101 Tenn. 587 | Tenn. | 1898
This bill is filed to set aside the satisfaction of a judgment and have it restored to vitality and force, and to have the judgment thus restored declared a lien upon land and the land sold to satisfy the same. . The Chancellor dismissed the bill, refusing any relief, and the complainant appealed. The Court of Chancery Appeals reversed the Chancellor, and decreed that the satisfaction be set aside; that a lien be declared for the reinstated judgment; that it be collected out of certain lands and out of a certain judgment obtained by defendant, McCoy, against Sells, the vendor of the land to him. The case was also remanded for an account of rents received by complainants and for the execution of the decree. Both parties have appealed to this
The facts found by the Court of Chancery Appeals, so far as they need he stated, are that McCoy purchased from P. G. Sells a tract of land which belonged originally to one Rice, at the price of $2,400, of which -$1,200 was paid in cash, and for the balance three notes were given, each for $400. One of these notes was paid, and complainant bought the other two for $666, and claims to be an innocent holder of them. They were secured by a lien on the land. The land, by proper proceeding, was sold to satisfy the judgment obtained on these notes, amounting to $1,050, and was bought by complainant, at his debt and costs, and the judgment was thus satisfied. It appears, however, that Rice, the original owner of the land, before he conveyed it to Sells, had made a conveyance of it to Nancy McCoy, reserving a life estate in himself. One of the conditions of the conveyance to Nancy McCoy was that she should live with Rice and family until his death. She failed to do this, but left the State, and Rice thereupon filed a bill to vacate the deed, alleging that it had never been delivered and had never taken effect. Such proceedings were had that this deed was set aside, and Rice thereupon sold to William Sells, and he to P. G. Sells, and he to A. J. McCoy, as before
The Court of Chancery Appeals find that when complainant bought the notes sued on he was assured by both McCoy, the maker, and Sells, the indorser, that the title to- the land for which they
Gonce, as before stated, obtained by his purchase the life estate of Rice, but did not get the fee simple. He went into possession in November, 1892. Rice died in May, 1893. In this interval, Gonce had received the rents and profits of the land, and was required by the Court of Chancery Appeals to account for the same as a credit upon his judgments when reinstated and as a condition to ' their reinstatement. Upon this feature of the case the question is narrowed down to this: Is the creditor, who has bid his judgments on land, and thus satisfied them, entitled to have this satisfaction vacated and the judgments reinstated because he only obtained a life estate in the land, when he believed he was getting a fee simple estate and bought under that belief? Unquestionably, if there be a total failure of title and the purchaser get nothing by his purchase, such a result would follow.
The provision of the Code (Shannon, § 4719), is, in substance, that the satisfaction may be set aside by soi. fa. if no title is obtained to the property bought to satisfy the judgment.
But the question in this case is, does such rem
He is not entitled to such relief if he obtains any £ ‘ beneficial interest ’ ’ by his purchase, and the Courts cannot measure the benefit or value of the interest acquired if it is substantial. Ilayes v. Cartwright, 6 Lea, 145. It should be stated that Gonce, the purchaser, does not offer to refund what he 'really obtained by his purchase, but he objects to refunding or accounting for anything he has received, and appeals from so much of the decree of the Court of Chancery Appeals as requires him to give credit for the rents received; in other words, he insists he has a right to have his judgments restored and reinstated and still to hold on to all he has received from a sale under these judgments. In his bill he does not offer to return what he received, and while he acquired Rice’s life estate under his purchase, he refuses to account for what he re
We are of opinion that the Court of Chancery Appeals is in error in holding that the complainant is entitled to have the satisfaction of the judgment in this case set aside and the judgments restored to force and vitality, but that he is bound by his purchase and the benefits received thereunder, and it is not necessary to consider the other question.