Goldschmidt v. Paley Rothman Goldstein Rosenberg & Cooper, CharteredGoldschmidt v. Paley Rothman Goldstein Rosenberg & Cooper, Chartered
Bеnson J. Fischer sued Howard L. Flax; the law firm which represented him (Paley, Rothman, Goldstein, Rosenberg & Cooper (“Paley Rothman”)); and Paley Rothman attorney Alan S. Mark for tor-tious interference with a proposed financial transaction that did not materialize. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Paley Rothman and Mark. After a brief trial, the court then awarded Paley Rothman, Flax,
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and Mark nearly $1 million in damages on their counterclaims asserting that Fischer had engaged in bad-faith litigation. A jury also awarded Flax $300,000 on his
quantum meruit
claim. We affirmed these judgments in
Fischer v. Estate of Flax,
These consolidated appeals involve further disputes related to those judgments. First, the trial court denied Fischer’s motion to set aside the judgments awarding damages against him for bad-faith litigation. Second, the court denied a motion by Paley Rothman and Mark to enforce a writ of attachment served upon Montgomery Bakers, Inc. (MBI), a closely held corporation in which Fischer was a shareholder and an officer. Finally, the court sanctioned Fischer’s attorneys, Stanley H. Goldschmidt and Arthur G. Kahn, for their part in facilitating Fischer’s bad-faith litigation. We remand for further proceedings with respect to the writ of attachment, but otherwise affirm.
I. Background
We thoroughly discussed the origins of this litigation in
Fischer I,
and offer an abbreviated version here. When Benson Fischer, a principal owner of Fischer Brewing Company, needed financing to expand the marketing and production of his products, his friend, Howard Flax, agreed to seek investors in exchange for a finder’s fee. Flax and Fischer memorialized the arrangement in a Letter Agreement giving Flax the right to acquire up to 15% of the company’s authorized stock if he found financing. Flax contacted Laidlaw
&
Co., an investment banking firm, which offered to underwrite an initial public offering of Fischer Brewing Company stock in exchange for a commission. After Laidlaw expressed interest, Fischer was informed that the fair practice rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) would prevent him from paying more than 15% of the gross offering proceeds to Flax and Laidlaw combined. Thus, Fischer could not compensate Laid-law without either breaching his agreement with Flax or violating the NASD rules. After the Laidlaw deal fell through,
Fischer complained that Flax, Paley Rothman, and Mark tortiously interfered with Fischer’s potential deal with Laidlaw. Flax, Paley Rothman, and Mark responded by asserting claims against Fischer for abuse of process (bad faith litigation). Flax filed a counterclaim for quantum me-ruit damages to recover the fair value of the services he provided to Fischer before the Laidlaw deal fell through. Paley Roth-man and Mark also sought Rule 11 sanctions against Fischer’s attorneys, Kahn and Goldschmidt, 2 alleging that they lacked a good faith basis in fact for making the claims in the complaint. The court initially denied the motion for Rule 11 sanctions, noting that it was premature to make a decision. After a lengthy period of discovery, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Paley Rothman and Mark, finding “there is no legally viable theory or evidence” to support Fischer’s claim for tortiоus interference.
Speaking through his attorney, Gold-schmidt, Fischer refused to proceed with trial on the remainder of his case. As a result, the court entered judgment against Fischer on each of his claims against Flax and, after a brief jury trial, entered judgment in the amount of $300,000 on Flax’s claim for quantum meruit damages. Following a bench trial on the bad faith litigation counterclaims, which Fischer did not attend and in which Goldschmidt did not participate, the court awarded Paley Roth-man, Mark, and Flax some $930,000 in attorney’s fees and costs, together with $40,000 in punitive damages.
Almost one year after we decided Fischer I, and over three years after the trial court entered the judgments against him, Fischer filed a motion to set aside the bad faith litigation and quantum meruit judgments. That motion was denied. In an effort to collect on its judgment, which remains unpaid, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment upon MBI, a family-owned corporation of which Fischer was an officer and shareholder. After two days of hearings, the trial court denied the motion to enforce the writ of attachment.
Paley Rothman and Mark renewed their motion for Rule 11 sanctions after summary judgment was entered against Fischer on his tortious interference claim. Once all of the judgments against Fischer were affirmed, the trial court held a hearing on the renewed Rule 11 motion. On December 1, 2003, the court imposed sanctions against Goldschmidt and Kahn in the amount of $50,000 each. These appeals followed.
II. The Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
Fischer asks, us to reverse the decision denying his motion to vacate, asserting that his attorney was suffering from a mental infirmity when he refused to attend the trials himself and advised Fischer that he need not attend either.
A. Facts
Trials were scheduled on the counterclaims filed by Flax, Paley Rothman, and Mark on dates between November 1999 and May 2000, but Fischer claimed that he was too ill to attend. Although the court previously had granted a seven-week postponement at Fischer’s request, it refused to approve further continuances without
Fischer argues that the judgments should be vacated because, unbeknownst to him, Goldschmidt was suffering from a mental illness at the time the trials were scheduled to occur. Fischer attached an affidavit to his motion, swearing that he was not aware that Goldschmidt declined an opportunity to defend against these claims in Fischer’s absence. Based on several' material inconsistencies in affidavits that Fischer previously had submitted to the court, Judge Graae concluded that Fischer’s affidavits “are not worth the paper they are written on.” Judge Graae also noted that “Mr. Fischer comes with filthy hands seeking equity,” citing instances where “he knowingly made false allegations against Mr. Flax, fabricated documents, tampered with witnesses, suborned perjury, and engaged in an elaborate cover-up to hide his misconduct.”
B. Standard of Review
Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief from a judgment under “extraordinary circumstances or where a judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship.”
Starling v. Jephunneh Lawrence & Associates,
“In exercising its discretion, the trial court must choose ‘what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law and state the reasons which support its conclusion.”
Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington, D.C. v. Belts,
C. Analysis
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Fischer’s motion to vacate judgment. The court’s conclusion that Fischer’s affidavits “are not worth the paper they are written on” is supported by a factual record replete with examples of Fischer’s untrustworthiness. As the trial court noted, Benson Fischer has “filthy hands”; he cannot expect a new trial based solely on self-serving statements made over three years after the judgments were entered against him. These judgments were issued on the merits, after a lengthy period of discovery and trials, and were eventually affirmed by this court. To allow Fischer to relitigate these issues now would violate “the overriding
Alternatively, even if we assume the statements within his affidavit are true, the materials submitted in support of Fischer’s motion fall far short of establishing that Goldschmidt was incapacitated by illness or that his illness caused the judgments against Fischer. Although the memorandum in support of his motion alleges that Goldschmidt “was suffering from an involuntary organic brain state causing impaired judgment,” there are no attached affidavits, reports, or other sworn materials attesting to Goldschmidt’s incapacity. Moreover, to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) on the theory that an attorney’s illness was an “extraordinary circumstance,” the moving party must, at a minimum, show a causal nexus between the illness and the adverse ruling.
See Douglas v. Kemp,
Fischer voluntarily chose Goldschmidt as his attorney and “cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.”
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
Fischer’s own affidavit belies any claim that he has only recently discovered his attorney’s actions. Fischer recites that “I was advised by Stanley Goldschmidt not to attеnd the hearing on the bad faith litigation claims of the Defendants and that neither he nor anyone from his office would be present as their attendance was not required or necessary.” Soon after he accepted this advice, substantial judgments were entered against him. Although the trend of the litigation obviously was unfavorable, Fischer apparently believed that their strategy ultimately would prevail. He relied upon “Mr. Goldschmidt’s representations to me that I would prevail on every issue on appeal....” Although Fischer’s new counsel has explained the defects in Goldschmidt’s legal advice, that does not change the fact that Fischer was aware of Goldschmidt’s conduct.
Cf. Unit
III. The Writ of Attachment—
A. The Factual and Procedural Background
Incorporated in June 2001, approximately six months after the judgments for bad faith litigation were entered against Fischer, MBI was formed to acquire substantially all of the assets of Montgomery Doughnuts, Inc., a bankrupt bakery. On October 8, 2001, Paley Rothman served a writ of attachment directing MBI to withhold “25% of [Benson Fischer’s] disposable wages for each workweek or other pay period.” MBI filed an answer, see
After hearings were held on July 18, 2002, and October 22, 2003, the court found that MBI “is owned by Benson Fischer, his wife Mona Fischer (holding a 50% joint interest) and his parents Sheldon and Ann Fischer (each owning a 25% interest).” Benson and Mona Fischer had loaned MBI $310,000 when it was established. Benson Fischer served as president of the corporation and “assum[ed] primary responsibility for marketing, promotion, product development, franchising, purchasing equipment, contracting with vendors, and overseeing the legal affairs of the company.” The business closed in February 2003 after its roof collapsed following a heavy snowfall. Nevertheless, Fischer continued to work on behalf of MBI, negotiating with insurers and others while attempting to revive the business. The record had not been supplemented to show the current state of affairs, so the court did not know if MBI had reopened.
From October 8, 2001, when the writ of attachment was served on MBI, through August 21, 2003, Benson Fischer had drawn checks from MBI accounts totaling $244,620. The money typically came in monthly pаyments of $8,957. Fischer characterized those amounts as repayments of the $310,000 loan, rather than salary for his work on behalf of the company. The court was tempted “to conclude that Benson Fischer’s repayment arrangements with MBI are just part of his scheme to keep Paley Rothman, Mark, and Flax from satisfying their judgments.” Having heard the testimony, however, it was persuaded “that MBI was set up financially in the same way Mr. Sheldon Fischer had set up his other businesses
Paley Rothman had presented expert testimony to assist in determining the fair market value of Fischer’s services, but the court made no finding on this question. “The amounts he drew would not reflect a full salary for comparable work, ... but might well be reasonable for an executive/owner during the start-up period of a new business.” “[T]he court [was] loath without further evidence to second-guess the judgment of a businessman that he can survive on less than normal while his business is being established.”
B. Legal Analysis
Seeking to collect at least part of the judgment Fischer owed, Paley Rothman relied upon
Payments by employer-garnishee where employee has no salary or salary inadequate for services rendered.
Where the judgment debtor claims or is proved to be rendering services to or employed by a relative or other person or by a corporation owned or controlled by a relative or other person, without salary or compensation, or at a salary or compensation so inadequate as to satisfy the court that the salary or compensation is merely colorable and designed to defraud or impede the creditors of the debtor, the court may direct the employer-garnishee to make payments on account of the judgment, in installments, based upon a reasonable value of the services rendered by the judgment debt- or under his employment or upon the debtor’s then earning ability.
There was no dispute that Fischer rendered services to MBI — according to his own testimony and that of his father, he worked long and hard, sometimes seven days a week. There also seems to be no dispute that he served without salary or compensation. The question is whether those facts are sufficient to trigger application of the statute or whether Paley Roth-man was obliged to demonstrate as well that the absence of salary was “designed to defraud or impede the creditors of the debtor.”
There is no infallible rule for answering such questions of statutory construction, but we have often found “guidance in the ‘Rule of the Last Antecedent,’ which is that ‘ordinarily, qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding them, and not to others more remote.’ ”
Evans v. Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange,
In this case, applying the Rule of the Last Antecedent points to the conclusion that the qualifying words “designed to defraud or impede the creditors of the debtor” modify “a salary or compensation so inadequate” and not the more remote phrase “without salary or compensation.” However, we need not rely on this gram
Where the judgment debtor ... is proved to be rendering services to or employed by ... a corporаtion owned or controlled by a relative or other person, without salary or compensation, ... the court may direct the employer-garnishee to make payments on account of the judgment, in installments, based upon a reasonable value of the services rendered by the judgment debtor under his employment or upon the debtor’s then earning ability.
Under this construction, the statute would apply in situations like this, when the judgment debtor is working without salary or compensation. There would be no need to prove that the arrangement was “designed to defraud or impede ... creditors.”
The parties have not cited, and we have not found, any legislative history which would undercut this “plain language” reading of the statute.
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Nor does case law require a different interpretation. Indeed, on the one occasion when we have construed this statute, we required a family corporation to make payments on behalf of its president. In
IBF Corp. v. Alpern,
In IBF Corp., we did not address the issue of statutory construction now before us, but we did explain, in passing, that “[t]he statute is designed to permit a levy against the corporate fisc when a debtor who renders services to the corporation takes inadequate, if any, compensation— and thus presumably leaves his or her money in the corporation — in order to defraud or otherwise impede personal creditors.” Id. at 597 (emphasis added). The italicized words seem to support Fischer’s position, but they appear to be mere dictum. There is no discussion of the issue presented here, and, when the opinion summarizes the trial court’s findings, there is no reference to an intent to defraud or impede creditors. Id. (Under the interpretation of the statute espoused by MBI and Fischer, such a finding would have been necessary in order for us to affirm the order requiring payments.)
In
Phillips v. Sugrue,
Here, by contrast, Fischer is a controlling insider in a for-profit business enterprise. There are no First Amendment obstacles to adjudicating the question of whether MBI can be required “to make payments on account of the judgment, in installments, based upon a reasonable value of the services rendered by” Fischer.
Paley Rothman does not argue that the “loan repayments” were, in fact, disguised salary. Rather, it highlighted these payments simply to dеmonstrate that MBI had money available to make payments to Fischer each month. The Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Benson Fischer (somewhat curiously aligned in this litigation with Paley Rothman) makes the same argument: “The shareholder agreement obligates MBI to make loan repayments only when there is a positive cash flow. Since MBI issued loan repayments to Fischer every single month, it is clear that the company had a positive net cash flow each month. Thus, instead of making loan repayments, the company easily could have directed its excess cash flow to pay Fischer a salary which would have been subject to attachment.” This aspect of the issue has not been fully briefed, and we do not decide it now, but it may develop, after further litigation in the trial court, that MBI must make payments on the judgment before it repays the loan from Fischer. We reject the argument that such an outcome would involve our courts imper-missibly in the governance of a Maryland corporation. This is not an issue of corpo
MBI and Fischer protest that Paley Rothman cannot have any greater rights against MBI than Fischer does,
see Phillips v. Sugrue,
The statute does repose discretion in the trial court when it provides that “the court
may direct
the employer-garnishee to make payments....”
We conclude, in sum, that the plain language of the statute does not require Paley Rothman to prove that the financial arrangements between MBI and Fischer were “designed to defraud or impede” his creditors. “[T]hose words do not apply to the case of an employee working for free.”
In re Schneiderman,
IV. Rule 11 Sanctions
Arthur Kahn and Stanley Goldschmidt argue that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing Rule 11 sanctions against each of them. They maintain that there was a factual basis for the assertions made in the original and amended complaints and that Paley Rothman failed to comply with the “safe harbor” requirements of Rule 11(c)(1)(A). Kahn particularly ar
A. Pertinent Facts
Although the Rule 11 sanctions grow out of Benson Fischer’s dispute with Howard Flax, they are not based on his decision to sue Flax for tortious interference with prospective business advantage, but rather on his extraordinary decision to sue Flax’s attorneys as well. The original complaint, drafted by Stanley Goldschmidt, accused Alan Mark and Paley Rothman of tortious interference, extortion and attempted extortion, aiding and abetting tortious activity, and conspiracy.
Arthur Kahn began representing Fischer after Mr. Goldschmidt withdrew from the case on May 30, 1997. See note 2, supra. Shortly after taking over, Kahn argued against dismissal of the original complaint, asserting that “[w]e’ve alleged point-blank that the defendant lawyer himself, in it for himself, intentionally interfered with our prospective economic advantage. ... [W]e assert [that] you were in it for yourself, ... you did it with malice and spite and ill will.” “These allegations, if accepted as true, definitely state a legally cognizable claim against the lawyer and the law firm.” Judge Bowers disagreed and dismissed all counts against Mark and Paley Rothman. As the court explained, there was nothing “to indicate that Mark did anything other than represent his client in reference to that fee.”
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Kahn filed an amended complaint,
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renewing the claim that Mark and Paley Rothman were guilty of tortious interference with the Laidlaw proposal. He specifically alleged that “Mark took the aforesaid actions on his own behalf and that of Paley Rothman, outside the scope of his purported employment by the Flax Defendants as their attorney, for his sole personal benefit with the specific intent to injure and damage the plaintiffs, knowing full well that the Flax Defendants’ said actions were without legal justificаtion and unlawful.” In context it is clear that these allegations were designed to meet the requirements of
Fraidin v. Weitzman,
On January 21, 1998, Paley Rothman served both Kahn and Goldschmidt with a copy of its draft motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, asserting that there was no factual basis for the allegations in the amended complaint. A month later, on February 20, Paley Rothman filed its motion in the Superior Court. Kahn withdrew from the case in June. When Gold-schmidt re-entered the case in July 1998, Paley Rothman wrote him, asking that he withdraw the claims against it. He did not do so, but filed three supplemental oppositions to the Rule 11 motion, “one more obdurate than the next,” according to Judge Graae. On July 24, 1998, Judge Graae denied the motion for sanctions as “prematurely filed,” noting that “it is obvious that sanctions might only apply if the complaint against these defendants were dismissed or summary judgment granted.” After summary judgment was entered
On October 8, 2003, Judge Graae held a day-long hearing on the matter. Stanley Goldschmidt testified that a period of apрroximately six months elapsed between the time he was retained by Benson Fischer and the filing of the original complaint. He described the steps he had taken to investigate the legal and factual bases for claims against Mark and Paley Rothman. He had studied the decision in Fraidin and relied on his understanding that an attorney’s “malice can be inferred by merely taking a position ... against an opposing party without legal justification.” After he re-entered the litigation, he reviewed the amended complaint and saw that Mr. Kahn had also taken the position “that Mr. Mark was acting for his own benefit.”
At the hearing, Mr. Kahn summarized his reasons for making the allegations against Mark and Paley Rothman. “I base[d] it on the fact that there was no valid claim for this commission, that it was pursued therefore without any merit and the motivation I could only construe for an attorney like Mr. Mark, qualified as he was, was for some personal animus that had been engendered by the invective heaped upon him by Mr. Fischer and by his friendship with Mr. Flax.” As Kahn explains in his brief, “Fischer alleged that Mark’s malice сame from within, because he took Fischer’s conduct toward himself and his friend [Flax] personally.”
Judge Graae considered “the professional conduct of Mr. Goldschmidt and Mr. Kahn to be well beyond the pale. These two experienced lawyers knew, or had to know, they did not have sufficient evidence to make a case for tortious interference by Mr. Mark and his firm, Paley Rothman.” “The essence of Fischer’s claims against Paley Rothman [was] that Mr. Mark was representing his friend Howard Flax on a claim of compensation to which he had no legal entitlement and, thus, Mr. Mark’s only motivation could have been to do harm to Fischer.” As evidence of Mark’s malice, “Mr. Goldschmidt and Mr. Kahn [had] the audacity to suggest that Mr. Fischer’s abusive and threatening conduct so angered Mr. Mark that he was provoked into a legally indefensible representation of Mr. Flax for the malicious purpose of damaging Fischer.” Alternatively, Goldschmidt implied that Mark was being paid under a contingency agreement or had a financial interest in the Letter Agreement underlying Flax’s claim. The trial court dismissed “[t]hese speculative theories about Mr. Mark’s motives [because they] were never substantiated by a single fact.” Even after discovery “rendered] their claims insupportable,” Mr. Goldschmidt and Mr. Kahn “rejected opportunities to correct and amend their pleadings.” “The court [could] only characterize their conduct as willful and badly motivated.”
The court decided that “[m]onetary sanctions [were] clearly appropriate.” Although Paley Rothman had spent $723,187 defending itself, and Mark invested more than 600 hours of uncompensated time assisting the firm in defending the claims against him, the court did not attempt to “balanc[e] the books.” Considering the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions, and the limited resources of Goldschmidt and Kahn, the court concluded that a sanction of $50,000 each would be “an amount sufficient to serve as a meaningful deterrent.” The court apportioned the sanction equally because it did not “find[] either lawyer more or less culpable than the other.”
Mr. Kahn filed a motion to vacate, alter, оr amend the judgment, appending his own affidavit and excerpts of deposition
Mr. Kahn persists in missing the point. He failed to conduct a proper factual investigation before filing [the amended complaint] reinstating Fischer’s claims against Mr. Mark and Paley Rothman. There was no factual support for the claim before he filed it, and none materialized later.
Indeed, rather than supporting the claims, discovery revealed that there was no factual basis for them, and Mr. Kahn “should have removed his blinders, faced up to the insubstantiality of the claim against Paley Rothman, and dismissed it from the case.”
B. Standard of Review
“This court reviews for abuse of discretion both a trial court’s determination that Rule 11 was violated and the amount of sanctions ordered.”
Cunningham v. Bathon,
C. The Court Properly Imposed Sanctions
Civil Rule 11 allows the Superior Court to impose sanctions on an attorney who has presented a pleading without evidentiary support or for “any improper purpose.”
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The reasonableness of the attorney’s inquiry depends on the circumstances of the case. “An inquiry that is unreasonable when an attorney has months to prepare a complaint may be reasonable when he has only a few days before the statute of limitations runs.”
Cooter & Gell v. Harimarx Corp.,
Although we eschew the benefits of “20/20 hindsight,”
Park v. Sandwich Chef, Inc.,
The rule continues to require litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by generally providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.... [A] litigant’s obligations with respect to the contents of [its] papers are not measured solely as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have any merit.... [I]f evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable opportunity for furthеr investigation or discovery, the party has a duty under the rule not to persist with that contention.
Fed.R.Cxv.P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment Subdivisions (b) and (c)).
1. “Safe Harbor” Notice Was Given
A party intending to move for sanctions under
A party cannot initiate the
This case is unusual because the trial court dismissed the initial
The procedural posture of this case is similar to that considered in
Divane v. Krull Electric Co., Inc.,
Here Kahn and Goldschmidt received ample warning that Paley Rothman intended to seek
2. Appellants Goldschmidt and Kahn Violated
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we “apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of [the trial] court’s
Only in rare circumstances will a party be justified in suing his opponent’s lawyer. “An attorney ‘who pursues in good faith his or her client’s interests on a matter fairly debatable in the law cannot be held liable to an opposing party.”
Fischer I,
Mr. Fischer speculated that Mr. Mark was motivated by malice because of his friendship with Flax, but we have rejected a similar inference on comparable facts. In
Ammerman v. Newman,
3. The Amount of Sanctions
Being thoroughly familiar with the record, the trial court recognized “that the claims made against Paley Rothman infected the entire litigation ... [and] had a huge impact ... in terms of time and expense.... ” “Mr. Mark and Paley Roth-man, although thoroughly vindicated on the merits, were badly hurt by this litigation ... a case they should never have had to defend.” Nevertheless, the court did not attempt to make them whole. Instead, it focused on the deterrent purpose of
This record reflects a careful exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Although Messrs. ' Kahn and Goldschmidt view the evidence differently, they have not demonstrated that the trial court based its decision on “a clearly erroneous evaluation of the evidence_”
Kleiman,
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment denying Mr. Fischer’s motion to vacate and the judgments imposing sanctions on Mr. Goldschmidt and Mr. Kahn. We vacate the decision denying enforcement of the writ of attachment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Notes
. Howard Flax died before the case went to trial and was replaced in the litigation by the personal representative of his estate.
. Mr. Kahn represented Fischer from July 11, 1997, to June 11, 1998, during which time he drafted and filed the amended complaint. Mr. Goldschmidt represented Fischer before and after Mr. Kahn did so.
. During the previously-held
. In
Rosen
we interpreted former Disciplinary Rule 1 — 101(A), which provided: "A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact in connection with, his application for admission to the bar." Focusing on the "language and syntax” of the rule, we concluded that "the requirement of deliberateness is conspicuously absent from” one of the "alternative groundfs] for sanctions.”
. We previously have explained that the legislative history of
. MBI does not challenge the authority of District of Columbia courts to enforce the writ against a Maryland corporation, presumably because the writ was served on the corporation's Registered Agent in the District of Columbia, Stanley Goldschmidt. Power over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction to enforce a writ of attachment.
Marvins Credit, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
. We are not persuaded by Paley Rothman’s argument that the court abused its discretion by admitting expert testimony from Bruce Pollekoff, an accountant called by MBI. The court was well aware that Pollekoff had not studied the books and records of MBI, but was testifying more generally about capitalization of small businesses. The court was fully capable of evaluating this testimony and accepting it for what it was worth.
. Judge Bowers stated his intention to dismiss with prejudice the claims against Mark and Paley Rothman. However, Mr. Kahn persuaded the court to order dismissal without prejudice so he could amend the complaint to include a specific factual basis for concluding that Mark acted with animosity or fraud.
. At the time of this litigation,
(b) Representations to court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary, delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have eviden-tiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11(b) (1995 Supp.).
. We repeatedly have looked to cases interpreting
. The district court in
Divane
had concluded that no safe harbor notice was required in the circumstances of that case, see
. They also expend substantial effort trying to convince us that there was a factual basis for Fischer’s claim that Howard Reissner was the first to contact Laidlaw about underwriting an initial public offering of Fischer Brewing Company stock.
But see Fischer I,
. As we previously have observed, "Fischer’s claims of conspiracy and aiding and abetting are entirely derivative of his claim of tortious interference by Flax.”
Fischer I,
. Mr. Goldschmidt cites other cases discussing an attorney’s liability to an opposing party, but those decisions do not support his cause.
See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross,