Garcia and Ramirez qualify as "employees.”
. Castillo, in turn, relied on Martinez.
. We express no opinion as to the holding in Morris.
. These provisions require a written lease for the use of the equipment. 49 C.F.R. § 376.11(a). Among other things, the lease must provide that the lessee motor carrier "shall havе exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease ... [and] shall assume complete responsibility for the operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.” Id. § 376.12(c).
. 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 4.11(a) (adopting, inter alia, parts 385, 387, 390, 391, and 396 of the Federal Regulations).
. While the fact that Gonzalez's harvesters loaded the truck is relevant to Jackson’s negligent-overloading claim, that claim is no longer at issue.
. To that end, we note that Gonzalez’s possession of a motor-carrier license is irrelevant in determining whether he acted as a motor carrier with respect to this incident. See Camp,
.As the dissent in the court of appeals aptly noted, ’’[s]urely virtually every person who finds it necessary to hire a truck to haul a cargo also must tell the trucker where to get the cargo and where to haul it.”
. As noted above, the trial court rendered a default judgment against Garcia for several million dollars for breaching these duties.
. See also Ellwood Tex. Forge Corp. v. Jones,
. Garcia testified Gonzalez told him that tandem trucks would do better than bigger trucks, which would risk getting stuck in the sandy field during the loading process.
. It is undisputed that it was the condition of the tire, not the type of truck, that caused the accident.
. The Ramirezes also rely on Gonzalez’s testimony that he had a financial interest in making sure the silage made it to the destination, that he did not tell Chester Farms that he would be hiring other drivers, and that background checks are important. This is no evidence of control. Every contractor has a
. The remand encompasses only the common-law negligent-hiring claim. To the extent Jackson asserts statutory or regulatory bases for this claim under the Federal or Texas Regulations, we have already addressed those in this opinion.