{1} Plаintiff Robert Gomez appeals from two judgments dismissing his claims with prejudice in two separate actions against Defendant Gary Chavarria. The district court in each action determined that Plaintiffs claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976), and that the one-year extension granted to minors in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-10 (1975) did not save the actions. The issues are the same in both actions. Plaintiff asserts that the district court misapplied Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} In his action filed on March 29, 2007, Plaintiff alleged that on February 13, 2004, he was sixteen years old and was injured in a vehicle collision caused by Defendant. In his action filed on April 24, 2007, Plaintiff allegеd that on April 23, 2004, he was seventeen years old and was again injured in another vehicle collision caused by Defendant. Plaintiff turned eighteen on April 2, 2005.
{3} Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings in both actions based on the bar of Section 37-1-8. In response, Plaintiff argued that his claims and the three-year limitations period in Section 37-1-8 were tolled until he reached age eighteen, and that additionally, under Section 37-1-10, the limitations period was also tolled for another year after he reached eighteen. Based on the theory that, under Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10, “a minor is afforded the general statute of limitations of three years plus one yeаr (per tolling),” Plaintiff argued that the limitations period would not expire until February 13, 2008, in the first action and April 23, 2008, in the second action, “or until his birthday of April 2, 2008[,] since the tolling provision seemingly provides for both dates.”
{4} The district court disagreed with Plaintiff and dismissed both actions with prejudice. Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff contеnds that pursuant to minority/disability tolling principles and Section 37-1-10 he is allowed four years from the accrual dates within which to file the actions. Second, he contends that an interpretation of Section 37-1-10 to the contrary “would constitute a new rule that should not be applied to him retroactively.” Third, he contends that the district court’s interpretation of Section 37-1-10 violated his equal protection rights and his substantive
DISCUSSION
{5} The limitations period under Section 37-1-8 is three years. Section 37-1-10 states: “The times limited for the bringing of actions by the preceding provisions of this chapter shall, in favor of minors and incapacitated persons, be extended so that they shall have one year from and after the termination of such incapacity within which to commence said actions.”
{6} We first address the deadline for filing the actions. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Cooper v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
Deadline for Filing Actions
{7} The three-year limitations period in Section 37-1-8 begins to run against both adults and minors when the cause of action accrues. Slade v. Slade,
{8} With respect to his first action, Plaintiff reached eighteen a little over a year after the date of the accrual of the first cause of action, February 13, 2004, the date of the first accident. When he reached eighteen, he had almost a year and ten months within which to sue before the Section 37-1-8 three-year limitations period ended on February 13, 2007. With respect to his second action, Plaintiff rеached eighteen a little short of one year after the accrual of the second cause of action, April 23, 2004, the date of the second accident. When he reached eighteen, he had a little more than two years within which to sue before the Section 37-1-8 three-year limitations period ended оn April 23, 2007.
{9} On appeal, Plaintiff argues that it is to be assumed “that the minority years are ‘lost years’ in terms of ability to act on one’s own behalf.” He argues that because the time between the accidents and his eighteenth birthday was approximately one year, he “ ‘suffered]’ from incapacity by way of his minority” and “effectivеly ‘lost’ one year, a period of time when, legally, he was not considered able to assert or even understand his rights under the law.” He asserts that “[t]he logical interpretation of the statute is that [he] had a one-year period following his eighteenth birthday during which the statute of limitations was tolled.” In attempting to piece together Plaintiffs arguments, we understand him to say that the “lost year,” was a one-year period of tolling, which should be added onto the three-year limitations period so as to extend that period a year beyond the dates of February 13, 2007, and April 23, 2007, to February 13, 2008, and April 23, 2008, thereby bringing him within a permissible limitations period. Nothing in the statutes or сase law, however, supports Plaintiffs arguments.
{10} The intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 37-1-10 was to give minors a reasonable period of time after reaching majority within which to file an action. See State v. Gutierrez,
{11} In both actions, Plaintiff had more than a full year after he reached eighteen within which to sue before the three-year limitations period in Section 37-1-8 ran its course. Plaintiffs arguments provide no basis upon which to hold that he had or needed longer than the date of expiration of the three-year limitations period within which to file his actions. Furthermore, if the three-year limitations period had ended on a date less than one year from Plaintiffs eighteenth birthday, we think that the intent underlying Section 37-1-10 would allow a full year following his eighteenth birthday for filing. Section 37-1-10 sets a standard that one year is a reasonable period of time for suit once minors reach the age of majority. No case exists in New Mexico law that indicates that a maximum of one year, under the circumstances here, would be unreasonable. We agree with Defendant’s view of the statutes: “A minor’s lawsuit for personal injury is not barred until one year after the minor reaches the age of majority or until three years after the accident — whichever computation of time gives the injured minor the most timе to act.” We conclude that Plaintiff had a reasonable time and opportunity in the year following his eighteenth birthday to file his actions. He also had a reasonable time and opportunity to file his actions before the three-year limitations period expired. We therefore hold that the district court did not misсonstrue or misapply the statute of limitations.
Retroactive Application
{12} Plaintiff contends that a holding that his actions were barred under Section 37-1-8 “would constitute a new rule that should not be applied to him retroactively.” Plaintiff cites Whenry v. Whenry,
{13} As a preliminary matter, in his argument on this issue Plaintiff asserts that his trial attorney relied on the interpretation of the statutes that Plaintiff now presents on appeal and that the attorney filed the actions “almost one full year prior to what he believed [was] the applicable deadline.” Plaintiff asks this Court to apply our holding prospectively only so as not to punish him “for his attorney’s reasonable mistake as to the meaning of a previously unconstraed statute.” Assuming, without deciding, that the statements of the attorney’s reliance and belief might be material to the analysis of the issue before us, we will not consider the statemеnts. Plaintiffs brief is devoid of any citation to the record indicating where Plaintiff presented these reliance and belief facts to the district court. We will not search the record for evidence to support a party’s argument. In re Estate of Heeter,
{14} On the merits of the issue, we note that, in Slade, our Supreme Court stated:
Statutes of limitation begin to run against everyone, including minors, when thecause of action accrues, and tolling statutes only extend the time for completing the bar of the statute so that the minor shall have an opportunity to act for himself after the disability caused by his minority has been removed.
{15} Plaintiffs reliance on Tafoya v. Doe,
Constitutionality
{16} Plaintiff contends that the district court’s construction of the statutes of limitations violates his substantive due process and equal protection rights under the United States Constitution. He аsserts that “[s]ubstantive [d]ue [p]rocess claims are addressed together with [e]qual [protection [c]laims because a [substantive [d]ue [process attack necessarily and implicitly includes an equal protection attack” and cites ACLU of New Mexico, but provides no pinpoint citation. He acknowledges that rational-basis review is proper. We determine whether the statutes as construed are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See ACLU of N.M.,
{17} “The purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect prospective defendants from the burden of defending against stale claims while providing an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary diligencе to pursue lawful claims.” Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. La Farge,
{18} Plaintiff argues, however, that Section 37-1-10 does not serve a legitimate interest, in that “it cuts off the claims of some minors while bolstering the claims of others based on an arbitrary difference in their particular ages at the time an action accrues.” Plaintiff illustrates his argument by pointing out what he contends is an arbitrary classification: Where the age of majority is eighteen, minors fifteen or younger would receive the benefit of an extra year, since the three-year limitations period would expire before they reach eighteen, whereas minors sixteen or older would not receive that same benefit. Plaintiff offers this further explanation:
Despite the fact that the sixteen year old “suffers” from his status as a minor for two years, once he reaches the age of majority!,] the trial court’s interpretation of the statute not only counts those two years against him for purposes of the statute of limitations, it also strips him of the benefit of an extra year of tolling. In contrast, the fifteen year old who reaches the age of majority after three years [is] afforded the extra year of tolling, allowing him a total of four years in which to file suit.
Thus, as we read Plaintiffs argument, not to accept his interpretation of the statute arbitrarily discriminates between him and others who are over sixteen at the time of injury, on the one hand, and persons who are under age sixteen at the time of injury, on the other hand.
{19} We reject this argument. First, as we discussed earlier in this opinion, Plaintiffs construction of the statutes at issue is not plausible or reasonable. A minor is not harmed or prejudiced by the statute’s continuing to run during minority, because Section 37-1-10 recognizes that a minor is not required to file an action before turning eighteen. Further, the statute reсognizes that because a minor is not required to file before reaching majority it is fair and proper to allow a year’s time when eighteen is reached within which to file an action. Second, there is no reasonable basis on which to conclude that a minor who is at least sixteen when an injury occurs would be treаted differently on any arbitrary or discriminatory basis. Third, under the district court’s determination and our holding, Plaintiff is not denied a benefit that persons under sixteen at the time of injury would receive. Were Plaintiff under sixteen at the time of the accidents, he would have had a year after he reached eighteen within which to sue. Plaintiff was over sixteen at the time of his accidents, and he had more than one year after he reached eighteen within which to sue. The district court’s application of the statutes was not arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonable.
{20} We therefore hold that, in regard to Plaintiffs argument of arbitrary discrimination as to classes of minors, the manner in which the district court and this Court have construed Sections 37-1-8 and 37-1-10 does not violate any substantive due process or equal protection rights.
CONCLUSION
{21} We affirm the district court.
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.