Defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine in violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (Code Ann. Ch. 79A-8) and now appeals. Held:
1. Defendant enumerates еrror on the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (cocaine seized by police officers from the map compartment of defendant’s automobile). The search and seizure was not made pursuant to a search warrant, and defendant contends the police officers had no probablе cause to search the automobile and that "there was nothing in the agents’ knowledge that would have led a reasonably prudent man to believe that aрpellant’s automobile contained cocaine.”
The legal principle involved is not in controversy and was well stated in
Johnson v. State,
It is our view that the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress amply authorized a finding that the circumstances would have led a reasonаbly prudent man to believe that defendant’s automobile contained contraband. The record reveals that a number of police officers had positioned themselves in and around a motel with communications devices to observe and gain information about an illegal sale of approximately one pound of cocaine being arranged by an undercover agent. One Simmons drove his black Volkswagen to the agent’s room at the rear of the motel cоmplex, sold an ounce of cocaine to the agent, and when the agent sought to make an additional purchase, Simmons stated that he would have to return later that night after checking with "his man,” or supplier, who wanted to supply the cocaine an ounce at a time. The agent agreed and Simmons left, driving his Volkswagеn to the front parking lot where he parked next to defendant’s blue Volkswagen which had been there during the meantime. Simmons got out of his black Volkswagen, entered thе blue one and talked with the occupant for three or four minutes. Simmons them re-entered his automobile and the two Volkswagens left together. The officers attеmpted to follow them but lost them in traffic arid returned to their positions at the motel. Approximately two hours later the two Volkswagens returned together and proceeded to the rear of the motel complex. Simmons parked in front of the undercover agent’s room and entered. Defendant backed his blue Volkswаgen into a parking space at the edge of the building and remained behind the steering wheel, and as two of the officers drove around to the rear in an unmarked car defendant slid down in his seat, it appearing to the officers as though he was trying to hide. The officers approached, showed their identification and asked defendant to step out. As he did so an officer on the driver’s side saw a plastic bag containing white powder protruding from the riiap panel or pouсh of the door, on the driver’s side. An officer standing beside the car on the passenger’s side looked through the window when the driver’s door was closed and also observed the bag and powder protruding from the pouch. This officer testified that the bag containing the powder was the same type he had seen in other *667 narcotics cases and was positioned only halfway into the pouch so "that possibly in case a police officer came up, he could throw it out without аny problem, without having to go into the pouch and look for it, because it was quite a large pouch.” The officer came around to the driver’s side, removеd the bag, and defendant was placed under arrest.
Under these circumstances we disagree with defendant that the officers were acting upon mere suspicion, but on the contrary conclude that they had probable cause for a search and that there was no unreasonable search and seizure.
2. Defеndant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of the State’s expert witness, a toxicologist with the State Crime Laboratory, over the objection that the expert did not herself personally prepare the standard samples, graphs, tracings, etc. used for comparison purposes in testing the сocaine. While defendant concedes in his brief that "the expert may give his opinion based upon hearsay or such other facts as he may wish, and his opiniоn is always admissible and the jury may give it such weight as it deems fit,” and that the opinion of the expert here is "well reasoned and based upon extensive use of enormоusly sophisticated machinery after years of training,” reliance is placed upon
Espy v. Preston,
3. During the state’s сlosing argument, which was not reported, the following occurred: "Mr. Carriere [defense counsel]: Your Honor, I respectfully request that the Court admonish Mr. England for the disparaging remarks with respect to counsel here, addressing the jury and having a difficult time keeping a straight face. The Court: Sustain the objection.” Error is enumerated on the failure of the court to admonish the assistant district attorney. Since we have not been presented with a sufficient record of the statement and the cоntext in which it was made to enable us to pass upon this ground, we can find no reversible error.
Jackson v. State,
4. Defendant complains of the admission into evidence of the initial conversation between Simmons and the undercover agent with regard to the sale of the cocаine. It is contended that the statements of Simmons concerned only himself and his activities in negotiating the sale and are not material or relevant to the indictment charging defendant with possession only, and that the state did not prove prima facie by competent evidence, other than by the acts or statements оf Simmons, the co-conspirator, that a conspiracy existed. However, a conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct еvidence
(Geter v.
State,
Judgment affirmed.