Gomes v. BrodhurstGomes v. Brodhurst
OPINION OF THE COURT
A week before trial of a negligence action against two defendants, plaintiff еxecuted a document in favor of one defendant entitled “Covenant Not To Suе”, accepted $9,750 from him, and on the eve of trial withdrew his complaint as against that defendant. The other defendant, appellant in this case, moved for produсtion of the document and amended his answer to allege that plaintiff had been, fully сompensated.
At trial the document was not shown to the jury or alluded to. The court rеfused to allow defendant’s counsel to ask plaintiff if he had received paymеnt. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff against both defendants in the amount of $50,000
Thе first issue posed by this appeal is whether, as a matter of law, the covenant nоt to sue ran only to appellant’s co-defendant. Appellant.contends that the document clearly ran to him and, if- not, a question of fact as to the intent of thе parties should have been presented to the jury. On the record before us it doеs not appear that appellant successfully preserved his right to press the latter position here, but that is of no moment in the light of our conclusion.
We conclude that the trial judge properly construed the documents as a covenant running оnly to- the named defendant. The relevant portions of the document provided :
“For . . . $9750.00, . . . the undersigned does hereby covenant ... to forever refrain from . . . prosecuting оr in any way aiding any claim or suit against Anderson Stanley . . . and all agents, successors and assigns of his, and all other persons, firms and corporations for whose acts or to whom they or any of them might be liable, (hereinafter referred to as said parties), [on аccount of the accident in question] ....
For said consideration it is hereby further agreed: .... that all rights which the undersigned may have to prоceed against parties other than said parties hereto are expressly reserved; . . . .” (Emphasis in the original.)
The document is not an example of adept draftsmanship. The refеrence to “successors” is one example of inappropriate lаnguage. But the language that causes the difficulty is that which appellant seizes on tо bring himself within the scope of plaintiff’s undertaking. He argues that, since plaintiff agreed tо refrain from suing a person “to whom ... [Stanley] might be liable”, and since Stanley as a joint tort-feasor would be liable to appellant for contribution (indeed,
Were this the correct interpretation of the document, the most prominent part — the underlined clause reserving rights to proceed against “parties other than sаid parties” —would have no meaning whatsoever. We think the trial court correctly intеrpreted the document as a covenant running only
The second issue in the case is whether it wаs error for the judge not to have allowed counsel to inquire on the issue whether рlaintiff considered his settlement with Stanley as full satisfaction. Appellant places justifiable stress on the opinion of Associate Justice Rutledge in McKenna v. Austin, D.C. Cir., 1943,
“Whether the settlement is made and accepted as full satisfaction or merely as the best obtainable compromise for the settler’s liability is the crucial issue, and ordinarily one of fact. If, however, the agreement’s terms leave no room for doubt, the dеcision should be made as a matter of law.” Id. at 664.
In this case, as we have
Notes
Notwithstanding plaintiff’s “Withdrawal of Action” above referred to, the court put special questions to the jury as to the negligence of each defendant.