Opinion
Thе plaintiff, John A. Gomes, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant, Massachusetts Bay Insurance *418 Company. 1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that he was not entitled to coverage under the underinsured motorist policy endorsement issued by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) construed General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while “occupying” a covered motor vehicle, rather than construing it to require such coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy, (2) concluded that the exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to him because he was not “occupying” a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute and (3) failed to conclude that because he was a named insured under his employer’s policy, he was not barred from collecting underinsured motorist coverage by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. 2 In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured on January 11, 2001, while working in his capacity as a volunteer fire policeman for the Pawcatuck fire district (district). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he responded to an emergency call, parked his vehicle at a nearby intersection and began directing traffic to carry out his assigned duties. He further alleged that whilе standing in the middle of the road directing traffic, he was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by the tortfeasor, Stanley *419 Prachniak, and was seriously injured. The plaintiff applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits from the district for his injuries. The plaintiff also recovered $100,000 from Prachniak’s insurance carrier for the injuries he sustained. The plaintiff brought the present action to collect on the underinsured motorist coverage provided by a policy issued to him by Allstate Insurance Company and by a policy issued to the district by the defendant.
On January 28, 2003, the defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, was not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the defendant’s policy. In support of its motion, the defendant argued that General Statutes § 31-284 (a), the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision, limited the plaintiff to the remedies provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. 3 The defendant further argued that the underin-sured motorist coverage exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336 (f) was inapplicable to the plaintiff because he was not occupying a covered motor vehicle at the time of the accident. 4
The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s motion and argued that when interpreted in light of legislative
*420
intent, the exception provided by § 38a-336 (f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In the alternative, the plaintiff argued that the exception was applicable because he was occupying or using a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. In addition to these arguments, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that pursuant to
Agosto
v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
On June 26, 2003, the court issued a memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision provided by § 38a-336 (f) was not applicable because the plaintiff was “in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck” and was not occupying a covered vehicle as “defined by the policy to mean ‘in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.’ ” Thе court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiffs recovery was limited to those remedies provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. On July 10, 2003, the plaintiff filed this appeal.
On July 16,2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation in which he sought to have the court address his argument that § 38a-336 (f) was applicable regardless of whether he was occupying a covered vehicle at the time of the accident. The court denied the motion. On November 5, 2003, the plaintiff filed a second motion for articulation regarding the reasons for the court’s *421 apparent rejection of the argument based on Agosto that he made during the hearing. 5 The plaintiff stated: “In light of the absence of any indication that the trial court addressed [the] Agosto argument, the plaintiff requests that an articulation be granted in order to create a proper record for this appeal.” On November 13, 2003, the court denied the motion.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for review of the court’s November 13, 2003 decision denying the motion for articulation. 6 We granted the plaintiffs motion for review and, citing Agosto, ordered the court to “articulate whether the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits as an insured as opposed to ‘as an occupant’ of a covered motor vehicle.” The order also directed that the articulation include the factual and legal bases for the court’s decision.
The court articulated its decision, explaining that, at the time it issued its decision, it had considered the issue before it to be whether the plaintiff was occupying a covered vehicle rather than whether ambiguity of the policy language entitled the plaintiff to coverage. After reviewing Agosto and Hansen, the court concluded that the policy language was ambiguous and thаt accordingly, the plaintiff “is entitled to coverage under the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage policy of the defendant.” In the final sentence of its articulation, the court stated that it “therefore, reverses itself and denies the motion for summary judgment.”
The defendant filed a motion for review in which it asked this court to vacate the trial court’s articulation on the ground that it had exceeded its authority by reversing its prior summary judgment ruling when responding to this court’s order for articulation. We granted the motion and ordered stricken the final sen *422 tence of the trial court’s articulation reversing its prior ruling. 7 Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that when the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it improperly concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured and underinsured motorist pоlicy endorsement. Before addressing his specific claims, we set forth the applicable standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See also
Craig
v.
Stafford Construction, Inc.,
In addition, because this appeal involves questions of statutory construction, we set forth our well established principles of statutory interpretation. “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Wasko
v.
Manella,
I
The plaintiff claims thаt the court improperly construed § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while “occupying” a covered motor vehicle, rather than construing it to require such coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that a conflict exists between § 38a-336 (a) (1), which mandates uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for any person insured under the liability portion of an automobile insurance policy, and § 38a-336 (f), which limits such coverage to those employees injured while “occupying” a covered motor vehicle. The plaintiff further contends that an absurd and unworkable result will occur if § 38a-336 (f) is construed as limiting uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage to those employees “occupying” a сovered motor vehicle. The plaintiff argues that the conflicting statutes should be harmonized with the public policy underlying mandatory uninsured and *424 underinsured motorist coverage, by interpreting § 38a-336 (f) as requiring uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsements to provide coverage to any person insured under the liability portion of the policy. We disagree.
“As with all issues of statutory inteipretation, we look first to the language of the statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Starks
v.
University of Connecticut,
“In determining the meaning of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also tо the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.”
Schiano
v.
Bliss Exterminating Co.,
*425
The text of § 38a-336 (f) expressly provides an exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule contained in § 31-284 (a) by allowing an injured employee to сollect benefits from his or her employer’s uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance coverage. The text, however, plainly and unambiguously limits the applicability of the exception to those employees injured while
occupying
a covered motor vehicle. “In construing the meaning of a statute . . . courts do not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for it . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hyllen-Davey
v.
Plan & Zoning Commission,
The plaintiff contends, however, that construing § 38a-336 (f) according to its plain and unambiguous meaning will lead to the absurd and unworkable result of limiting coverage required by § 38a-336 (a) (1). General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: “Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to sеction 38a-334 . . .
for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underin-sured motor vehicles . . . because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. . . ,”
9
(Emphasis added.) Thus, by its terms, § 38a-336 (a) (1) requires
*426
that each automobile liability policy provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to a class of persons that is coextensive with that insured under the liability section of the policy.
Middlesex Ins. Co.
v.
Quinn,
We are not persuaded that construing § 38a-336 (f) to limit the uninsured and underinsured motorist exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision to only those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle will lead to an absurd or unworkable result. We are mindful that our uninsured and underinsured motorist statute “is remedial in nature and designed to protect people injured by [uninsured and underinsurеd] motorists . . . [and that] remedial statutes should be construed liberally in favor of those whom the law is intended to protect.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Gohel
v.
Allstate Ins.
Co.,
We must also consider the remedial purpose of the workers’ compensation statutory scheme, including the exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a), to which § 38a-336 (f) provides an exception. “The Workers’ Compensation Act . . . provides the sole remedy for employees and their dependents for work-related injuries and death. ... Its purpose is to provide a prompt, efficient, simple and inexpensive procedure for obtaining benefits related to employment.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Pietraroia
v.
Northeast Utilities,
Prior to the enactment of § 38a-336 (f), our Supreme Court held that the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 (a) precluded an employee injured while operating the employer’s vehicle in the course of employment from seeking uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits directly from a self-insured employer;
Bouley
v.
Norwich,
Although the plaintiff urges this court to harmonize what he contends to be a continuing conflict between the statutory mandate of uninsured and underinsured coverage and the impact of the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision, we decline to do so because we conclude that the legislature appropriately resolved the conflict when it enacted § 38a-336 (f). We presume that the legislature acted with knowledge of the existence and contents of both § 31-284 (a) and § 38a-336 (a) (1). We also presume that it was mindful of the remedial purposes behind both the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute and the Workers’ Compensation Act and intended to create a consistent body of law. See
Commissioner
v.
Freedom of Information Commission,
On the basis of the language of § 38a-336 (f), it is apparent that the legislature addressed the
interplay
between the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute and the Workers’ Compensation Act by providing a
limited
exception to the exclusivity provision. The legislature could have chosen to allow the
Bouley
and
Colman
decisions to stand, or it could have chosen to provide a broader exception to the exclusivity provision. Instead, the legislature chose to harmonize the conflicting statutory schemes by providing an exception, while limiting its applicability to those employees “injured while
occupying
a covered motor vehicle
*429
. . . .”
10
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 38a-336 (f). “There is no question that the legislature may, by the language it uses in a statute or a section of a statute, demonstrate its intent that it be limited or restricted.”
Taravella,
v.
Stanley,
Even if we were to agree with the plaintiff that consideration of extratextual evidence of the meaning of § 38a-336 (f) is warranted in this case, we note that the legislative history the plaintiff presented would be insufficient to override the plain and unambiguous text of the statute. The plaintiff argues that the legislature intended to provide coverage for all employees without regard to occupancy and that “use of statutory language suggesting any restriction on that right must be dismissed as accidental.” The plaintiff further argues that absent any legislative history showing that the legislature expressly intended to limit the applicability of the exception to the exclusivity rule to those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle, we should ignore the plain and unambiguous text of the statute. Thеse arguments are wholly inconsistent with our well established principles of statutory interpretation.
When searching for the legislative intent of the meaning of a statute, we always begin with an examination of the statutory language because it “is the most important factor to be considered . . . .”
State
v.
Courchesne,
As discussеd, the text of § 38a-336 (f) is plain and unambiguous and strongly suggests that the legislature intended to limit applicability of the exception to those employees injured while occupying a covered vehicle. We find nothing in the legislative history that persuades us that the legislature intended a meaning contrary to this plain and unambiguous text. We disagree that the legislative history cited by the plaintiff shows an obvious legislative intent that would override the plain meaning of the statute. The legislative history simply reveals discussion regarding the basic purpose of the statute and the reasons underlying its enactment. The mere
absence
of discussion regarding the limitation of the applicability of the exclusivity exception is insufficient to persuade us that the legislature did not intend the plain meaning of the statute. See
Spears
v.
Garcia,
We conclude that the court properly construed § 38a-336 (f) as limiting underinsured motorist coverage to those employees of a named insured who are injured while “occupying” a covered motor vehicle.
*431 II
We next address the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly concluded that the exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to him because he was not “occupying” a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the term “occupying” should be interpreted broadly in order to implement the purpose of § 38a-336 (f), which he argues is to ensure that employees are not barred from the coverage provided by the uninsured and under-insured motorist statute. Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the term “occupying” as used in § 38a-336 (f) should be interpreted to include any situation in which an employee is injured while within reasonable physical proximity to a covered motor vehicle and actively engaged in the use of that vehicle. The plaintiff therefore urges this court to reject the “physical contact” test and adopt the “use and proximity” test for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether the employee was injured while occupying a covered vehicle. We disagree with these arguments.
In its memorandum of decision, when discussing whether the term “occupying” as used in § 38a-336 (f) applied to the plaintiff, the court stated: “Occupying is defined by the policy to mean ‘in, upon, getting in, on, out or off.’ In the present case the plaintiff was not getting in, or out of a covered vehicle when he was injured .... The plaintiff was not physically touching the covered vehicle and, in fact, was in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck .... These facts are not in dispute. General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) applies only to those injured ‘while occupying a covered motor vehicle . . . .’ Accordingly, because the plaintiff was not in, upon, getting in, out or off a [covered] motor vehicle at the time of the injury, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.” *432 Presumably because § 38a-336 (f) does not define “occupying,” the court, understandably, turned to the policy definition. Although this definition may prove instructive, it does not control our interpretation of the meaning of “occupying” as used in § 38a-336 (f).
When a statute does not define a term, we “look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in the dictionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Tele Tech of Connecticut Corp.
v.
Dept. of Public Utility Control,
We are also guided by the definition of “occupying” contained in another statute. General Statutes § 38a-363 (c) provides: “ ‘Occupying’ a vehicle means to be in or upon or entering into or alighting from the vehicle.”
11
This definition is not controlling because § 38a-336 © is not one of the specifically enumerated sections to which § 38a-363 applies. When, however, one statute does not define a term, we may use thе definition set forth in another section of the General Statutes concerning the same subject matter to inform our understanding of the term’s meaning.
12
See
State
v.
Ramos,
In addition to the definitions noted, we are guided by our case precedent regarding interpretation of the
*433
meaning of “occupying” and other related language used in uninsured and underinsured motorist policy provisions. In
Testone
v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
In
Allstate Ins. Co.
v.
Howe,
Testone and Allstate Ins. Co. place Connecticut courts among those of several states that “have predicated determinations about whether an individual was ‘occupying’ an insured vehicle on there being some ‘physical contact’ with the vehicle.” 1 A. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance (2d Ed. Rev. 2004) § 5.2, p. 238 (noting that “ ‘physical contact’ test has not been adopted in most states”). We reiterate that the Testone and Allstate Ins. Co. decisions relied on the “physical contact” test when determining whether the language used in uninsured and underin-sured motorist policy provisions entitled the claimant to coverage. In this case, the defendant argues that we must also use the “physical contact” test for determining whether the term “occupying” as used in § 38a-336 (f) applies to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff, however, urges adoption of the broader “use and proximity” test. As the name implies, under this test, “judges usually examine the facts to determine (1) whether the injury occurred while the claimant was in a zone or area that was within reasonable proximity to the insured vehicle, or (2) whether the claimant was *435 injured while engaged in a task related to the operation, maintenance, or use of the vehicle. If either of these conditions is found to exist, judges usually conclude that claimants are entitled to coverage.” 1 A. Widiss, supra, § 5.2, p. 238. Underlying the expansive interpretation of coverage terms embodied by this approach are (1) the rule of construction that where terms are ambiguous the policy is to be construed against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, and (2) the policy сhoice of maximizing statutorily mandated uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Id., 260.
We decline the invitation to adopt the “use and proximity” test for three reasons. First, in consideration of the common meaning of the word and the
more
expansive definitions provided in § 38a-363 (c), we conclude that “occupying” as used in § 38a-336 (f) is
not
ambiguous. Second, as discussed in part I, we conclude that the legislature expressed its policy decision regarding the scope of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage available to employees when it enacted § 38a-336 (f), which expressly limits such coverage to those employees injured while “occupying” a covered vehicle. An expansive interpretation of “occupying” would undermine the legislature’s declaration of its intent regarding the interplay of the exclusivity provision of the wоrkers’ compensation laws and the uninsured motorist laws. Third, we are compelled to follow our Supreme Court’s express approval of the “physical contact” test in
Testone
v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
supra,
In this case, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was not physically touching the covered vehicle and, in fact, was in the middle of an intersection directing traffic when struck. As such, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been occupying a covered vehicle under the com *436 monly approved usage of the term and in light of the “physical contact” test. We conclude that the court properly determined that the exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule provided by § 38a-336 (f) does not apply to the plаintiff because he was not occupying a covered motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
Ill
Finally, we address the plaintiffs claim that as a named insured under his employer’s policy, he is not barred from collecting underinsured motorist coverage by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. Specifically, he argues that pursuant to
Agosto
v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra,
In
Hansen,
the plaintiffs decedent, who was killed while riding a snowmobile that collided with an underin-sured motor vehicle, was a shareholder and the sole paid employee of a closely held corporation.
Hansen
v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co.,
supra,
In
Agosto,
which was a companion case of
Hansen,
the plaintiffs decedent, a state police trooper, was killed during a traffic stop when he was struck by another vehicle while outside of his police cruiser.
Agosto
v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra,
In this case, the uninsured and underinsured motorist endorsement included in the commercial automobile insurance policy issued to the district contains language identical to the endorsements at issue in Hansen and Agosto. The coverage provision of the endorsement states in relevant part: “We will pay all sums the ‘insured’ is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an ‘uninsured motor vehicle.’ The damages must result from ‘bodily injury’ sustained by the ‘insured’ caused by an ‘accident.’ . . .” The “who is an insured” provision of the endorsement provides a list that includes the following: “1. You. 2. If you are an individual, any ‘family member.’ 3. Anyone else ‘occupying’ a covered ‘auto’ . . . .”
The plaintiff argues that we should follow Agosto and Hansen, and hold that this language, which is contained in a commercial policy issued to a fire district, is ambiguous and therefore must be construed to provide coverage to the plaintiff as an insured, regardless of whether he was occupying a covered auto. The defendant argues that this case is distinguishable from Hansen and Agosto because, unlike the insurers in those cases, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff is a named insured under the policy and did not attempt to disclaim coverage on that basis. The defendant also contends that we are not bound by Agosto because it has raised an argument not addressed in that case, namely, that the *439 plaintiff, even as a named insured, is not entitled to coverage because he cannot overcome the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.
The plaintiff argues that the claim for underinsured motorist coverage in Agosto should have been subject to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision contained in § 31-284 because, although not stated in the decision, it is likely that the plaintiffs decedent, a state trooper, had recovered workers’ compensation benefits from his employer. The Agosto decision, however, does not discuss the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision or the exception contained in § 38a-336 (f). The plaintiff argues that this absence of discussion suggests that the decedent’s status as a named insured overrode any need to question whether he was barred by the exclusivity provision. We cannot assume, however, that the exclusivity provision is not a bar to the plaintiff in this case simply because our Supreme Court did not address the issue in a factually similar case.
The plaintiff applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits from the district for his injuries. The plaintiff is now claiming coverage under his employer’s insurance. He argues that, pursuant to Hansen and Agosto, he qualifies as an insured under the underin-sured motorist endorsement and that, pursuant to the employee coverage extension endorsements, he qualifies as a named insured under the liability coverage portion of the policy. Thus, the issue is whether, absent an exception, § 31-284 bars the plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist coverage under his employer’s policy despite the fact that he is a named insured. We conclude that it does.
Section 31-284 (a) provides in relevant part: “All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the [workers’ compensation insurance] requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, *440 or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising оut of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.”
Although the policy provides protection for the plaintiff, the policy is not, as he argues, his own insurance policy. It is his employer’s policy. It is irrelevant that he is a named insured under the policy. Section 31-284 bars all claims made by employees against their employers for injuries sustained in the course of employment other than claims for remedies provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Thus, the exclusivity provision bars the plaintiff from claiming underinsured motorist cоverage under his employer’s policy, unless an exception applies. As discussed in part I, § 38a-336 (f) provides a limited exception to the exclusivity provision for those employees “injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment . . . .’’In part II, however, we concluded that this exception does not apply to the plaintiff under the facts of this case. We conclude that the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision bars the plaintiff from collecting undeiin-sured motorist coverage under his employer’s policy, even though the plaintiff is a named insured.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The plaintiff also named Allstate Insurance Company as a defendant, but it was not a party to the motion for summary judgment that is the subject of this appeal. Accordingly, the term “defendant” refers only to Massachusetts Bаy Insurance Company.
“In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Morris
v.
Congdon,
General Statutes § 31-284 (a) provides in relevant part: “All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.”
General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) provides: “Notwithstanding subsectiоn (a) of section 31-284, an employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.”
See Practice Book § 66-5.
See Practice Book § 66-7.
Although our order was not explicit, it is well established that an articulation is not an opportunity for the trial court to substitute a prior decision. See
Fantasia
v.
Milford Fastening Systems,
See footnote 3.
Section 38a-334-6 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, entitled “Minimum Provisions for Protection Against Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists,” provides in relevant part: “(a) Coverage. The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every motor vehicle to which the bodily injury liability coverage applies. . . .”
We also note that the legislature’s exclusion of those employees injured as nonoccupants from the applicability of the exception to the exclusivity provision and thereby from uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage cannot be viewed as inadvertent in view that our law “has long recognized that [such] coverage may apply to non-occupants of motor vehicles.” J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (3d Ed. 2004) § 3.7, p. 256; see also
Harvey
v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.,
In addition, General Statutes § 38a-363 (h) provides in relevant part: “ ‘Pedestrian’ means any person not occupying a vehicle . . . .”
“General Statutes §§ 38a-363 and 38a-336 (f) both are contained in chapter 700, which is entitled “Property and Casualty Insurance.”
The
Testone
court concluded further that “intent to enter a vehicle alone is not ‘entering’ a vehicle within the meaning of the insurance policy.”
Testone
v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
supra,
In its articulation, the court addressed this issue for the first time and concluded that pursuant to
Agosto
v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra,
In addition, at oral argument, the plaintiff claimed that the exclusivity provision is inapplicable in this case because pursuant to General Statutes § 31-284 (a), the policy endorsements extending coverage to volunteers and employees as insureds represented an agreement between the plaintiff and
*437
the district to provide additional compensation beyond the workers’ compensation remedies. In relevant part, § 31-284 (a) provides that “nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation.” We decline to address this issue on the basis of the long settled rule that this court does not consider claims that are raised for the first time at oral argument and that are, consequently, inadequately briefed. See
Blatchley
v.
Mintz,