STEVEN L. GOMES v. MENDOCINO CITY COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT
A167862
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 4/14/25
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
(Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. 21CV00177)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
STEVEN L. GOMES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MENDOCINO CITY COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant.
Steven Gomes filed the underlying action to invalidate ordinances that regulate groundwater use in the unincorporated town of Mendocino. The ordinances were adopted by the Mendocino City Community Services District (the district), which has been authorized by the Legislature to manage the town‘s groundwater resources pursuant to
On appeal, Gomes contends the judgment must be reversed because the ordinances impose fees for groundwater extraction that voters must approve in an election, which the district did not hold. (See
BACKGROUND
The District‘s Authority
The district was established under the Community Services District Law. (
The Act, which was added to the Water Code in 1987, “applies only to the area within the existing boundaries” of the district. (
The Act also authorizes the district to “fix and collect rates for the extraction of groundwater” (
The Groundwater Management Program and Gomes I
In 1990, the district established its first groundwater management program by adopting Ordinance No. 90-1. (Gomes I, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 254.) Ordinance No. 90-1 required, among other things, that a property owner obtain a groundwater extraction permit for a new development, for a change in use, or for a newly constructed or modified well. (Id. at p. 254.) Most permit applicants were also required to comply with other requirements, such as obtaining a hydrological study, installing a water meter, and accepting an allotment that limited the amount of groundwater they could extract. (Ibid.) Ordinance No. 90-1 was enacted in compliance with the procedures outlined in
Steven Gomes owns a 1.8-acre parcel of property in Mendocino, located in the district. In 2014, Gomes was notified that he was required to obtain a groundwater extraction permit and allotment, as a stage four water emergency condition had been declared. (Gomes I, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.) In December 2014, the district lowered the drought condition to stage one, but because the permit and allotment requirement had already been triggered, the district maintained that Gomes was required to obtain a permit and allotment. (Ibid.) Gomes objected, both initially and after the drought level was lowered. The district‘s governing board held hearings to address Gomes‘s objections and concluded Gomes was obligated to obtain a permit, and was subject to penalties should he fail to comply. In 2015, Gomes filed his petition and complaint for declaratory relief in Gomes I, contending that the 2007 measures were invalid on numerous grounds. (Id. at pp. 255–256)
The Gomes I court made two material findings that assist us in resolving the present appeal. As a preliminary matter, the court found that the district has authority to limit the right of property owners to extract groundwater from their land. (Gomes I, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 256–258.) Gomes had argued that the district had no such authority, as it was not expressly conferred in the Act. (Id. at pp. 256–257.) Gomes raised this issue for the first time on appeal, but it was a legal question and the court rejected it on the merits. The court found that the district‘s “authority to manage groundwater necessarily includes the ability to limit the quantity of water that individual users may extract.” (Id. at p. 257; see also p. 258.)
Second, the Gomes I court found that the 2007 measures Gomes challenged were invalid because the district had not complied with procedures prescribed by the Act for enacting programs for the management of groundwater. (Gomes I, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 258–260Gomes I, at p. 258.) The trial court agreed with the district, expressing concern that requiring compliance with the Act‘s procedural requirements for every ordinance no matter how inconsequential would “render the operation of a management plan unnecessarily and unreasonably unwieldy.” (Id. at p. 259.) But the Gomes I court found that the trial court had misconstrued the law and reversed the judgment. (Id. at pp. 259, 261.)
Ultimately, the Gomes I court reversed the judgment with directions for the superior court to issue a declaratory judgment declaring that Ordinance No. 07-01, Ordinance No. 07-04, and the resolution establishing a water shortage contingency plan were void because they were not adopted in the manner prescribed by
The District‘s Monthly Groundwater Management Charges
In June 2018, before the appeal in Gomes I was decided, the district enacted Ordinance No. 2018-3, which was captioned as an ordinance establishing a charge for groundwater management. Before adopting this
Ordinance No. 2018-3 provides that “all developed parcels located within the District boundary that extract groundwater from privately owned well(s) or receive water extracted from mutual water company well(s)” shall pay the district a “Charge for Groundwater Management.” The charge is calculated using the equivalent single-family dwelling (ESD) concept already in use for assessing monthly sewer fees. This approach estimates water usage of 200 gallons per day for a two-bedroom single-family residence—a
The 2020 Groundwater Management Program
In 2020, after Gomes I was decided, the district adopted a series of ordinances that gave rise to the current action. Ordinance Nos. 2020-1, 2020-2, and 2020-3 and three related resolutions (collectively, the 2020 measures) establish groundwater management regulations and fees, and a water shortage contingency plan.
Ordinance No. 2020-1 is captioned as a groundwater extraction permit requirement for all real property in the district. It requires, among other things, that all developed parcels must have a valid groundwater extraction permit and limit groundwater extraction to an allotment approved by the district. To obtain the required permit, the property owner must submit a written application accompanied by a “fee in an amount determined by the Board to cover the cost of administering this groundwater extraction permit process.” Many applicants must submit a hydrological study and pay a fee “as determined by the Board to cover the cost” for the district to review the study. All applicants must agree to install a water meter, and once an extraction permit is issued, the permittee must submit monthly meter readings to the district. Ordinance No. 2020-1 imposes misdemeanor and financial penalties for failure to comply with the permit and/or allotment requirements, and it contains a prevailing party attorney‘s fee provision.
Ordinance No. 2020-2 is captioned as a water contingency plan. Among other things, this ordinance establishes water conservation policies and year-
Ordinance No. 2020-3 is captioned as an ordinance to set fees and charges for the 2020–2021 fiscal year, and thereafter unless revised. This ordinance is not limited to groundwater management programs but lists all fees and charges adopted by the district. It incorporates an Exhibit 1, consisting of a list of district fees and charges, and it repeals and replaces all existing fees and charges that conflict with the Exhibit 1 fee schedule. Pertinent here, Exhibit 1 sets forth fees relating to Ordinance No. 2020-01 as follows: $200 for an administrative permit; $300 for Board permit approval; and $700 for hydrological study approval. Exhibit 1 also continues the amount of the monthly groundwater management charge imposed pursuant to Ordinance No. 2018-3 at $10.63 per ESD.
The Present Action
In April 2021, Gomes initiated this action by filing a petition and complaint for declaratory relief. Gomes alleged that after Gomes I was decided, the district exceeded its authority and failed to proceed in a manner required by law when adopting the 2020 measures. Gomes‘s pleading is difficult to decipher, but, indisputably, he did not allege that the district failed to comply with
Instead, Gomes challenged aspects of the 2020 groundwater management ordinances on various legal grounds, which he incorporated into causes of action seeking multiple forms of writ, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Pretrial proceedings included a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
The evidence phase of trial was conducted over two court days in late October 2022. Gomes challenged the 2020 measures on the following grounds none of which remains at issue in the appeal: the district failed to obtain required approval from the Local Agency Formation Commission; permit and management fee provisions violate articles XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution; the district failed to comply with the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act; an attorney‘s fee provision in the ordinances is unlawful; and a member of the district board that adopted the measures had an impermissible conflict of interest. In addition, Gomes argued that provisions in the 2020 ordinances that authorize the district to collect fees from property owners violate
After the parties presented their evidence, they filed posttrial briefs. In February 2023, the court obtained supplemental briefs addressing specifically whether
On March 20, 2023, the court filed its decision, setting forth its findings in a nine-page order. The court rejected all of Gomes‘s claims, save one. It found that Ordinance Nos. 2020-1 and 2020-2 each contain an invalid provision purportedly authorizing the district to recover attorney‘s fees and costs for prevailing in litigation ” ‘concerning this ordinance.‘” (Italics
Of the other issues resolved by the trial court, two of its findings are relevant to the present appeal. First, Gomes argued that permit and management fees imposed in the 2020 measures are unlawful under provisions in Proposition 218 that added articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution. Rejecting this claim, the court found that the permit and management fees were actually adopted in prior ordinances that Gomes had not challenged in this action. Gomes failed to cite authority for his assumption that a “mere recitation of fees previously adopted and unchallenged” required compliance with Proposition 218, the court found. Moreover, the trial evidence showed that the district had, “out of an abundance of caution,” elected to comply with “the procedures set forth in Article III C and D” when it previously adopted these fees, so the court found it unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute about whether such compliance was actually required.
Second, Gomes argued that the management fee charged by the district is invalid under
In concluding that
Thus, with the exception of the attorney‘s fee provision in two of the 2020 measures, the court found in favor of the district and ruled that the “remainder of the Ordinances will remain intact.” Judgment was entered, and notice of its entry served on March 27, 2023.
DISCUSSION
Gomes “cabins” his appeal to the issue whether fees imposed by the district must be adopted pursuant to
Yet Gomes seeks broad relief, contending that the district‘s entire groundwater management scheme must be declared invalid. In developing this theory, Gomes recognizes little or no distinction between the different types of charges the district has enacted. He contends they are all “fees charged as a condition of using groundwater,” and on that basis are subject to
In addressing these matters, we review the trial court‘s factual findings for substantial evidence, while independently reviewing its conclusions on legal issues. (Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 115, 123.)
I. Gomes Is Not Barred From Challenging the District‘s Fees
We begin by addressing the district‘s contentions that principles of res judicata and forfeiture preclude Gomes from challenging fees attendant to the groundwater management programs. We disagree.
A. Res judicata
The doctrine of res judicata, which consists of two parts, “describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ ” (Ibid.) “Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in a
With respect to claim preclusion, there are three requirements: the prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment; the parties in the second lawsuit must be the same or in privity with the parties in the first lawsuit; and the second lawsuit must involve the same cause of action. (City of Oakland, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.) As there is no dispute the first two requirements are met, we limit our discussion to whether the current action involves the same cause of action alleged in Gomes I.
“A claim raised in a second suit is ‘based on the same cause of action’ as one asserted in a prior action if they are both premised on the same ‘primary right.’ [Citation.] ‘The plaintiff‘s primary right is the right to be free from a particular injury, regardless of the legal theory on which liability for the injury is based. [Citation.] The scope of the primary right therefore depends on how the injury is defined. A cause of action comprises the plaintiff‘s primary right, the defendant‘s corresponding primary duty, and the defendant‘s wrongful act in breach of that duty.’ ” (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 801.)
Applying these principles, we conclude that the current action and Gomes I are based on different primary rights. The claims in Gomes I were based on the right to be free from specific regulations promulgated in 2007 that were not authorized by statute, whereas here Gomes bases his claim on the right to be free from similar, but not identical, regulations the district promulgated in 2020. Gomes alleges the same type of injury in both cases, i.e., that he is being subjected to invalid regulations relating to his use of groundwater, but the injury itself is not the same because the second action
The district contends that claim preclusion should apply because the “two suits address nearly identical successor ordinances.” (Italics added.) We think the pertinent fact is that Gomes is not challenging the same ordinances that were declared void in Gomes I. The district relies on Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 692 (Atwell), which involved a petition challenging a city‘s approval of a project to expand an existing Wal-Mart store, a project alleged to be inconsistent with the city‘s land use policies. The Atwell court found that the petition was barred by res judicata because a prior petition challenging the city‘s prior approval of the same project had asserted the same claim. (Id. at pp. 694–695.) Atwell is inapposite, as that case involved a project that was approved and then reapproved after unrelated changes to the project‘s environmental impact report. (Id. at p. 697.) Between the two approval votes, the project remained unchanged, and both approving resolutions declared it to “‘be consistent with the General Plan and Zoning Ordinance.‘” (Id. at p. 701.) Because there were no changes of material fact between the petition challenging the first approval and the petition challenging the second, the Atwell court concluded the petitions raised the same claim, so the second petition was barred by res judicata. (Id. at p. 702.)
By contrast here, the district‘s 2007 permit ordinance and water shortage contingency plan were declared void, and the present action involves replacement ordinances the district adopted in 2020. On a practical level, the package of 2020 ordinances differed from its predecessor because the new groundwater management charge was almost twice the size of its 2007 predecessor. On a conceptual level, the 2020 ordinances comprised a specific
The district fares no better under its theory of issue preclusion. “In order for issue preclusion to apply, the following elements must be met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding; (4) the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” (Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1132 (Williams).) “The party asserting issue preclusion has the burden of establishing the above elements.” (Ibid.)
The first requirement for applying collateral estoppel, the identical issue requirement, “’ “addresses whether ‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) The issue
The district attempts to satisfy the identical issue requirement by defining the dispositive issue in Gomes I so broadly as to subsume the claim Gomes raises in the present appeal. According to this multipart argument: the issue in Gomes I was “the proper procedure” for enacting a groundwater management program; the Gomes I court actually decided this issue by concluding that the district was required to comply with procedures specified in
Nothing in the structure of the Act or the substantive provisions themselves supports the district‘s premise that the procedures set forth in
The district suggests issue preclusion should apply because the 2007 groundwater management programs challenged in Gomes I contained fee provisions that were substantively similar to fee provisions in the 2020 program that Gomes challenges in this case. Again, the district misconstrues the requirements for collateral estoppel, which applies only to an issue that was “actually litigated” and “necessarily decided.” (Williams, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) Even if the 2007 fee provisions had been identical to 2020 fee provisions, the 2007 measures were declared void in a final decision that did not address whether they were subject to the requirements of
B. This Court May Review the Merits of Gomes‘s Claim
The district contends that Gomes waived his claim that the current groundwater program violates
The district argues that even after the trial court agreed to address
II. Analysis
Gomes contends the 2020 measures are void in their entirety because the district failed to obtain voter approval in a “referendum” for the fees they impose, as he asserts
A. Sections 10708 and 10710 Apply to Rates for Extracting Groundwater
The Act requires that the district hold an election before collecting “rates for the extraction of groundwater.” (
Both of these provisions apply specifically to “rates for the extraction of groundwater” (
The word “rate” when used as a noun is commonly understood to mean an amount as measured against something else, such as a fixed price or charge. (See Merriam-Webster‘s 11th Collegiate Dictionary (2003) p. 1032.) Both parties acknowledge this generally understood definition, but add spins to suit their respective litigation positions. Gomes takes the view that a rate in this context means any charge relating to groundwater management. The district posits that because the word “rate” is used in a regulation, it refers specifically and exclusively to a per-unit charge for groundwater. We reject both contentions. Although we agree with the parties that context matters, we find the relevant context in the statutes themselves. The Legislature did not require voters to approve in an election all groundwater-related charges, nor did it limit application of
As the statutory language is clear on this point, we see no need for extrinsic aids. We note, however, that legislative history presented at trial reinforces our straightforward reading of these statutes. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9 [published legislative history may be cited without a request for judicial notice].)
Gomes argues these statutes should be construed to apply to any fee or charge in a groundwater ordinance because the “actual legislative history” shows the sponsor of Assembly Bill 786 believed the district‘s entire groundwater program would have to be approved by ” ‘a majority vote of the residents of the District.’ ” As support for this argument, Gomes has filed a motion requesting judicial notice “of the fact of the existence of the legislative history of 1987 Assembly Bill 786.” Gomes attached to his motion more than 200 pages of material, apparently a large number of separate items culled from different sources, which Gomes‘s counsel represents as the legislative history of 1987 Assembly Bill 786.
First, we think Gomes is misinterpreting his own proffered legislative history. He also quotes the sponsor of the bill as explaining, a ” ‘plan would have to be approved by a majority of the registered voters living in the district through a process of public meetings.’ ” This is, of course, an accurate
Gomes I has already established that affirmative voter approval “is not required for adoption of a groundwater management program; rather, compliance with the ‘enhanced adoption procedure’ specified in
Applying the clear language of these statutes, we conclude that a rate “for the extraction of groundwater” means a charge for extracting groundwater. (
We consider first the groundwater management charge that was adopted pursuant to Ordinance No. 2018-3, and then readopted or restated in Ordinance No. 2020-3. In upholding Ordinance No. 2020-3, the trial court found that this groundwater management fee is not subject to the requirements of
Ordinance No. 2020-3 authorizes the district to collect a monthly charge that applies to all developed parcels in the district that extract groundwater or that receive extracted groundwater. This monthly fee funds a variety of services provided by the district, including administering a water shortage contingency plan, issuing extraction permits, reviewing studies, monitoring water levels, and operating a recycled water system. We conclude that the management charge is not a rate for extracting groundwater. It is a fee that property owners who use groundwater pay the district for groundwater management services, generally.
Gomes contends that the monthly management charge falls within the definition of a rate and intimates that the trial court concluded otherwise only because it mistakenly concluded a rate must be a per-unit charge. We agree with Gomes that a rate does not have to be a per-unit charge, but we disagree that
Insisting that there is no distinction between an extraction fee and a management fee, Gomes argues that
For one thing, Gomes‘s argument misreads the language of
Another material flaw in Gomes‘s argument stems from his assumption that
In his reply brief, Gomes argues unconvincingly that the Community Services District Law does not authorize the district to charge fees for groundwater management services. He posits first that the Community Services District Law “says nothing of groundwater,” which may be true but is not dispositive. There is no dispute the district‘s authority to manage groundwater derives from the Act, rather than from the Community Services District Law. But that issue is separate from the issue here, pertaining to
Next, Gomes argues that because the Community Services District Law is a general law, while the Act is a specialized statute pertaining specifically to groundwater management, the Act must control to the extent there is any conflict between them. (Citing Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 419.) This principle has no application here, as Gomes fails to identify any conflict between the two statutes. In fact, the two complement each other. We have concluded the Act allows, but does not require, the district to impose “rates for the extraction of groundwater” (
C. Permit-Related Fees
We turn next to the fees imposed pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-1, the “Groundwater Extraction Permit Ordinance.” As our background summary reflects, amounts charged for these permit-related fees are set forth in Ordinance No. 2020-3. Although these fees are different from the monthly management charge imposed pursuant to Ordinance No. 2018-3, the trial
Groundwater extraction permit fees come in three increments: fees for administrative review of a permit application, for review that encompasses a hydrological study, and for obtaining the board‘s permit approval. Taken together, these fees constitute a one-time charge for obtaining a groundwater extraction permit. The ordinance requires “all developed parcels” within the district to have a permit and to “limit groundwater extraction to an approved . . . allotment.” Once obtained, the permit “remain[s] in effect in perpetuity or until a new Groundwater Extraction Permit is issued.”
We conclude that the groundwater extraction permit charges are not a rate “for the extraction of groundwater.” (
Gomes overlooks a subtle but important distinction between a charge that is a prerequisite to an activity and a charge that is levied for actually engaging in the activity. A permit is a prerequisite to participating in an activity, here the extraction of groundwater, but having a permit does not mean the permittee is actually engaged in the permitted activity. To use the language of Gomes‘s brief, the permit fees are a charge on “a threshold ability to extract groundwater,” but that is not the same as being a charge on the actual extraction of groundwater. Paying the fees is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for the extraction of groundwater.
Put another way, if the permit-related fees are any kind of rate, they are a rate for obtaining a permit to extract the allotted amount of groundwater, not a rate for the extraction of that groundwater. The service for which the district is charging is its determination of how much groundwater a property owner may draw, consistent with the district‘s water use standards and a site‘s hydrology. The property owner pays the permit fees to obtain this assessment and approval; and the property owner pays without regard to whether—or how often—he or she actually extracts this quantity of groundwater.8 Indeed, Ordinance No. 2020-1 requires all owners
Because permit fees are not paid for the activity of extracting groundwater, they are not “rates for the extraction of groundwater” under
D. Penalties
Finally, we consider penalties the district imposes for violating its groundwater ordinances. These charges include penalties for failure to comply with the permit and/or allotment requirements in Ordinance No. 2020-1, and penalties for violating water conservation measures in Ordinance No. 2020-2. We conclude these penalties are not charges for extracting groundwater, but fines for violating the ordinances. Thus, to the extent the ordinances are otherwise valid, so too are the penalties, without regard to
In his opening brief, Gomes contends the district‘s “penalty structure . . . fixes rates for the extraction of groundwater,” pointing out that groundwater extraction above the allotted level results in a penalty calculated at “a rate of two cents per gallon of excess use per month, up to 10 [percent] overage,” and a higher rate for larger overages. We reject Gomes‘s effort to equate this penalty rate, even though based on the size of the overage, with a rate “for the extraction of groundwater.” The penalties imposed in the 2020 measures are not triggered by extracting groundwater
In his reply brief, Gomes argues that penalties should not be exempted from the requirements of
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
FUJISAKI, J.
PETROU, J.
Gomes v. Mendocino City Community Services District (A167862)
Trial Judge: Hon. Jeanine B. Nadel
Counsel: Vannucci Momsen Morrow, and Colin W. Morrow for Plaintiff and Appellant
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Joseph D. Petta, Matthew D. Zinn, Seth Goldman; and Stokes, Hamer, Kirk & Eads, Chris Carol Hamer for Defendants and Respondents