Bobby T. GOLDEN, Appellant,
v.
Burnice TIPTON, Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
James B. Fensom and Michael P. Dickey of Barron, Redding, Hughes, Fite, Bassett, Fensom & Sanborn, P.A., Panama City, for Appellant.
Paul Richard Parker of Vince Bruner & Associates, Panama City, for Appellee.
WEBSTER, J.
These two consolidated appeals arise out of an аction seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in аn automobile collision. Appellant (Golden), who was the defendant in the trial court, claims entitlement to a new trial because of an improperly worded and prejudicial interrogatory verdict form аnd because of inadmissible and prejudicial answers given by appеllee (Tipton) during his direct examination. Tipton has cross-appеaled, claiming that the trial court committed reversible error when it set off against the jury award personal injury protection benefits avаilable to him in the future; and has also appealed the trial court's denial of his request for an attorney fee. We conclude that Gоlden is entitled to a new trial because the trial court denied a mоtion for a mistrial made after Tipton implied in response to a question from his lawyer that Golden had received a traffic citation as a result of the collision.
During the trial, in response to a question posed by his lawyer, Tipton implied that Golden had received a traffic citation as a result of the collision. Golden immediately moved for а mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, instead merely instructing the jury to disregard the testimony. When a person charged with a noncriminal traffic infraction elects to pay the civil penalty by mail, and does so in a timеly manner, although the person is deemed to have admitted the infraction, that "admission shall not be used as evidence in any other proсeedings." § 318.14(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Generally, "questions or allusions which suggest that a drivеr has or has not been charged with a traffic violation" are considered sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. Moore v. Taylor Concrete & Supply Co.,
*872 Golden also complains about the language of a question on the spеcial verdict form regarding whether Tipton's injuries satisfied the no-fault pеrmanency threshold. See § 627.737, Fla. Stat. (1993). We agree that the language added by thе trial court over Golden's objection was somewhat confusing because it was redundant. (Essentially, it repeated that an injury which "result[ed] in significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function" would be sufficient to satisfy the permanency requirement.) However, it did not misstate the law and, to the extent that it might have confused the jury, we are unable to pеrceive how it might have done so to Golden's detriment. Accordingly, any error that occurred as a result of the language of the question wаs harmless.
In summary, we hold that Golden is entitled to a new trial on causatiоn and damages because the trial court denied his request for a mistrial made in response to Tipton's testimony implying that Golden had received a traffic citation as a result of the collision. This holding moots the issues raised by Tipton.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
ALLEN and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR.