Golphin v. StateGolphin v. State
Joseph Golphin was charged with the crimes of robbery and using a firearm in the commission of a felony in three separate cases. He was convicted of robbery in each instance and received three concurrent life sentenсes. He was also found guilty on each of the charges of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. For two of these сrimes he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 years but no sentence was entered on the third conviction.
A recitation of the facts surrounding Golphin’s arrest is pertinent to the determination of one or more of these cases. On Nоvember 30, 1972, at about 11:00 P. M., the Blinker Bar was robbed. One of the investigating officers was John Dell who was also the husband of an employee of the bar. In the course of his investigation, six eyewitnesses testified that five black men had participated in the robbery. Another eyewitness said that six men had been involved. General descriptions of height and weight were obtained. One of thеse men was described as wearing an unusual type of white shirt with sequins on it. Another was said to have plaited hair.
About three hours after the crime had been committed, Officer Dell saw five persons at a drive-in restaurant who appeared to meet the descriptions given him by the eyewitnesses. When they left in a car, the officer followed them and caused them to stоp. He asked the driver who was wearing the sequin shirt (Golphin) for his driver’s license. The driver failed to produce a driver’s license but gave Dell three different identifications. At this point, the officer saw in the back seat a radio he recognized as bеing the property of the Blinker Bar. The five occupants of the vehicle were placed under arrest. Golphin was subsequently identified in a line-up and charged not only with the crimes relating to the Blinker Bar but also with respect to other robbеries having previously occurred at the Pizza Plut and the Royal Castle Restaurant.
Golphin was first tried by a jury in the case involving the Pizzа Hut and was found guilty. The same result obtained in the next case involving the Royal Castle which was tried before the court. Golphin thеn entered pleas of nolo contendere on the charges relating to the Blinker Bar, it being stipulated for purposes of appeal that the State could prove a prima facie case based on the evidence as adduced in the other two trials and that the court could take into consideration the evidence submitted in both trials. Thereupon, the judge found Golphin to be guilty on both charges.
Officer Dell knew that a felony had been committed. There was a substantial similarity in the appearance of the occupants of thе car and the description given him of the robbers by the eyewitnesses. This constituted sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that the occupants of the car committed the Blinker Bar robbery such as to permit the stopping of the car tо make an arrest without a warrant under F.S. 901.15, F.S.A. Kaymore v. State, Fla.App.1st, 1972,
Golphin also asserts thаt he was improperly prejudiced by the introduction of evidence in violation of the so-called “Williams Rule.” Williams v. State, Fla.1959,
However, the other two cases are not tainted by that error. In the non-jury trial fоr the robbery of the Royal Castle, the State introduced no Williams Rule evidence. Insofar as the convictions relating tо the Blinker Bar are concerned, there was adequate evidence in the record of the Pizza Hut trial to convict him of these offenses. There is no reason to assume that the State would have attempted to introduce Williams Rule tеstimony, particularly in view of the fact that in this case the State was in a position to introduce into evidence the radio stolen from the Blinker Bar.
The judgments of conviction of robbery and using a firearm in the commission of a felony relating to the Royal Castle (Case No. 73-197) and relating to the Blinker Bar (Case No. 73-196) are affirmed. The sentences with respect to both of the convictions for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in those cases are vacated because both crimes arose out of the same transaction. Coates v. State, Fla.App.2nd, 1974,