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Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc.
300 N.W. 207
Minn.
1941
Check Treatment

*1 INC. AND OTHERS. LERCH BROS. GOLDEN LUCY AND TRAVELERS COMPANY INDEMNITY GLOBE COMPANY, GARNISHEES.1 INSURANCE

August 1, 1941. 32,648. 32,640, Nos. Minn. 281 N. See 203 W.

Holmes, May all, Iieavill cG Neimeyer, appellant In- Travelers Company. surance

Faegre, Krause, Benson Paul J. MeCough, and Wright W. Brooks, appellant Indemnity Globe Company.

Sexton, Mordaunt, cG Kennedy Carroll, for plaintiff-respondent. Strmch, Thomas H. for defendants-respondents Abigail S. Lerch 1Reported in 300 N. W. 207. George Lerch Lereli, deceased, Lerch, Fred representative

Brothers, copartnership.

Stone, Justice. Minn. N.

In Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc. 203 281 W. *2 judgment damages for suffered plaintiff got (who her husband verdict) died of Broth- negligence after as result Lerch a From 1915 to ers, copartnership. 1929, Mr. Golden -was their employe. negligence That the failure to him provide was In place consequence, safe to work. he contracted the disease (from January 1935) which he died of pneumoconiosis silicosis with an and result of superimposed end fatal tuberculosis. He quit had Lerch Inc. 1930. employment by January his Bros.

Lucy Golden, special plaintiff administratrix and substituted original case, assigned judgments (there has her are two of one the district court one and them, here costs dis- Inc.2 bursements) by garnish- to Lerch Bros. That corporation ment Trav- Indemnity now seeks to hold the Globe garnishees, liable of Lerch Brothers. Companies, elers Insurance as insurers' against garnishees severally going them, The decisions below the order their alternative for amend- appeal denying motions ed or a new trial. findings of in Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc. narrow. theory recovery

The was violation of Mason St. negligence charged The was the § of wherein required laboratory That ventilation proper statute dust therein from the crush- employed arising Golden was so that samples of would not become harmful ing and treatment ore those employed. advanced on behalf nor evidence was there by pleadings

Neither injury. of theory accidental original in the case of plaintiff Recovery enlightening. controlling, but is That is negative verdict, in the that be- implicit finding fact, upon was based August 8, 1929, operated copartnership until when aas 2 Lerch Brothers organized over the business. corporation and took had Golden the victim negligence become defendants’ cause rather accident. slowly disease than developing an insidious insurers two were identical cover- issued Compensation labeled “Standard Workmen’s They are age. Policy.” They employer against insured Liability Employers’ includ- “personal injuries by employees, reason of loss time therefrom.” After initial any ing death falls two classes. first coverage into insures statement, liability of insured under com- against workmen’s generally That is the workmen’s side law. pensation contract. employers’ liability to do with the coverage.

The other has side employ- “to this indemnify the insurer’s is respect, promise In that him liability imposed reason law er loss employees of such such of said damages on account injuries may wherever such be sustained legally employed as are the territorial limits of the United States America.” within indemnity subject to this limitation promise (paragraph That *3 : “This shall to agreement apply only of the policy) VII occurring during reason accidents the so sustained in Item 2 Declara- and defined as such of said policy period limited to, Item referred part policy. which are a the so tions,” damage, or other makes no mention of accidents cadise but dates of period during confined limitations terminal “the is to (Italics in unless cancelled.” Policy force, which the shall remain supplied.)

A of the that “this policy, F, Employer, upon condition the accident, occurrence of an written notice give shall immediate Company thereof to the with the information fullest ob- [insurer] condition, Another D, injured employe tainable.” makes beneficiary of the contract.3 contract, It declares the re- 3 In view of the fact injured clearly employes are so beneficiaries policies, query suggests why necessary the itself it was in order to garnishment reach the insurers to resort the circuitous route of rather Rhude, than direct suit: La Mourea v. 209 Minn. 295 N. W. 304. not affected “shall the failure of injured employes, spect required by refrain from act doing any to do or Employer this any Employer default of this after the accident nor Policy; giving any required.” notice premiums payment if if liable, all, only they employ- are insured the The insurers arising from chronic as damages employes er disease against January from accident. Since arising 15, 1919, well as those off whatever it was. risk, Travelers have been again Golden case is before us. We do not The record If of Lerch quit employ much of its facts. Golden had repeat January concurrently expiration 15, 1919, Brothers there is no of that date or policy, that, Travelers evidence last any he had become afflicted with disease. He have earlier, if the had slight that, exposure but to so an extent exposed, been resulting been no probably not there would have continued, been disease. falls far law, record, against Travelers,

As matter arising from an insured risk incurred shmving damage short of best, finding against 1919. At the Travelers January 15, before conjecture on rather than inference. issue Avouldrest January continuously covered the risk from The Globe Golden hold inasmuch as January 1, that, 1931. We 15, 1919, from accident, Avhichdid not result of chronic disease died other insurance, liable. That is because the is not company Globe did liability compensation, for workmen’s than that rather and disease, but or death disability cover * * * Even accidents.” by reason of “injuries only, been confined Avouldhave insurance compensation the workmen’s of all for its inclusion except of accident to cases liability for includes necessarily That law. *4 1927 Mason St. the statute. occupational disease classed or pneumoconiosis, 4327. Silicosis Supp. and 1940 § included. not so are tuberculosis, superimposed Avithout 34 follow those Were hopeless conflict.4 we cases are

The otherwise our conclusion would be Alabama,5 Nebraska from York, New view are accord with cases is. In our than and the federal courts.6 Pennsylvania, Illinois, Jersey, New authority, we have state Because of the conflict reexamination thoroughgoing the most problem the whole given we capable. ivhich are not under employers his of Golden recovery on common-laAv lia- exclusively It Avas their law. not through functioned harmfully, That tort

bility negligence. insidious exclusively by or but rather and accident, because which there was no accident. chronic disease, causation YII of there is no paragraph policies, So, “only” to policies apply the insurer. That makes the paragraph is too language “sustained reason of accidents.” its plain application reasonable debate. With Avithout subject justifiable matter, there is no One least ambiguity. 4 Cases similar to in An those cited herein are collected and discussed notations, 737; 374; 158; 112 A. L. A. L. R. 35 52 A. 64 R. A. L. R. L. R. 966; L.R.A.(N.S.) 30 1192. 5 Updike Employers 745, Corp. Inv. Co. v. Assur. 131 Neb. L. Ltd. 270 107; Agricola N. W. 236 American Mut. L. Co. v. Furnace Co. Ala. Ins. 535, Compare Victory Sparkler Specialty Francks, 183 So. 677. & Co. v. 368, 363; 635, Metropolitan 147 Md. 44 128 A. A. L. R. Bosworth v. L. 663, 780; King 114 Ins. Co. Co. W. Va. 173 S. E. v. Ins. 123 Travelers 1, 311; Hoage Corp. App. 192 Employers’ Conn. 62 v. L. Ltd. Assur. 77, (2d) contrary reached, D. C. 64 F. 715. Similar results were but cov erage adjective was restricted use of “accident” rather the word as an noun, than a a material Harv. L. variation. See 25 Rev. 328. 6 Taylor Dredging (2 Cir.) (2d) 449; Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. 90 F. Sterling (2d) Corp. 582, Globe Ind. Co. v. 283 N. 27 N. E. Stewart Y. 441, affirming App. 1027, (2d) 678; 257 Div. S. 13 N. Y. United States Corp. 316, Radium v. Globe Ind. J. Billo Co. 13 N. Misc. 178 A. 271. See Allegheny 110; 97, Storage Pa. Steel Co. 328 195 A. Boal v. Electric Battery 815; Cir.) (2d) Co. 98 F. Peru Plow Wheel Co. v. Industrial 216, Employers’ 311 Comm. 142 N. E. Jackson v. L. Ill. Assur. Corp. affirmed, App. 139 248 Y. Div. Misc. N. S. affirmed, Y. S. E. N. N. N. Y. *5 is its occasional creation of ambigui- judicial process of

errors really exist. It none is not for judges where in contracts to ties to stuff for mere them, counsel dummies whereon or up, permit set bayonet. dialectical with the skill to demonstrate to to go it is well the factual roots of the proceeding, Before and somewhat in detail examining again nature of issue The medical testimony supporting ailment. re- fatal Golden’s is illustrated by Golden case that of Dr. E. L. covery examination and personal X-rays, based on Cheney, diagnosis, whose superimposed tuber- “pneumoconiosis,7 had a was Golden involving He infection, lungs.” tuberculosis both trouble, cular germ not a disease. His opinion said was was that pneumoconiosis particularly certain atmospheres, “the men who work dust-laden * * * of are known to period years, over a types dust, of pneumoconiosis. condition we call That is the found with this on lung tissues.” He added that particles effects of the dust usually of pneumoconiosis very “is slow.” progress onset work time with long “can continue with his The victim result The usual is a degree pneumoconiosis.” considerable of infection. Pneumoconiosis greater susceptibility tuberculosis “He had the foundation” of Golden’s trouble. original “was respiratory infection first, and he had this pneumoconiosis [in- infec- second, and then later the definite tubercular fluenza] general applied or 7 “A term to chronic induration fibrous inflammation lungs given are of the due to the inhalation of dust. Various names causing inflammation; anthracosis, according to the kind of dust dust; siderosis, that due to inhalation of due to the inhalation of coal dust; chalicosis, that due to the inhalation of mineral dust.” metallic Dictionary ed.). Gould’s Medical spellings Apparently term this there are three alternative pneumonokoniosis. disease, vis., pneumoconiosis, pneumonoconiosis, and We opinion, vis., pneumo- spelling in our former used have adhered to coniosis. deposit particles authority “A thus defines silicosis: The same lung specifically, condition of the or a chronic fibroid in the silica tissues particles glands, produced inhalation of lymphatic the bronchial silica.” opin- the medical Cheney’s testimony typical was all Dr.

tion.” beginning It showed a condition plaintiff. for the ion time or any definite years, within referable, time. long for a were unknown progress Its existence event. direct a cause the antithesis of accident. That demonstrates definition, (which from medical silicosis is but one appears As by germ does not result infection of pneumoconiosis) sort are more or must dwell cities less contin We who bacillus. lungs many pneumoconiosis. us, ually exposed *6 show the effects of anthracosis. might Silicosis inspection, close “occupation disease,” simply an which is “one caused is frequently Dictionary patient.” Gould’s Medical occupation how irrelevant is the of presence That shows tort as ed.). The cause of disease too occupational causation. has of agency of neglect employers furnishing the tortious em been often working premises. neglect target with safe Such is the of ployes requiring ventilation of workrooms with proper where, our statute subjected dangerous would be to the inhalation employes it, out gases. Mason St. So we cannot noxious dusts § is plainly occupational that what is otherwise and an disease agree by nonoccupational wholly rendered fortuitous circumstance by an employer’s caused tort. In is it is contrast American Agricola L. Co. v. Furnace Ala. 535, Mut. Ins. Co. 236 183 So. 677. may be, occasionally Habitual conduct a is, tort. But it is Whatever may an accident. else it an be, never accident is an it must be such, susceptible event. As of identification and refer- time, place, result, degree ence whatever of certainty demand. case particular conduct, performance Habitual intentional as to but not as an effect, harmful cannot be accident under any reasonable defini- employer’s subjection His tion. Golden to work in an unven- tilated, dust-filled was all along workroom intentional and usual. not an It was tortious but accident. It was the cause his dis- The latter was a ease. fibroid condition of his lungs, insidiously through continued the chronic to the fatal slowly started through long many working hours inhalation, his stage, particles of minute air-borne year, after silica dust. year days, any reasonable inclusion defies reasonable defini- a cause Such do cannot Accidents not and years take tion accident.

happening. separate nor any succeeding the first inhalation silica

Neither It rather perceived. process can slow' than an dust be event. accident must an episode an be of which policies, insurance Under followed it given, proof notice be within happened can of dust, term. No inhalation unless it so toxic as disease, can be such event. result in acute Neither can of inhalations. succession it is of itself results, w'here an event. it

Disease, But is result concerned, than we are now cause, rather as de controlling cause alone. The cision, with disease result is relevant only as to identifying it aids in the cause so appraise the latter as or not. At this point helps accidental consideration to observe distinction medical betw'een diseases which are acute and those which are chronic.8 former are characterized by sud frequently den onset so are referable to accident cause.9 as. For example are cases of typhoid fever, Aetna L. Co. Ins. v. Port land (9 Cir.) Gas Coke Co. F. L. R. 1916D, *7 glanders, H. P. Hood v. Sons Maryland Co. Cas. 223, 206 Mass. terminology 8 In medical “having an “acute rapid disease” is one on set, course, pronounced symptoms short termination; not chronic. Sharp, antonym severe.” “Chronic” is “long- the of “acute.” It means continued; long duration; opposed acute.” Gould’s Medical Diction ary (3 ed.). 9 But see State ex rel. Faribault Court, Woolen Mills Co. v. District 138 210, Minn. 164 1918F, N. (typhoid W. L. R. A. 855 contracted from drinking water, accident). pneumonia, held not an Costly Same as to City Eveleth, 173 Minn. 218 N. W. 126. Both cases were con trolled the definition of “accident” in our workmen’s law. unexpected event, That definition is happening suddenly “an or unforeseen violently, fault, producing with or without human the time injury physical body.” 4326(h). to the structure the Mason St. §

38 A. R. tetrachloride S. L.R.A.(N.S.) E.

92 N. in Ind. Co. v. Banner Grain Co. asthma, Globe poisoning (2d) Cir.) F. always an insidious and silicosis, as have diseases, such Chronic slowly long period, for a They progress unrecognized beginning. process Moreover, of their presence. suspicion without if may attacked it, stopped, and, we understand fibrosis, as the point where, without may progress beyond not enough, soon do be known. We its will examination, presence scientific chronic disease cannot result that, occasion, imply mean is that cancer be caused Our impression from accident. a blow. were damages the tort recovered in the

Because, accident, there no neither insurer is liable. So case, Golden judgment with be en- order must be reversed direction garnishees. tered ordered.

So (dissenting). Chief Gallagher, Justice agree I am regret I unable conclusions reached case, I The as view the majority. problem presented, has ambiguous construction of provisions to do with the certain lia- That bility policies. provisions insurance involved here are the fact ambiguous is evidenced courts which have pass- question disagree as to given ed the construction to be majority As stated Mr. Justice Stone policies. opin- are conflict.” If hopeless “The cases courts cannot ion, agree laymen these should be policies construed, to how must be at a extent the nature and protection they to know loss are to they insurance purchase when get containing such provisions. substantially facts are stated in the majority opinion. in the question case is whether defendants in the present Bros, damages liable for are for which Lerch

proceedings were *8 in the main action. Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc. held responsible 281 N. W. 249. 203 Minn. In- policies by issued defendant Travelers

It is conceded from during period were June Company effective surance policies and that issued the Globe January to August were effective June to 15, 1919, Indemnity Company in Golden Lerch Inc. supra, It was determined Bros. 13, 1929. injuries caused oc- negligence which Golden’s the acts August 1917 and are curred June between the same form. The Travelers is similar substantially policy Indemnity Company, Globe attached to one issued (the parts to and of the record. material read part made indicating capitalized parts italicized and portions in extra type): set out black “Globe Company Indemnity

(herein Company) called the Hereby Agree with this named described as Employer, Does respects per- forming pant hereof, such in the Declarations as time including death at injuries by employees, sonal as resulting therefrom folloios: Promptly any person thereto,

I. To entitled (a) Pay manner Law in the Compensation Workmen’s * * * provided, therein by reason (b) Indemnify Employer I. To loss this him damages liability imposed law for as are employees said injuries of such such account be sustained such employed wherever legally * * * of the United States territorial limits within of work (a) by inspection this Employer II. To Serve desir- deemed Policy when covered places this thereupon suggest Company able may operate improvements changes Employer work, injuries during severity the number or to reduce *9 of such injuries, by investigation notice (b) upon and, in ac- by any resulting settlement claims thereof law. cordance and on Employer, in the name behalf this To

III. Defend any time other which at proceedings or suits any * * * him on account of such against injuries, instituted any in Employer taxed this all costs Pay To IV. * * * by Company, defended legal proceeding by injuries to such sustained apply shall agreement This V. Employer this whose employed or persons any person in actual be included the total remuneration shall entire made, hereinafter which is provision remuneration Policy for this is premium remuneration which injuries adjusted, and, also such computed to be any Vice-President, Secre- President, sustained so corporation. of this if a Employer, Treasurer tary or designated officer shall not be any such .remuneration actually charge per- unless he is premium subjected ordinarily undertaken duties as are such forming or workman. foreman superintendent, such so sustained injuries shall apply agreement This VI. operations business described said reason purpose insurance, of this which, Declarations operations necessary, all incident ap- include or shall or connected thereto, therewith, whether such purtenant are conducted at the places work defined and operations in said Declarations or in connection described elsewhere to, in relation such work with, places. shall agreement apply This to such only injuries so

VII. sus- by reason of accidents occurring tained Policy during the Period limited and defined as Item of2 said Declarations.” reads: Declarations 2 of the

Item remain un- Policy force, shall during period “The Policy called the Policy (herein provided as less cancelled ..............., from.............., 192..., he Period), shall time, a. m., o’clock standard and one minute . at twelve ., covered any operation place where of said dates to each place or at operation, respects hereby conducted, is respects that sustained, as injury hereby covered where injury.” found: things, other court, among

The trial F. Golden were said James “15. That the Fred negligence George Lerch to and resulted due Brothers, firm of Lerch co- under the name doing business Lerch, *10 for him a provide in and to safe failing neglecting partnership, containing from dust injurious and a free place to work place matter. foreign silica and other F. and the of said James employment

“16. That the Golden by defendants, he was the employment employed of where place firm name doing Fred business under the Lerch, Lerch and George covered, by the contracts Brothers, co-partnership, were of Lerch herein to said garnishees of the insurance issued and delivered ; F. under which said James that the circumstances co-partnership entitled the in- injuries Golden sustained as heretofore related to sured, Lerch, co-partners, pro- Lerch and Fred as such George and to be tection under the of insurance aforementioned compelled pay. for the were to judgments they indemnified the nature “17. That the herein were familiar with insurers Lerch,-doing Lerch and Fred defendants, George work the said co-partnership, Brothers, firm name of Lerch business work that were in and and nature of the engaged type performed by employees.” to be their for the plaintiff

It determined that liable to defendants were court of this paid by judgments amounts satisfaction $30,000. and of district about aggregating court our for determination is ivhether question The primary an present ambiguity involved as here provisions policy if how should be construed. construction, and, so, they require use of the word “accidents” in para- contend that Defendants “injuries” characterizes the terms and 7 of the so poliey graph they at other of the injuries” appear places where “personal recovery injuries occurring strictly as to limit in its narrower sense. accident as used the word “accidents” as used in (1) It claim plaintiff’s “injuries” and “per- 7 does not characterize the terms paragraph policy, but it is injuries” parts sonal as used other designating used occurrence merely purpose policy, (2) that, though refers even only the limits used claimed injuries, the nature of the characterize plaintiff, by Golden, the term includes the plaintiff main action. construction choice, I is between the narrow it, view one

relied defendants and the more liberal contended we plaintiff. previous It seems to that under our decisions me language are committed to liberal rule that “the the more policy, benefit, insurer for its must being selected reasonable doubt as to its unambiguous, be clear and Dunnell, must be resolved in favor the insured.” 3' meaning cases cited. Dig. Supp. 4659, and § to sustain contentions. authority plaintiff’s There is abundant L. Assur. Employers’ court Missouri supreme Soukup L. R. (2d) 108 W. had Corp. Ltd. 341 Mo. S. *11 an question herein involved. There em- pass upon occasion to the damages in an action for ploye employer recovered an safety resulting to health and pertaining violation of a statute the The em- alleged by employe poisoning. the contraction lead ployer compensation employer’s carried a workmen’s and involved but issued another com- policy similar to the one here pany. in the main judgment against employer After the action. asserted garnishee instituted. were proceedings garnishment The trial in this case. defendants asserted claims the same the appeal On garnishee. judgment ordered court court, supreme Missouri affirmed. judgment garnishee decisions considering of appellant stating the claims after upon here relied are those by it, some there relied 112 A. L. R. S. W. Mo. (341 said defendants, [2d] 149): heed or appellant, give nor does not, do

“Those decisions injuries’ phrase ‘personal important to the any significance attach to other than assume in the policies, reiterated iterated thus used and as throughout sense in one and the same it is used in the attributed ‘accident’ in the sense connotes accident rule merely ancillary possibly law — document in written used a repeatedly construction that a term sense, unless in the same may to have been used presumed en- in its or the document consideration of the context proper tirety opinion otherwise determine. We are ambiguity an injuries’ presents term employment ‘personal of the requiring legal policies.” construction causing After of the analyzing pertinent provisions (341 Mo. ambiguity, the court reached the conclusion 92) applicable restrictive S. W. clause was [2d] of the policy “in far it fixes limits 1(b) only clause so (the work- 1(a)” to clause wholly applicable while it is period, word “acci- It also construed the men’s compensation provision). which it held to be poisoning, lead dent” as there used to include Mo. 108 S. W. court said disease. The occupational 92): [2d] after have, conclusions we con- foregoing arriving

“In parts, sought as a all their whole sidering object parties purpose the main ascertain what was effectuate their intention and to making them the contracts in sub- interpretation, legal principles of settled application *12 44 viz.: No

stance, substantive clause should perish be allowed to by construction unless in unsurmountable obstacles stand way of any other course; whole, looking the instrument as courts give should such construction that each clause will have some effect and perform some office; seeming contradictions must be harmonized, if that course possible; a construction which en- tirely neutralizes one provision should not if con- adopted tract is susceptible of another gives construction which effect to all of provisions its and is intent general consistent with the (6 R. C. L., p. 835).”

In the later case of Tomnitz v. Ltd. Employers’ Corp. L. Assur. 343 Mo. 121 S. (2d) 745, W. the same court had before it a case involving injuries caused silicosis. proceed Garnishment ings were resorted an effort to reach the insurer. The gar nishee there asserted the same claims here relied upon. The court said (343 Mo. 333, 121 S. W. : 751) [2d]

“The bar does define the terms injuries, bodily accidentally sustained or place any limitation thereon. In view of great variety of meanings of term accident, and view of the judgment defendant’s and of the garnishee’s construction or interpretation of the policy, and especially the interpretation garnishee, and in view of the failure define terms in- bodily juries, accidentally sustained or to place any limitation thereon, it is say reasonable to that an ambiguity meaning exists as of the terms bodily injuries, accidentally as used present policy, when such situation exists, insuring con- tract will be construed in the most light favorable to the insured. In the present situation, we rule that the occupational disease of acquired silicosis Tomnitz was a sus- bodily injury, accidentally tained within the meaning these terms in the policy.”

The Missouri court of held appeals to the same effect Blanke- E. & P. Co. v. (Mo. Baer Ocean Acc. Guarantee Corp. App.) 96 (2d) 648; S. W. Beehler Steel Prod. Co. v. American L. Mut. Ins. v. Gir- Cape and Row (2d) 985; Mo. 108 S. W. App. 841, Co. (2d) (Mo. Co. S. W. Foundry App.) ardeau Conn. Co. 116 George In McLachlan Hat Plecity insurance and an employer recovered his plaintiff poisoning due to mercurial company *13 differ- several insured his had been employment. employer in its Avas plaintiff which during ent companies period over the one be- entirely Avas employ, controversy appeal on the and the rested which upon tAveen to determine companies the insurance plaintiff. due the discharge compensation the obligation com- clause so All of the contained the notorious seventh 223, Conn. (116 mon in The court stated policies. these : 708) adopted that it Avas suggests seventh clause “The form of the in- only accidental our Act covered Compensation a time Avhen liability Avayto determine the limits apt and it is the juries injuries.” regards of the insurer as such in the as used the word “accident”

The court also stated of employment to mean the conditions must be taken policy all in- held that It poisoning. the mercurial produced employment period risk over the entire who carried the surers for the liable would be incapacity about final brought Avliich one injury an construing such aAvarded, thus of the policies. Avithinthe terms coming Ltd. Corp. L. Assur. Employers Inv. Co. v. Updike

The case supreme Nebraska decided 270 N. W. 131 Neb. insur- policy involved court on November case. in the instant involved with those identical ance almost , place a safe to furnish failing for negligence After a suit refusal injuries employe to an personal work not did ground policy to defend the insurer an action commenced involved, employer cover interpretation judgments procure act declaratory finder language that “Avhere the rules provisions. Applying of its than one of more susceptible is of insurance policy in a employed adopted” be will to the insured most favorable construction, clearly policy insurance of an insuring clause “where the and that clearly does clause limiting subsequent and a risk, covers a policy,” covered risk will be deemed it, exclude Neb. considering what was an “accident” said court 110) 270 N. W. : in a many ‘accident’ used meanings,

“The term has and when it indemnity insurance, stipulated, contract of unless otherwise should to the insured. given the construction most favorable generally, policies provide It is true accident insurance that, only injury by risks where the insured an accidental ex- suffers question ternal violent means. There in the no at- tempt to Consequently, meaning define the term ‘accident.’ the word most to the accepted. favorable insured should be

“In Chapin Ocean Accident Guarantee 96 Neb. Corporation, 213, 147 N. W. [467, L.R.A.(N.S.) (at 227], p. was said 217): *14 ‘The susceptible word “accident” is and has received many definitions, varying with connection in which it is used. It is: “An event that without one’s place foresight takes or ex- pectation; an undesigned, sudden, unexpected chance; event; contingency; often, undesigned an and unforeseen occurrence of an ’ afflictive or def- character; mishap.” unfortunate This casualty; inition quoted Dictionary. is from Webster’s New International In the in opinion indemnity it further said: ‘As used an policy this, opinion such as we are of that the word “accident” means an undesigned and unforeseen occurrence an afflictive unfortunate character in other resulting bodily injury person a of the word ordinary meaning than insured.’ Since this is an under the above insured, principles and is more favorable to the meaning definition as the quoted accepted must be question. in We in seven of the term, paragraph policy as used Roth made Eunice necessarily it follows that the claim think 47 accident and that properly designated petition in her policy.” the insurance covered American supporting plaintiff’s Other cases contention are 236 183 So. Agricola 535, 677; Mut. L. Furnace Co. Ala. Ins. Co. v. 368, Md. 128 A. Victory Francks, & v. 147 Specialty Co. Sparkler 114 635, 363; Metropolitan 44 R. Bosworth L. Ins. Co. W. A. L. v. 1, Ins. Conn. 192 663, 780; E. Travelers Co. 123 King Va. 173 S. v. 311; 223, Cas. Co. 206 Mass. Maryland A. P. Hood & v. H. Sons Aetna L. 138 A. R. L.R.A.(N.S.) 1192, N. S. E. R. F. L. Cir.) (9 Ins. Co. Portland Gas Coke Co. 1916D, 1027. Grain Co. Ind. Co. v. Banner

Of is the case of Globe interest appeals, the circuit court Cir.) F. decided (8 (2d) in this originated That June 1937. case eighth circuit, on N. 195 Minn. 261 W. v. Banner Grain Co. state. Clark employer of an alleged negligence upon It was predicated to furnish work and employe place its a safe failing to provide the em- injury adequate ventilation, proper Com- Grain judgment After an the Banner health. adverse ploye’s Indemnity Company Globe its pany sued the Judge, Circuit Booth, appeals, circuit court of insurance. length quoted some insurer, affirming decision findings Judge Nordbye. to the from the attached memorandum 781): F. It reads [2d] of Clark was mishap tetrachloride poisoning

“That clear, and it is fair as- and unforeseen seems was unexpected found attack that, by its insidious jury sume elapsed and that lining lung, Clark’s time membrane to Clark was distin- happening injury resulted, before definition contemplated the occurrence guished from * * * jury, Act. Compensation Minnesota Workmen’s *15 to Clark ivas not an evidence, happening concluded that suddenly violently, which produced accident that occurred to the structure injury the time of the all of physical body, 48 , by the. definition of accident the Work- contemplated which is * * * jury’s verdict However, Act. Compensation

men’s happening that finding must be limited to a the Clark case accident as defined to Clark ivas not an injury in an resulting finding of and such Compensation Act, Workmen’s the occur- enlarged finding extended or to a jury cannot be and unlimited not an accident within the unrestricted rence was in the contract appears definition- of the term Accident’ as into the parties.” insurance that was entered between occupational as an pneumoconiosis recognized Silicosis act. If it disease under the Minnesota workmen’s under, the act. were, injuries compensable would have been Golden’s suffered and of its malady of the nature of the he Regardless observance prevented by medical it could have been of. the term, failing employer negligence statute. The cause ivas dust. of fumes and carrying ventilation for the off provide proper ..negli many holding There are cases character do not come within the classification gence of a like Francks, Specialty & Co. v. Victory Sparkler disease. occupational Collier-Latimer, A. R. 363; L. Pero v. 635, 147 Md. 368, Elec. Co. v. Meach (2d) 690; Birmingham 52 P. Wyo. 131, Inc. 49 Kelly, Polson Co. v. 322; Logging 175 So. 506, 234 Ala. am, Iowa, Coal Co. 184 (2d) 412; Gay Hocking P. 167, 80 Wash. Furnace Agricola Mut. L. Co. v. 360; 169 N. American Ins. W. 236 Ala. 183 So. Co. States Radium upon by defendants, relied United

Of the cases Co. N. J. Misc. 178 A. Belleville v. Globe Ind. Corp. Ill. App. Cas. Co. 266 Co. v. United States Enameling Stamping Y, 162 Misc. 292 N. S. Hamera, Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 586; and similar containing provisions all hold to. occupational do not cover diseases. ones here involved mean nor are them, “accident” is not discussed in of the term ing seemingly cases angle. There are other they treated from that upon- I with the cases the view take and conflict with

£9 Cir.) (2Co. Taylor Dredging relies. Co. v. Travelers Ins. plaintiff F. 328 Pa. 195 (2d) Allegheny 97, 90 Billo v. Steel Co. 449; Employers’ Corp. Jackson v. L. 139 Misc. 686, Assur. N. Y. of impossible. S. 207. Reconciliation the cases seems “as agreed, they did,

It occurs to me that when the insurers * * * respects injuries sustained to in- personal by employees im- liability reason of the demnify Employer against by this loss posed upon by him law for damages injuries,” on account of such kind they clearly agreed injuries protect against loss no Golden. Absent there would be paragraph question it. If by about of that paragraph par- the inclusion ticularly the word companies injected “accidents” therein the am- into their biguity policies, they they subjected themselves did, of application the rule a construction favor- requiring most able to the insured. that I Applying test, difficulty find no reaching the conclusion that the policies injuries covered the sus- tained Golden. But if even ive to hold no liability were exists unless the were such a nature toas be termed I “accident,” am of opinion process lungs Golden’s were injured, by the slow infiltration silica, is as much an “accident” as an injury caused pressure or crushing. result same.

I agree the trial court recovery against should be had both defendants. We said in Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc. 203 Minn. 215, 217, N. W. 251:

“Plaintiff was exposed to dust containing silica [Golden] least from the time of employment his in <1917until August 8, * * * period Over a more than years plaintiff was subjected to the inhalation of large quantities of dust, much * * * silica. containing Plaintiff exposed was to this situa- tion average on an from two to three each day hours and from days per six to seven week during eight the seven to months of year years’ in each of his 12 operation employment by partners. plaintiff’s between this situation and sub- causal connection “The think, adequately sequent is, supported.” we ailments two period covered tort ivas continuous over employer against agreed indemnify Both companies policies. him for dam- by law liability imposed upon “by loss reason lia- was injuries.” The insurance ages account of such main employer imposed bility, during necessary damage to show the extent action. It was not 116 Conn. George each McLachlan Hat Co. Plecity period. *17 Fa- 447; Minn. 203 N. Lampi, Pete W. N. E. 274 Mass. 720. Case, brizio’s be affirmed. appealed order from should Justice Peterson, (dissenting). Hilton, Justice, Gallagher. expressed by Mr. Chief Justice We concur the views SINGER, IN BANKRUPTCY OF STEPHEN TRUSTEE & MILLING FARMERS ELEVATOR GOODRIDGE v. A. MANDT AND OTHERS. B. COMPANY,

BENSON-QUINN COMPANY, RESPONDENT.1

September 1941. 33,015. No. 1 Reported in 299 N. W.

Case Details

Case Name: Golden v. Lerch Bros. Inc.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Minnesota
Date Published: Aug 1, 1941
Citation: 300 N.W. 207
Docket Number: Nos. 32,640, 32,648.
Court Abbreviation: Minn.
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