52 Wash. 685 | Wash. | 1909
On June 21, 1907, the plaintiff purchased from the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company, at Spokane, Washington, an excursion ticket, at a price less than the usual fare, entitling her to transportation with a reasonable amount of baggage over the lines of the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company from Spokane, Washington, to Portland, Oregon, and from Portland, Oregon, to Albany, Oregon, over the lines of the Southern Pacific Company, and from thence over the line of the Corvallis & Eastern Railroad Company, to Newport, Oregon, and return over the same lines. The contract part of the ticket was as follows:
“In issuing and selling this ticket for passage over other transportation lines The Oregon Railroad and Navigation Company acts only as agent for such lines, assumes no responsibility beyond its own line, and assumes no liability either for itself or for the lines represented on this ticket, for baggage except for wearing apparel, and then only for one hundred dollars in value, unless a contract in writing is made for a greater value. This ticket is void unless officially stamped and dated, and the coupons belonging to this ticket will be void if detached.”
A coupon was attached which was, in effect, an order on the Southern Pacific Company for a ticket over its line from Portland, Oregon, and the Corvallis & Eastern to Newport and return. On the same day the plaintiff left Spokane and pursued her journey with an interruption of one day in Portland, Oregon, occasioned by the fact that no trains ran on the Corvallis & Eastern road on Sunday. Her baggage was checked to Newport by the Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company. She left Newport on the 11th' day of September, 1907. The agent of the Corvallis & Eastern road at Newport gave her a local check that, in so far as the railroad companies engaging to carry this passenger are concérned, was good only over the line of that road. However, plaintiff swears — and her testimony is not contradicted in that behalf — that the word “Spokane” was marked on the local check as the destination of her baggage. She arrived in Spo
Without speculating on the various questions that have been entertained in the cases, and which have led to hopeless contrariety of opinion as to the effect to be given to the passenger’s knowledge, or lack of knowledge, or opportunity to know the character and effect of the contract printed on a railroad ticket, and the extent to which the common law liability to transport a passenger to his destination may be limited by special contract, we shall assume, for the purposes of this opinion, that the respondent had full knowledge of all the conditions, reserving the question whether the attempt of the appellant to limit its liability to losses occurring on its own line, was, considering the facts presented in the record, effectual to accomplish its purpose. It seems to be settled by practically all of the cases that it is the duty of the carrier issuing a coupon ticket, in the absence of any special contract limiting its liability, to carry the passenger only to the end of its line and deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond.
“This rule of liability is adopted generally by the courts in this country, and is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction.” Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Mineral Springs Mfg. Co., 16 Wall. 318, 21 L. Ed. 297.
“In the absence of a special agreement to that effect, such liability will not attach, and the agreement will not be inferred from doubtful expressions or loose language, but only from clear and satisfactory evidence.”
These cases- were followed in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Jones, 155 U. S. 333, 15 Sup. Ct. 136, 39 L. Ed. 176. It is also a rule well within the great weight of authority, that the nature of the contract must be determined by a consideration of all the circumstances attending the particular case presented, and that the ticket itself is not the only evidence that may be introduced and considered; for, notwithstanding the form of the ticket and the construction put upon it by the carrier^ circumstances may be such as to imply an entirely different contract. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Loftis, 72 Ohio St. 288, 74 N. E. 179, 106 Am. St. 597. In fact, the most striking incident of our present inquiry is that each case involving the reasonableness of conditions printed upon railroad tickets has been determined not as an abstract proposition, but rather by their application to the particular facts disclosed in the instant case.
The principal question for our determination is the legal effect of the contract above quoted. The interest of the public in the matter and manner of the transportation of passengers or goods is such that all contracts limiting liability, made or attempted to be made by the carrier, will be construed in the light of public policy. A part of the burden of properly disposing of this case is overcome by the case of Allen & Gilbert-Ramker Co. v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 42 Wash. 64, 84 Pac. 620, which commits this court to this doc
In the case of Allen & Gilbert-Ramaker Co. v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., supra, speaking to this point, the court said:
“In fact, it seems to us that to deny this right to the shipper would be equivalent to a denial of justice at the hands of the law. The money is paid in one lump sum. The equitable distribution of this money is not within the province of the shipper. He has no way of ascertaining what the contract is between the different connecting lines in relation to their recompense or responsibility, and if his goods are lost or damaged he is relegated to a search across the continent to obtain information as to the responsibility of the different carriers for the damage, information which, in many cases, would be entirely unavailable. He has no way of accompanying the goods to look after them himself; probably would not be allowed to do so, under the transportation rules of the different companies, if he were so inclined. He deals with one company, which accepts his goods, receipts him for the same, and contracts to carry them to their destination; and any*691 rule which would throw upon him the difficulties we have suggested would be unnecessary and inequitable.”
Escape from this reasoning is sought in the suggestion that a different rule prevails between the carriers of freight and baggage, in that a passenger accompanies his baggage and can look out for it. While in theory this may be true— it has been so decided by some courts — yet in fact and practice nothing can be further from the truth. To undertake to look after baggage under modern conditions of travel would put an impossible burden on the passenger, and an attempted compliance on the part of the traveling public would result in a condition intolerable to the railroad companies. In the case of Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Roach (35 Kan. 740), 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases 257, cited by appellant, it was held that the last carrier was not liable for the loss of baggage, in the absence of a showing of such community interest as would make the carriers partners inter sese, and that the sale of a through ticket over the route by the connecting carriers, and the checking of baggage to the end of the route without other evidence to show the relations of the companies, would not bind the last carrier as a principal. Without admitting the rule, it seems to us that the difference between that case and this is suggested by the conclusion reached by the court. The argument made to exempt the last carrier would bind the first carrier had it been the defendant. The court said:
“The theory that the defendant company was the original contracting carrier finds no support in the testimony, and no liability arises against the company on that ground. Where, then, is the liability? It is contended by the railroad company that the New York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co., being the first carrier, is alone liable. While a railroad company cannot be compelled to transport to a point beyond its own line, it is well settled that it may lawfully contract to carry persons and property over its own and other lines, to a destination beyond its own route; and when such a contract is made, it assumes all the obligations of a carrier over the
The case of Felder v. Columbia etc. R. Co. (21 S. C. 35, 53 Am. Rep. 656), 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases 264, is the one most relied upon by appellant. This was a case sounding in tort against the last carrier. We do not consider it in point. Another leading case upon which dependence is put is that of Milnor v. New York etc. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 363. In that case the contracting carrier was sued for a loss occurring off of its line, and the court held it was not liable, on the theory that it acted as the agent of the negligent carrier merely for the purpose of selling its tickets. The force of this case as an
Reference to the innumerable cases against carriers upon the subject of liability for lost baggage or freight, shows that, if the last carrier is sued, it generally defends upon the ground that it was not a party to the contract, or that the goods did not come into its possession; whereas if the contracting carrier is sued, it usually defends upon the theory that it acted only as agent for the connecting carrier, and in the absence of a special contract or the disclosure of facts showing a partnership, it is not bound to answer; thus, in either event, binding the party damaged to the production of proof entirely beyond his control, and making his recovery almost if not absolutely- impossible. He might have to go from one to the other, through all the connecting system, to find the responsible party. The only just rule is to bind the contracting carrier to its contract, where the facts in the given case warrant it, and to hold all other connecting carriers to answer for their negligence, in which event it would no doubt be necessary to show that the baggage had actually come into the possession of the negligent carrier.
Here appellant was the contracting party. It agreed in law to do all that the party paid for, and is held on the contract rather than on the theory of tort. The effect of the ticket issued to respondent was to deprive her of the opportunity of looking after her baggage. If it expected to put that duty upon her it should have so informed her. The conduct of appellant was inconsistent with the condition printed on.the ticket, and raised an implied contract that her baggage would be returned in like manner as it had been forwarded. The nature of appellant’s engagement was such as to make
The court below allowed a recovery for the full value of the baggage as alleged by respondent. The fourth condition upon the ticket issued to respondent is as follows: “The baggage liability limited to wearing apparel not exceeding $100 in value.” In such cases the same rule applies to baggage as to freight, 6 Cyc. 663. It has been almost universally held that this condition, when attached to a ticket sold at a price below the usual fare, is a reasonable one, and will be enforced by the courts. The respondent’s recovery should have been limited to the amount agreed upon. Windmiller v. Northern Pac. R. Co., ante p. 613, 101 Pac. 225; Jensen v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 51 Wash. 448, 98 Pac. 1124; Hill v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 33 Wash. 697, 74 Pac. 1054; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717; The Priscilla, 106 Fed. 739.
This case will therefore be affirmed, with instructions to the lower court to enter a judgment in favor of respondent for the sum of $100. Appellant will recover its costs in this court.
Rudkin, C. J., Dunbar, Mount, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.
Crow, Gose, Parker, and Morris, JJ., took no part.