Gonzalez, Sergio v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Collier County)

Aug 5, 2026

2:26-cv-00981

ORDER

Petitioner Sergio Salazar Gonzalez is Cuban national with a final removal order. He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As best the Court can tell from the pro se petition, he argues that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 1.) The Government opposes the petition. (Doc. 11.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Legal Framework

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

II. Discussion

The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6).

But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 679. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Gonzalez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. He was detained on February 12, 2026. Because he has been detained for less than six months from that point, he remains within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025). Seemingly recognizing this hurdle, the habeas petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that removal is not likely. But that argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”).

Gonzalez also seemingly argues that his clean supervision record precludes ICE from revoking his supervision. (Doc. 1 at 7.) This argument fails. He is subject to a final removal order that stands uncontested. The INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Gonzalez’s release specifically to enforce his outstanding removal order, gave him notice of the revocation, and afforded him an informal interview. (Docs. 11-8.) Returning him to custody thus serves a recognized, legitimate government objective and was done in compliance with the INA’s regulations.

Gonzalez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 5, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge