ALFONSO MARIO GONZALES, JR., Plaintiff, vs. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
Civ. No. 16-1354 KK
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER2
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record (Doc. 16) filed May 10, 2017, in support of Plaintiff Alfonso Mario Gonzales, Jr.s (Plaintiff) Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking review of the decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, (Defendant or Commissioner) denying Plaintiffs claim for Title XVI supplemental security income benefits. On July 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Reverse and Remand to Agency for Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum (Motion). (Doc. 19.) The Commissioner filed a Response in opposition on September 7, 2017 (Doc. 21), and Plaintiff filed a Reply on September 22, 2017. (Doc. 22.) The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioners final decision under
I. Background and Procedural Record
Claimant Alfonso Mario Gonzales, Jr. (Mr. Gonzales) alleges that he became disabled on September 12, 2012, at the age of thirty-three because of back, neck and knee injuries, asthma, post-traumatic stress syndrome, severe headaches, anxiety, and dizziness. (Tr. 30, 76, 239.3) Mr. Gonzales completed the eighth grade, and worked as a busboy, dishwasher, and warehouse worker. (Tr. 240, 241, 250-52.) Mr. Gonzales reported he stopped working on March 1, 2003, because of his medical conditions. (Tr. 239.)
On September 1, 2012, Mr. Gonzales protectively filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Act,
II. Applicable Law
A. Disability Determination Process
An individual is considered disabled if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
- At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity.4 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled regardless of his medical condition.
- At step two, the ALJ must determine the severity of the claimed physical or mental impairment(s). If the claimant does not have an impairment(s) or combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement, he is not disabled.
- At step three, the ALJ must determine whether a claimants impairment(s) meets or equals in severity one of the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations and meets the duration requirement. If so, a claimant is presumed disabled.
- If, however, the claimants impairments do not meet or equal in severity one of the listing described in Appendix 1 of the regulations, the ALJ must determine at step four whether the claimant can perform his past relevant work. Answering this question involves three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ considers all of the relevant medical and other evidence and determines what is the most [claimant] can still do despite [his physical and mental] limitations.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1) ,416.945(a)(1) . This is called the claimants residual functional capacity (RFC).Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3) ,416.945(a)(3) . Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mentaldemands of claimants past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether, given claimants RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those demands. A claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not disabled. - If the claimant does not have the RFC to perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner, at step five, must show that the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy, considering the claimants RFC, age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner is unable to make that showing, the claimant is deemed disabled. If, however, the Commissioner is able to make the required showing, the claimant is deemed not disabled.
See
B. Standard of Review
This Court must affirm the Commissioners denial of social security benefits unless (1) the decision is not supported by substantial evidence or (2) the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in reaching the decision.
III. Analysis
The ALJ made his decision that Mr. Gonzales was not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation. (Tr. 19-20.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Mr. Gonzales had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date of September 12, 2012,5 and had severe impairments of obesity, anxiety disorder, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, and pain disorder. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ, however, determined that Mr. Gonzales s impairments did not meet or equal in severity one the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. (Tr. 13-15.) As a result, the ALJ proceeded to step four and found that Mr. Gonzales had the residual functional capacity to perform less than a full range of light work as defined in
the claimant is able to lift up to 20 pounds occasionally, lift or carry up to ten pounds frequently, stand or walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday and sit for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday, with normal breaks. He should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes odors dust and gasses. From a mental standpoint, the claimant is limited to work involving only
simple routine tasks with little to no changes in the work setting. He can make commensurate work related decisions and respond appropriately to coworkers and supervisors, but contact with co-workers should only be superficial.
(Tr. 15.) The ALJ further concluded at step four that Mr. Gonzales had no past relevant work. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ determined at step five based on Mr. Gonzales s age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Mr. Gonzales could perform. (Tr. 19-20.) For this reason, the ALJ determined that Mr. Gonzales was not disabled. (Tr. 20.)
In support of his Motion, Mr. Gonzales argues that (1) the ALJ failed to properly consider the State agency psychological consultant opinion evidence; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly consider Mr. Gonzales s obesity. (Doc. 19 at 7-12.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds there is no reversible error.
A. State Agency Psychological Consultant Opinion Evidence
1. State Agency Examining Psychological Consultant Mark Simpson, PsyD, LADAC
On December 15, 2012, Mr. Gonzales presented to Mark Simpson, PsyD, for a mental status consultative examination. (Tr. 390-92.) Dr. Simpson initially noted that Mr. Gonzales did not appear to have difficulty with balance, walking, or sitting, and that there was no evidence of pain behaviors during the approximately one hour evaluation. (Tr. 390.) Dr. Simpson indicated that Mr. Gonzales was cooperative throughout the evaluation. (Id.)
Mr. Gonzales reported a long history of depression, anger, anxiety, learning difficulties, difficulties with concentration, and chronic neck and back pain. (Id.) He also reported that anxiety attacks had resulted in three emergency room visits the previous year.6 (Id.) Mr. Gonzales told Dr. Simpson that he had been stabbed twice in his torso, once in 1985 and
On mental status exam, Dr. Simpson observed that Mr. Gonzales was (1) oriented to person, date, place, and to the reason he was being evaluated, and that there was no evidence of psychomotor agitation or retardation. (Tr. 391.) He noted that (1) Mr. Gonzales s mood was depressed and his affect was constricted; (2) he presented as being undereducated; (3) his thought process was linear and goal directed; and (4) his insight and judgment were good. (Id.) Dr. Simpson indicated there was no evidence of perception abnormalities, and no evidence of suicidal and/or homicidal ideations. (Id.)
Dr. Simpson s Axis I diagnosis was post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic, and he assessed a GAF score of 53.7 (Tr. 391.) Dr. Simpson s impression was that Mr. Gonzales was challenged by chronic pain, asthma, headaches, and by PTSD and that it appeared that these challenges will make it more difficult to seek, obtain, and maintain employment. (Tr. 392.) As to Mr. Gonzales s mental functional limitations, Dr. Simpson assessed that Mr. Gonzales had mild limitations in his ability (1) to understand and remember very short and simple instructions; and (2) to be aware of normal hazards in the workplace. (Id.) He further assessed that Mr. Gonzales had mild-to-moderate limitations in his ability (1) to understand and remember detailed or complex instructions; (2) to carry out instructions; (3) to attend and concentrate;
2. State Agency Nonexamining Psychological Consultant Howard G. Atkins, Ph.D.
On August 30, 2013, Howard G. Atkins, Ph.D., reviewed Mr. Gonzales s medical records at reconsideration.8 (Tr. 96, 100-102.) Dr. Atkins restated Dr. Cox s explanation related to Mr. Gonzales s alleged mental impairments (see fn. 8, supra), and explained further that
[a]fter the Initial mental assessment was completed, an MSCE was performed 12/15/12 where [claimant] reported 3 emergency room visits over the previous year due to anxiety attacks. MSE reflect mild-moderate limitations. CE examiner cites diagnosis of PTSD, chronic with GAF=53. Examiner notes conditions, mostly physical, would make it difficult for the [claimant] to maintain employment. While mental symptoms may restrict the [claimant] somewhat, they would not wholly compromise his ability to function in a work setting. See MRFC.
(Tr. 96.)
Dr. Atkins prepared a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment and indicated that Mr. Gonzales was not significantly limited in his ability (1) to remember locations and work-
[o]verall, claimant should be able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, simple work on a sustained basis, particularly in settings of low social contact, including the abilities to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; make judgments commensurate with the functions of simple work, i.e., simple work-related decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work situations; & deal with changes in a routine work setting if introduced gradually.
(Tr. 102.)
3. ALJs Mental RFC
The ALJ assessed that from a mental standpoint, Mr. Gonzales was
limited to work involving only simple routine tasks with little to no changes in the work setting. He can make commensurate work related decisions and respond appropriately to coworkers and supervisors, but contact with co-workers should only be superficial.
(Tr. 15.) In making her assessment, the ALJ accorded significant weight to Dr. Simpson s opinion that Mr. Gonzales experienced no more than mild to moderate limitations in any functional area. (Tr. 18.) The ALJ explained that Dr. Simpson s opinion was consistent with the lack of any mental health treatment in the record, and supported by Dr. Simpson s treatment notes that indicated negative psychiatric symptoms. (Id.) The ALJ also accorded some weight to Dr. Atkins opinion. (Tr. 19.)
Mr. Gonzales argues that the ALJ rejected certain of Dr. Atkins findings without explanation. (Doc. 19 at 8-9.) Specifically, Mr. Gonzales asserts that Dr. Atkins assessed that Mr. Gonzales should have limited social contact, but that the ALJ only limited Mr. Gonzales s contact with co-workers and not with supervisors and the public. (Id.) Mr. Gonzales further asserts that Dr. Atkins assessed that Mr. Gonzales could deal with changes in a routine work setting if introduced gradually, but that the ALJs RFC provided only for little to no changes in the work setting. (Id.) Mr. Gonzales also argues that the ALJ failed to provide what weight she attributed to Dr. Simpson s opinion and failed to use the required regulatory factors in doing so. (Id.) Conceding in his Reply that the ALJ weighed Dr. Simpson s opinion, Mr. Gonzales newly asserted that the ALJ limited Mr. Gonzales s contact with co-workers, but failed to incorporate, without explanation, Dr. Simpson s mild to moderate limitations related to contact with supervisors and the public. (Doc. 22 at 2.) The Commissioner contends that although the ALJ did not adopt Dr. Atkins mental RFC assessment verbatim, the ALJ fully accounted for all of
An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given each opinion will vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical professional. Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215. Specifically, when assessing a claimants RFC, an ALJ must explain what weight is assigned to each opinion and why. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5.9 An ALJ must also consider a series of specific factors in determining what weight to give any medical opinion. Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215 (citing Goatcher v. United States Dept of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995)).10 An ALJ need not articulate every factor. Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). Ultimately, ALJs are required to weigh medical source opinions and to provide appropriate explanations for accepting or rejecting such opinions. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5 (emphasis added); see Keyes-Zachary v Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing
a. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the State Agency Psychological Consultant Opinions
As an initial matter, contrary to Mr. Gonzales s argument in his Motion, the ALJ weighed Dr. Simpson s opinion and accorded it significant weight. (Tr. 18.) In doing so, the ALJ explained that Dr. Simpson s opinion was consistent with the record as a whole and supported by Dr. Simpson s treatment notes. (Id.) These are specific factors to be considered in determining what weight to give a medical opinion. See
The ALJ also weighed Dr. Atkins opinion, according it some weight. (Tr. 19.) Although the ALJ did not provide an explanation for the weight she accorded Dr. Atkins opinion, as discussed below, there is no inconsistency between Dr. Atkins opinion and the ALJs mental RFC assessment. As such, any error is harmless. See Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that when the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence unfavorably in order to determine a claimants RFC, the need for express analysis is weakened); see also Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 579 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding that an ALJs failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJs assessment of RFC).
b. The ALJs Mental RFC Regarding Mr. Gonzales s Ability to Adapt in the Workplace Is Not Inconsistent With Dr. Atkins Assessment
Dr. Atkins assessed that Mr. Gonzales could deal with changes in a routine work setting if introduced gradually. (Tr. 102.) The ALJ in turn assessed that Mr. Gonzales could have little to no changes in the work setting.12 (Tr. 15.) Although the ALJ did not repeat verbatim Dr. Atkins narrative, the Court is persuaded that the ALJ sufficiently captured the essence of Dr. Atkins assessed limitation. See Carver v. Colvin, 600 F. Appx 616, 619-20 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that the ALJ sufficiently captured essence of consultative examiners narrative and need not repeat it verbatim). Moreover, Mr. Gonzales has failed to demonstrate precisely how a limitation to changes introduced gradually is more restrictive than little to no changes.
c. The ALJs Failure to Include Specific Limitations Related to Mr. Gonzales s Ability to Interact With Supervisors and the Public Is Harmless Error
Dr. Atkins stated in his narrative that Mr. Gonzales should be able to meet the basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, simple work on a sustained basis, particularly in settings of low social contact[.] (Tr. 102.) Dr. Atkins went on to assess, however, that Mr. Gonzales could respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and work situations. (Id.) The ALJ in turn assessed that Mr. Gonzales could respond appropriately to coworkers and supervisors, but contact with co-workers should only be superficial. (Tr. 15.) As such, the ALJs mental RFC is not inconsistent with Dr. Atkins assessment.
Dr. Simpson assessed that Mr. Gonzales had mild to moderate limitations in his ability to interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. (Tr. 392.) While the ALJ did not explain why she only limited Mr. Gonzales s social interaction with co-workers and not with supervisors
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the State agency psychological opinion evidence and that the ALJs mental RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Obesity
The ALJ determined at step two that Mr. Gonzales s obesity was severe. At step four, the ALJ stated that she
considered the claimants obesity in accordance with SSR 02-1p. The claimant testified that no doctor has recommended that he lose weight to help alleviate his back and knee problems.13 He stated he has been eating better however, in an attempt to lose weight. Nevertheless, while the claimant may have some difficulty in performing more strenuous activity on a regular basis, the claimants obesity does not preclude him from performing work activities at a lesser exertional level.
(Tr. 17.) Mr. Gonzales argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider his obesity at step three, and failed to consider the specific impact of Mr. Gonzales s obesity at step four in violation of SSR 02-1p. (Doc. 19 at 10-12.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly considered Mr. Gonzales s obesity, which was reflected in the ALJs decision and the RFC. (Doc. 21 at 12-15.) The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
SSR 02-1p explains how obesity is considered in the sequential evaluation process. SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, *3. Obesity is generally established as a medically determinable impairment when a physician and/or consultative examiner has diagnosed it. Id. At step two, we will find that obesity is a severe impairment when, alone or in combination with another
[b]ecause there is no listing for obesity, we will find that an individual with obesity meets the requirements of a listing if he or she has another impairment that, by itself, meets the requirements of a listing. We will also find that a listing is met if there is an impairment that, in combination with obesity, meets the requirements of a listing.
. . .
However, we will not make assumptions about the severity or functional effects of obesity combined with other impairments. Obesity in combination with another impairment may or may not increase the severity or functional limitations of the other impairment. We will evaluate each case based on the information in the case record.
Id. at *5-6; see also DeWitt v. Astrue, 381 F. Appx 782, 785 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting SSR 02-1). At steps four and five, [a]n assessment should also be made of the effect obesity has upon the individuals ability to perform routine movement and necessary physical activity within the work environment. Id. at *6.
1. The ALJs Failure to Discuss Mr. Gonzales s Obesity at Step Three Is Harmless Error
In Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729 (10th Cir 2005), the Tenth Circuit held that an ALJs conclusion at step three that a claimants impairments do not meet or equal any listing, while failing to discuss particular evidence, may be upheld if the ALJs findings at other steps of the sequential process provide a proper basis for doing so. Id. at 733-35. That is the case here. While the ALJ stated at step three that she found that the opinions of state agency physicians that the claimants impairments neither met nor equaled the severity of a listed impairment
2. The ALJ Properly Considered Mr. Gonzales s Obesity at Step Four
Mr. Gonzales relies on the Tenth Circuits decision in DeWitt v. Astrue, 381 F. Appx 782 (10th Cir. 2010) to argue that the ALJ relied on her own assumptions about the severity or functional effects of Mr. Gonzales s obesity instead of discussing the evidence at step four.
Here, although Mr. Gonzales did not raise obesity as an alleged impairment or limitation in either his application or at the administrative hearing, the ALJ nonetheless determined that Mr. Gonzales s obesity was severe based on the medical record evidence. (Tr. 13.) In her step four analysis, the ALJ discussed all of Mr. Gonzales s medical record evidence. (Tr. 15-18.) The ALJ also set forth and applied the standard for considering Mr. Gonzales s obesity and concluded that while Mr. Gonzales may have some difficulty performing more strenuous activity on a regular basis, [his] obesity does not preclude him from performing work activities at a lesser exertional level. (Tr. 17.) The ALJ further concluded that the evidence supported a pain-producing mild to moderate upper and lower back and knee impairment, and that she had not discounted Mr. Gonzales s subjective complaints, but that Mr. Gonzales s conditions were not of a relative severity, individually, or cumulatively to eliminate work with lesser exertional requirements. (Tr. 18.)
Importantly, Mr. Gonzales does not identify any evidence, nor can the Court find any, to support that his obesity causes further limitations that would preclude his performing less than a full range of light work. See DeWitt, 381 F. Appx at 785 (the ALJ will not make assumptions
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJs step four findings justify her step three conclusion that Mr. Gonzales s impairments, alone or in combination with other impairments, did not meet or equal in severity one the listings described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. As such, the ALJs failure to specifically discuss Mr. Gonzales s obesity at step three is harmless error. See Fisher-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that no remand for a more thorough discussion of the listings at step three is required when confirmed or unchallenged findings made elsewhere in the ALJs decision confirm the step-three determination under review.). The Court further finds that the ALJ properly considered Mr. Gonzales s obesity at step four and that the ALJs step four findings are supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Gonzales s Motion to Reverse and Remand to Agency for Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 19) is DENIED.
KIRTAN KHALSA
United States Magistrate Judge, Presiding by Consent
Notes
(Tr. 81.)[Claimant] alleging PTSD, and anxiety D/O. He has no mental health provider, no hx of hospitalization for mental impairment. His orthopedic doctor notes that he may have mild depressive symptoms but then states it is out of his expertise. [Claimant] alleges that he is unable to do anything on his ADL form. However it should be noted that w/regard to the physical side, [claimant] was found to be fully exaggerating his symptoms in relation to his near normal objective medical evidence.
8/12/12 PE, Psych notes NML mood/affect. Behavior is normal. Thought content is normal. Judgment is normal. AOx3.
FTF interview: Neat and well groomed. Casually dressed, polite. [Claimant states] unable to complete the app and report b/c he gets headaches when he reads.
No MDI.
