273 Pa. 107 | Pa. | 1922
Defendant’s petition is for a rule to show cause why a judgment in ejectment entered on a lease should not be opened. On October 7, 1916, Harry S. Cohen, as agent, leased in writing to defendant, for the term of four years and three months, the premises No. 3400 and 3402 Kentucky Avenue, Philadelphia, with an option to lessee to purchase the property on or before January 1,1917, for the sum of $10,000 clear of encumbrances. The court below refused to open the judgment and this appeal fol
Defendant rested bis case upon bis right to exercise tbe option. The following extract from tbe opinion of tbe court below sufficiently answers defendant’s contention : “Tbe testimony is undisputed that Harry S. Cohen was not authorized in writing by Goldstein to execute either tbe lease or option contained therein, neither did Goldstein or bis wife [the property in tbe meantime having been transferred to Mrs. Goldstein] ever ratify tbe lease or option in writing. Tbe testimony is conflicting as to whether Goldstein knew and orally approved of tbe option given in tbe lease, but whatever be tbe fact in regard to that it is clear that, in tbe absence of written authorization or written ratification, tbe lease and the option contained therein fall within tbe provisions of tbe statute of frauds, with tbe result that the estate created by tbe lease was one at will only and that the option is unenforceable by tbe lessee: Lewis v. Bradford, 10 Watts 67; Parish v. Koons, 1 Parson’s Select Equity Cases 79; McDowell v. Simpson, 3 Watts 129. . . . . . Therefore, in tbe ejectment proceedings, they do not
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.