*1 persuaded disputed procedure ren- we that a different contends that the Nor are complex”, required by uniqueness and result is the mere his defense “more dered prejudiced exposure disputed procedure. In Sidman him the inherent of of the trial States, supra, extrinsic the simultaneous trier to evidence of each United however, juries not, separate wrongdoing. has direct- codefendants before He of two determined any upheld. such detriment the court ed us to evidence of was There record, find none. Given it has been shown that where juries were operative underlying fairly facts similarity was conducted perceive instructed, such nontraditional charges, properly it is difficult the three tax F.2d procedures may bifurcated resolution be sustained.20 how their true Where, as was There was no mention agree. efforts. his defense 1168. We appellant also to exclude here, is careful jury of the fact trial court to the of- regulatory of extrinsic existence charged any with had been reference guided instructed fenses, properly properly jurors court are charges, and the and the responsibilities concern- evidence disregard the jury to nature of as to the consider, they may which the ammunition. evidence impediment. process no due we find Appellant relies on a single New York motor vehicle case in which a county court calling There no error for rever- concluded that the simultaneous trial of sal, judgments appealed are af- two charges to the magistrate and firmed. the other three to jury was impermissibly Affirmed. prejudicial. People v. Konopka, 5 Misc.2d 507, 164 There, (1957). how-
ever, jury expressly was confronted
with the fact that the accused had been
charged with offenses other than those they which guilt. to determine process The due implications of the si- Jesse Jr., GOLPHIN, Appellant, adjudication multaneous charges several single separate defendant before PARK MONROE ASSOCIATES, Appellee. triers have not been considered No. 7797. court any federal circuit ap- court of peals. Supreme While is true that Appeals. District Columbia Court of rejected Court has the Due Process Clause Argued June 1974. as a constitutional basis for the collateral estoppel ultimately issues resolved under Decided Feb. 1976. the Fifth Amendment in Ashe v. Rehearing Rehearing en Bane Swenson,19 certainly procedure April 6, Denied 1976. review nevertheless must conform to the general requirement of fairness un-
derlies the guarantee. See Connecticut, 319, 325-28,
Palko v. 302 U.S. (1937).
58 S.Ct.
conclude that the of fundamental mandate
fairness has been satisfied. ‘experi- juries] Hoag Jersey, 19. [two v. Hew as an endorsement of (1958). in this case.” was carried out S.Ct. L.Ed.2d ment’ that F.2d Sidman, careful Ninth Circuit read “our is not to note that *2 Miller, C.,
Herman Washington, D. for appellee. FICKLING,
Before GALLAGHER NEBEKER, Judges. Associate
GALLAGHER, Judge: Associate appeal This is an from the Landlord and Tenant Branch Superior of the Court of the District of appellee, Columbia. The Associates, Park Monroe against filed suit one of its Golphin, Jr., ap- Jesse pellant, possession for apartment he occupied. granted The trial court sion to the landlord.
Appellant apartment leased an Park Monroe Associates for a fixed term year. of one days Ten before expira- the tion of the term the tenant was served with a notice to prem- vacate and the ises, which the tenant failed to do. complaint was filed in the trial court with ground possession for being asserted as the “[ejxpiration of days quit.” During trial, however, the court permitted the landlord to amend the com- plaint assert, effect, that was being sought due to the lease, the term though the given notice was shortly before the end of the term. We will view this case in the context of the permitted amendment. show offered trial, tenant
At
demanded
had
landlord
or-
against
retaliation
premises
a tenant’s
membership in
of and
ganization
retaliation
association,
inas
as well
viola-
housing code
complaints of
previous
governmen-
made to the
tions
re-
he
He
tal authorities.
be-
he
day after
quit the
a notice to
ceived
association.
tenant’s
president
came
offered
tenant
particularly,
More
active
not become
if he had
show
with
association, in accordance
tenant’s
he
the landlord
policy of
ten-
a month-to-month
C,
Anderson,
have become
Washington, D.
Terence J.
term;
one-year
expiration of the
Cahn,
at the
appellant.
Washing- ant
Edgar
for
S.
land-
policy
this established
ton,
C.,
appearance for and that
D.
also entered
express
with
in consonance
lord was
appellant.
question for us is
whether
Lastly,
terms of the lease.1
facts
this case
of “retaliato-
defense
proffered that
suits
six
ry
permitted
eviction” should
been
instituted
the landlord
oust other
occupancy
even though the tenant secured
members of the tenant’s association.
one-year lease,
under a
the term which
to admit
declined
court
expired.5
purpose
had
For the
re-
be-
*3
testimony as
irrelevant
proffered
accept
prof-
view we must
the excluded
2 provides that the land-
the
cause
statute
testimony
establishing
fered
that
this
immediately
is entitled to
lord
suit
was
brought
for retalia-
expiration
of the fixed
upon the
tory reasons.
any in-
Further,
court,
there
said
if
controlling
decision
consistency
concerning
the statute
between
“re
prevails.4
regulations3
taliatory
the statute
eviction” in
housing
Habib,
126,
Edwards v.
U.S.App.D.C.
had ex-
130
that
of the lease
Finding
the term
denied,
397 F.2d
687
that
cert.
393
court concluded
pired,
U.S.
1016,
618,
S.Ct.
21
possession.
L.Ed.2d 560 (1969).
was entitled to
We
89
doctrine,
par
might say
to
refuse
admit
hold it was error to
enthetically,
accepted
retaliatory
jurisdict
a
other
testimony
show
ions,6 as well.
purpose by the landlord.
eviction
Paragraph
provides:
any
1.
inconsistency
35 of the lease
If there be
between stat-
housing regulations
HOLDING OVER TENANCY
ute 45-901 and the
2910],
BY MONTH
I think
[§
the statute would
prevail
35.
continue
Should Tenant
premises
of the leased
after the
end of
and
permission
term herein created with
lord,
of Land-
statute
[t]he
[§
states
45-901]
agreed
tenancy
it is
possession immediately
thus creat-
landlord is entitled to
ed,
monthly
upon
expiration
shall be a
I
the term.
upon
party
giving
expired
terminated
either
hold that
the term
had
thirty days’
plaintiff
possession.
the other not less than
written
is entitled to
expire
day
notice to
on the 30th
1973,
5.
provides:
D.C.Code
§ 45-901
hereby
.
month.
.
. Tenant
his
waives
When real estate is leased for a certain
any
Quit.
Notice to
quit
necessary,
term no notice to
shall be
pos-
but the
1973,
landlord shall be entitled to the
2.
45-901.
session,
immediately
without
such
District
3..
of the term.
Columbia,
Retaliatory
1955,
Acts.
2910.
See,
g., Schweiger
Superior Court,
e.
v.
3
proceeding
to recover
action or
No
507,
Cal.Rptr. 729,
P.2d
90
476
97
Cal.3d
brought
[sic]
sion of
habitations
Engler
Capital
(1970);
Management Corp.,
v.
tenant,
against
an
otherwise
shall
owner
nor
445,
(Ch.1970) ;
N.J.Super.
112
private remedies for code violations since Edwards pro- reinforces our belief in the ne- and remanded Reversed for further cessity for a retaliatory broad eviction de- ceedings. retaliatory applying concept provisions eviction to the area of Land (note law, supra) apply lord and Tenant the decision made new law, proceedings possession. all actions or this at in least. As we They earlier, however, application by are dicated not this new confined to tenancies month, peculiar juris no means at will or now at this sufferance. supra. diction. See note 6 contrary, 10. If the result were the an in- Habib, supra, v. See cidental effect would be to enable a App.D.C. (McGowan, F.2d at to make academic the defense of J., concurring) having where it is said that incorporat- eviction the use of term leases Congress authorized the code ing term, montli-to-month, a fixed rather than be taken co have excluded evic- provision. holdover tion, alleged, as here the routine statu- tory provisions relating regain 1 1. While the rationale of Edwards was not possession. concept, that, new in there is no doubt but NEBEKER, form survived. See Judge (dissent- Associate No other of Westbrook, D.C.Mun.App., Bell 50 A.2d : ing) a as to failure of an estate My My dissent will colleagues be brief. Bell, sufferance to survive. As in step legal principles over brought ac- owner here also an immediate property in their law effort to extend the (D. possession. tion for An estate at will latter-day respecting rule ulterior motive 45-822) did survive C.Code § taking step, they for eviction. In sac- joint since “the will and lessee” of lessor private ownership rifice attributes of is lacking. property system. which are essential to our applying Housing Regu- In 2901 of the They do it at a time when there is mount- § lations, my colleagues cogni- fail to take step indication that the initial in this proscribes zance that it fact retalia- direction exacerbates rather than alleviates tory They acts also “tenant”. shortage substandard recognize fail Chapter low housing. and medium income rental 1101.1 Regulations states “[wjords See Edwards U.S.App.D.C. shall meaning usual 397 F.2d 703-04 unless the (Danaher, clearly context J., indicates different mean- dissenting). ing”, and that 1102 defines a “tenant” as flagrant violation of the Statute of possesses one “who holds or a habitation (D.C.Code Frauds 28-3502) and . with the consent of owner.” [the] 45-901,2 45-8071 §§ today’s Let us consider colleagues change, permit to be in the evidence, context of changed by extrinsic the basic fixed-term of a habita- lease tion plans where the lessor away nature of a They fixed-term lease. also create, from his plans possibly home but it, to return acknowledging without a new upon expiration of the term. If strange type he does so of leasehold estate where or leases to another and refuses demands one to vacate at the sion refusing to consent Perhaps the lease to month-to- it could be called *6 holdover, month the tenant tenancy by trespass. is, forestall it is Whatever it his eviction for the get time it takes to unprecedently superior somehow treated as jury trial on an assertion that is a possession” refusal the “estate in owner proscriptive regula- act within a under D.C.Code tion. The fundamental of an ordi- nature provides 45-901 nary fixed-term lease has now been the owner is entitled to immediate changed. It is plus now for a time certain upon sion expiration of the fixed rental litigation at least time. period. As of that moment the leasehold relationship parties between expired. appellant appel- The is property against lee’s its and is noth-
Appellant could not become a tenant will trespasser. housing regula- paragraph but a month-to-month because tions benefit him.3 Our provides only for this if the do not 35 of lease which, unprecedented step per- holding is an holds over with the landlord’s view, not take. mission, expressly we cannot should withheld. provides: 1. D.C.Code entitled to the § 45-807 landlord shall be but immediately notice, possession, An estate exists when the without such pos- owner has immediate term. session the land. 214(a) 3.The same he said for section July 25, of D.C. Act 1-35 provides: 2. D.C.Code 45-901 When real estate is leased for a certain necessary, term no notice to shall be cases, provision. In such it holdover appellee majority observes demand for would seem that a vacate at the end gave advance upon expiration of the term could not be post-term ab- of the term. Since proffer of motive stalled acceptance post-term occu- of rent sent It is hoped for refusal to renew. holdover pancy, does not leasehold create Sons, holding our will confined to its Donohoe & be v. John F. (Williams Inc., precise facts. D.C.Mun.App., (1949)), A.2d 239 Another must be basis for our that our extension of Ed
it would seem Habib, supra, given is that it apply must confined to cases where notice to long-term as tenancy. How well to short-term during the existence of the leas suggest, es. I reasoning, respectfully, else, except argu can that this by this dubious ment reveals a only misunderstanding regulations, applicable the is-' sue. A hardly month-to-month apply? held to landlords term; short one-year, it is Moreover, expected that indefinite. it also is to be term; long lease it is a definite provisions may now lease fixed-term expires, it is When ended. a month-to-month modified eliminate