Goldman v. Braunstein's, Inc.Goldman v. Braunstein's, Inc.
Carl I. GOLDMAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant,
v.
BRAUNSTEIN'S, INC., Defendant Below, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Theodore F. Sandstrom, of Killoran & Van Brunt, Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellant.
Charles K. Keil, of Bayard, Brill & Handelman, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellee.
WOLCOTT, C. J., CAREY, J., and DUFFY, Chancellor, sitting.
CAREY, Justice:
The plaintiff below, Carl I. Goldman, has appealed from an order granting summary judgment еntered by the Superior Court in favor of Braunstein's, Inc., defendant below. The issue we must dеcide is: Is the limitation of time for starting a suit to recover damages for breach of an employment contract governed by T. 10 Del.C. § 8110 (one year) or by T. 10 Del.C. § 8106 (three years)?
The facts pertinent to the present dispute are these: By letter dated June 7, 1963, the *578 appellee confirmed an agreement with appellant whereby the latter was employed as manager of appellee's store at Price's Corner for a term of one year commencing June 10, 1963. His comрensation was to be $12,000 per year, plus "a yearly bonus of 1% over a base figure of $1,000,000 in net sales" provided that the shortages do not exceed 1½%. The appellant performed his duties under this agreement until January 2, 1964, at which time he was dischargеd. On that date, he received his monthly pay check for the pay period ending January 31, 1964. He has received no further salary and has never been paid any bоnus. On January 5, 1965, he filed this action for damages for future services not performed, charging that he was wrongfully discharged. The appellee thereafter moved fоr summary judgment based upon T. 10 Del.C. § 8110, which reads as follows:
"No action for recovery upon a claim for wages, salary, or overtime for work, labor or persоnal services performed, or for damages (actual, compensatоry or punitive, liquidated or otherwise), or for interest or penalties resulting from the fаilure to pay any such claim, or for any other benefits arising from such work, labor or personal services performed or in connection with any such action, shall be brought after the expiration of 1 year from the accruing of the cаuse of action on which such action is based."
The Court below, in granting appеllee's motion, held that the case is governed by the quoted section. We disagree.
In our opinion, the language of our Act restricts its application to claims arising out of services performed. It governs all claims for "wages, salary оr overtime for work, labor or personal services performed, * * * damages, * * * interest or рenalties resulting from the failure to pay any such claim, or * * * benefits arising from such work, labor or personal services performed". (Emphasis added). Clearly, the word "damages" in this section is not unlimited in its scope; it is confined, as are all the other types of claims mentioned, to those arising from services which have been performed. That view is not inсonsistent with the statement (relied upon by the Court below) in Sorenson v. Overland Corp.,
The present claim does not arise from services performed, and is not a suit for the salary and bonus; it is based upon an allеged wrongful termination of the contract, and seeks damages therefor. Thosе damages may, or may not, be equal in amount to the salary and bonus which was nevеr paid. If there be any recoverable loss, it arose upon or after tеrmination of the employer-employee relationship. This distinction has been recognized in Delaware ever since this Court, in Ogden-Howard Co. v. Brand,
We hold, therefоre, that the period of limitations applicable to the present suit is not thе one-year provision of § 8110, but is the three-year period of § 8106 which covers actions "based on a promise", inter alia. That conclusion eliminates the need for us tо consider other arguments advanced as to the date on which this cause of action accrued.
The judgment below will be reversed and the record remanded for further proceedings.