135 N.W. 180 | N.D. | 1912
The summons and complaint were issued November 6, 1908, with an attachment, in an action by these plaintiffs against the defendant company, designated as the Peter Fox Sons Company, a corporation, instead of against a copartnership with members named as-
On December 19th, without notice, upon a showing by affidavits, plaintiffs moved the court to amend all the pleadings nunc pro tunc, to read as now entitled. And on December 21st,' and while the motion to set aside the service was pending, the motion to amend nunc pro
Immediately after the entry of this judgment, on affidavits and' under a special appearance, an order to show cause was applied for and issued. It briefly recited the proceedings had and the pendency of the-prior motion under special appearance, and cited plaintiffs to show cause-forthwith why the service of the summons, the judgment entered, and all other proceedings had, should not' he vacated and set aside and the action be dismissed. In applying for this order to show cause, defendants endeavored to avoid making a general appearance. Their motion was: “Come now the above-named defendants, appearing specially for the-purpose of this motion and none other, objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, and move the court for an order setting aside and vacating-the service of summons herein, and vacating and setting aside the judgment heretofore entered herein against the defendants, and vacating and setting aside all proceedings heretofore had herein.” On the return of the order to show cause the court, on February.10, 1909, denied' the motion, thereby refusing to vacate the judgment or dismiss the action. Appellants appeal therefrom, assigning error sufficient to require-a review of these entire proceedings.
A discussion of jurisdictional principles is now in order. Jurisdiction to issue the provisional remedy of attachment upon compliance-with the statutory requisites was vested in the court by statute. A summons was issued, regular on its face, accompanied with a verified complaint and affidavit and undertaking for attachment, and upon their presentation the clerk issued from the court a warrant of attachment for
“It is clear that the Eoswald Grocery Company, whatever it was, whether a partnership, a corporation, or an individual assuming the name for the purposes of trade, was the party against whom or which suit was instituted, has all along been prosecuted, and will be continued if and after the amendments moved for are allowed. There is, in other words, no question here as to the identity of the defendant throughout all the proceedings which have been or may, in any proposed event, be had, being originally and at all times the same in the mind of the plaintiff. The entity which entered into the rental contract, which has enjoyed the shelter of plaintiff’s house, which has failed to pay the agreed price therefor, and which is sought, in this action, to be coerced into payment thereof, is one and the same, whether it be a contractual entity (a partnership), an artificial entity (a corporation), or a personal entity (an individual) ; and, whether one or another of these entities, its name is the same. — 'The Eoswald Grocery Company’ — and its liability is the same and enforceable by the same remedies. That entity, whatever its character, or the source or manner of its being, was proceeded against originally in this case and brought before the court by attachment of its property. Once there it was found that a mistake had been made; not as to the entity itself,— not as to the party sued, — but merely in respect of describing what kind of an entity the party defendant was. The motion to amend stated and confessed this mistake of description. The plaintiff averred and showed this mistake, and he asked to correct it. He, in effect, said to the court that while he.had sued the proper party, and had levied on the goods of the proper party, he had misdescribed that party, not, indeed, in respect even of the name of the defendant, but in respect solely of the status of that proper party, as being an artificial, instead of a personal,, entity,- for surely the averment that the Eoswald Grocery Company was a corporation is not part of the name of that company. It might as well be said that to aver' that Jones & Smith is a partnership is to make the averment of partnership a part of the
And in this connection we have, in § 6883, Bev. Codes 1905, a similar statute reading:
“The court may, before or after judgment, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading, process, or, proceeding, by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect, or by inserting other allegations material to the case; or, when the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense, by conforming the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved.”
The foregoing leaves but little to add. Defendant will contend that such an amendment is in reality bringing in new parties to the suit, and, therefore, if permissible, service of summons upon such new
See also Hathaway v. Sabin, 61 Vt. 608, 18 Atl. 188; Messler v. Schwarzkopf, 35 Misc. 72, 71 N. Y. Supp. 241; York v. Nash, 42 Or. 321, 71 Pac. 59; and Baldock v. Atwood, 21 Or. 73, 26 Pac. 1058. See also 30 Cyc. 144: “Under the codes and practice acts of the several states much latitude is now permitted with regard to amendments affecting parties, and it is usual that the court be permitted, on motion of either party at any time, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms as may be proper, to permit an amendment adding or striking out the name of a party, or correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or changing the character in which he is sued.” And 31 Cyc. 487, that “as a general rule, under the statutes, a misnomer of a plaintiff or defendant is amendable unless the amendment is such as to effect
In many of the foregoing cited cases the defendant, misnamed, has appeared generally and sought an advantage because of such misnomer, by answer, plea in abatement, or motion, invoking the jurisdiction generally of the court; and to such extent,-the additional reason why jurisdiction should be sustained that the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court existed over that here found. But authorities held that under a statute similar to § 6883, Bev. Codes 1905, once jurisdiction attaches the authority of the court is ample to correct-a mistake in name or designation of the party sued. The authorities are practically unanimous in holding with the Alabama case quoted, that the designation of the defendant as a corporation or partnership does not thereby conclude the court from permitting an amendment to the process or pleading that the same shall describe the legal entity of the real party, whether person, partnership, or corporation. Where the correct person, either natural or artificial, is served in an action brought against it on a cause of action existing, when it is erroneously named, jurisdiction is conferred upon service made upon it, and, hav
Defendants contend that the service made upon Anthony Fox was under a supposition that a corporation was being served and' that he was served as an officer of a corporation; and knowing that such substitute service was made for such purpose, and that no corporation existed, and that no valid proceeding could be had against it, he had the right to ignore, as he did, such service; and that plaintiff could not thereunder, to his prejudice, change by amendment the action to constitute one against a partnership of which he was a member, and thereby bind him or any members of the partnership individually by such service. This reasoning overlooks the fact that the Peter Fox Sons Company is the defendant, by whatever name it may exist, and Anthony Fox, personally, and through him his copartners, were charged with notice of the pendency of this suit and the knowledge of the law; and that thereunder an amendment was permissible that the suit might continue against the members of the partnership jointly, obedient to § 6847, Fev. Codes 1905, that “when the action is against two or more defendants, and the summons is served on one or more but not on all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows: (1) If the action is against defendants jointly indebted upon contract, he may proceed against the defendant served, unless the court otherwise directs; and if he recovers judgment it may be entered against all the defendants thus jointly indebted, so far only as that it may be enforced against the joint property of all and the separate property of the defendants served; . . . or (2) if the action is against defendants severally liable he may proceed against the defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants.” Under this statute the court, having had power to amend after personal service upon one member of the partnership, had jurisdiction to order a joint or joint and several judgment against such person; and where the property in-custodia legis was the joint property of the several partners, one of whom was served, the court properly ordered a joint judgment in so far as it was necessary to enforce the same against the joint property.
In reaching our conclusions, we have not overlooked the following cases, in part holding the contrary, and to that extent against what we believe to be the weight of authority: Leatherman v. Times Co. 88
Nor do the following, cited in appellant’s brief, apply, or announce any rule inconsistent with our holding: Powers v. Braly, 75 Cal. 237, 17 Pac. 197; Plemmons v. Southern Improv. Co. 108 N. C. 614, 13 S. E. 188, and Thompson v. Allen, 86 Mo. 85, to the effect that, on the bringing in of a new defendant, service must be had upon him before fur ther proceedings be taken. As heretofore stated, the amendment permitted brought in 'no new party, but merely permitted a change in description of the entity of the Peter Fox Sons Company, the defendant. While said partnership could not at common law be proceeded against as a legal entity without the partners being named, yet it was sued under its firm name with service upon one partner, and jurisdiction was thereby conferred upon the court of the Peter Fox Sons Company, in whatever capacity it might exist; and having such jurisdiction of it, the amendment allowed, designating its individual members, was not in fact bringing in new defendants. Had it been sued as a partnership, with partners named and service been made upon Anthony Fox, one of them, no question could be raised but that the court could render the judgment entered. With the same facts existing, but without designation of corporate entity or naming of partners, under Gans v. Beasley, 4 N. D. 140, 59 N. W. 714, the same thing here done and the same judgment here entered would necessarily have to be sustained. The erroneous designation of the defendant company as a corporation certainly could not defeat jurisdiction when under such holding a failure to characterize the entity sued does not.
The appellants, throughout this proceeding, have acted on the theory that no general appearance has been made. Their every act has been performed under a special appearance, although they have thereunder procured the issuance of an order to show cause by the court, and, upon the service thereof and appearance of opposing parties thereunder, have participated in the hearing called by the court. Whether so doing
Following appellants’ theory of the case, and consonant with his assignment of error, we do not pass upon whether the court abused its discretion in entering this judgment with the motion pending before it; nor do we treat the application other than as one solely of jurisdiction in the lower court to enter the judgment. As defendant there challenged only the jurisdiction, and that was there, as here, determined adversely to him, it was in no sense there, and is not here, to be treated as an application to vacate the judgment on other than strictly jurisdictional grounds.
Therefore our conclusion is that the service of this summons was not a void act, but instead clothed the court with jurisdiction over the Peter Fox Sons Company, whatever its legal status was; and possessing jurisdiction by attachment of the property, and with the personal service on Anthony Fox, having jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the court could permit the amendment as made, the defendant being wholly in default; that the effect of such amendment was not to substitute or bring in new parties defendant, but merely to establish the identity of the true party sued and served; and hence service of the amended or a new summons and amended pleadings was unnecessary, the court retaining jurisdiction by the service had, and