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Golden State Transit Corp., a California Corporation, D/B/A Yellow Cab of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, a Municipal Corporation
857 F.2d 631
9th Cir.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 not, (1985). Federally insured banks are. Un- case, the counselors where formulation, virtually ev- majority’s der a bank who entered

ery criminal defendant stir,” intimidating, however

and “created motive, other than claim a

could later take, actions. Be- for his or her

intent to result was agree that such a I cannot

cause majority’s

intended, I find the and because sense and ex-

holding contrary to common

perience, I dissent. CORP., a TRANSIT STATE

GOLDEN corporation, Yellow d/b/a

California Plaintiff-Appel Angeles, Los Cab

lant, ANGELES, municipal LOS

CITY OF Defendant-Appellee.

corporation,

No. Appeals, States Court

United

Ninth Circuit. 2, 1988.

Argued and Submitted Feb. Sept.

Decided *2 Fasman, Paul, Hastings,

Zachary Ja- D. Walker, D.C., Washington, for nofsky & plaintiff-appellant. Atty., Haggerty, City Los

John F. Asst. Cal., defendant-appellee. Angeles, WALLACE, ALARCON and Before BEEZER, Judges. Circuit BEEZER, Judge: Circuit Corp. City State Transit 608, 618, 106 S.Ct. Angeles, 475 U.S. Los 1395, 1401, the Su- City of Los preme Court held (“City”) could not condition Angeles renew- company’s franchise on settle- a taxi al of The ob- dispute. a labor ment of “destroyed the an action served that such by Congress power designed [in balance Act], and Relations the National Labor open leave Congress’ decision to frustrated weapons.” Id. at the use of economic The Court preempted Congress intrusion had into the government” collective “a local enacting process by amеnded, 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d). remanded The case was proceedings. further court for district remand, State Tran- appellant Golden On State”) sought (“Golden Corporation sit damages from for nonrenewal district court concluded franchise. The injunctive grant it had the relief, monetary ancillary and also relief authority to have the it did but that under alleged on an NLRA based U.S.C. § Supremaсy preemption. Clause violation not have that it did also found damages under authority to award possessed. it power inherent question for interlocu- certified the (C.D.Cal.1987). extend franchise was its F.Supp. 671 tory appeal, [Golden States] drivers,” appealed. dispute with its ... has (C.D.Cal.1981). F.Supp. The court affirm. We had also found “threatened]” *3 the unless Golden terminate frаnchise I to 194, id. dispute, at State settled its labor 1986, 1, Supreme the April On that the had denied Golden State and to condi- City’s the decision that weapon an “essential economic of a labor of the settlement tion renewal strength ability to wait out a strike.” the Nation- enjoined under —the dispute could be State, 475 U.S. 611-12, 106 Golden S.Ct. at (“NLRA”). Golden Relations Act al Labor 1397. at Statе, 619-20, at 475 U.S. at Supreme preceding the The facts 1401-02. the basis of Golden State’s claim that On follows: are as Court decision preempted City’s the intrusion NLRA the 1980, State, oper- which early In Golden bargaining process, the the collective into applied to the company, ated a taxicab granted State’s mo- court district Golden operating franchise. оf an renewal preliminary injunction. for a tion The fran- operated 400 cabs. Golden State “ample appeal by City, the we found On 31, 1981. expire to on March chise was due support injunction, to the but evidence” 1980, deci- the renewal In before October concluding it after that Golden dissolved City, a labor up by the taken sion was prevail- only a small likelihood of State had drivers ex- State’s contract with Golden State, F.2d Golden ing the merits. on contract was A short-term labor pired. (9th 758, Cir.1982). State’s 761-62 Golden and its State negotiated between Golden denied the for certiorari petition was 10, February 1981. drivers, on to end State, 459 U.S. Supreme Court. Golden 11, 1981, February Golden State’s On 729, (1983). 1105, strike, the struck. view drivers granted Thereafter, court the district renewal of Golden City postponed action on City. af judgment for the We summary 17, February franchise until State’s decision, holding this firmed 1981, 17, City Council February the On preempted intrusion was franchise extend State’s decided to Golden State, of the NLRA. Golden enactment 1981, 30, April on 1981 to from March Cir.1985). (9th The Su F.2d that, prior March condition to and remanded. preme Court reversed extension was that decided such Council that, under Interna held Supreme Court City. On March interests of in the best Aerospace and Machinists tional Ass’n of hearing public the Council held Employ Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin The dom- question. the “best interests” on Comm’n, 427 U.S. ment Relations hearing was at the discussed inant issue 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 S.Ct. the drivers’ strike. “ play of ‘the free with interfered action reasons, the Council variety of For a in col forces’ omitted]” economic [citation renewal of Golden condition decided to company lective between settlement of on taxicab franchise State’s at drivers, 475 U.S. Golden and State, Golden See dispute. its labor such a local 614, 106 that at and S.Ct. A 610-11, S.Ct. on conditioning renewal franchise action — the franchise motion to extend subsequent precluded, dispute settlement —was was defeated. precisely bargaining was collective since “ 31, 1981, the Golden State March On ‘Congress intended conduct which ” expired. franchise State, Taxicab Golden unregulated.’ be Metropol 614, 106 quoting court, sought State In federal Golden Massachusetts, ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍ Ins. itan damages from relief and injunctive Life “undisputed found City. The district court agrеed (1985). The refusing to basis for sole [the fact] preempt- statutory or complete relief where federal the NLRA State Golden violated, rights are and that constitutional City. by the action this ed rights are violated here. such ordered court remand, On four-year State Golden City to A suf- monetary relief ancillary franchise premises its section first Golden State State. “sаlvage” Golden ficient damages on 1983 claim for ancillary relief determined City’s alleged “violation” of the value market fair to the limited be would the date assets City's denial State’s claims that State any sum action, less “right" unregu- City's of the NLRA-eonferred *4 proceed- bankruptcy to pursuant dispute creates of labor received lated settlement 1983, entitlement, tо dam- ings. under section City. ages against the district proceedings, During remand on the argument briefing and 1983 ordered observes that section court Golden State grant authority to had it whether a feder- question recovery for “violation” of permits to Gold- damages compensatory statute sub- additional al statute where that creates v. See Maine stantive, rights. State. en enforceable 2502, Thiboutot, 1, 100 65 448 U.S. S.Ct. argument, briefing and Following full (1980) (violation of statute L.Ed.2d 555 did not it court factors relevant specific consider failure to compensa- further authority to have dependent permits children sec- aid for to F.Supp. damages. Golden tory School relief); Pennhurst State tion three cited reasons: The court at 571. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, Hospital v. аnd not entitled to First, was State Golden (1981) (sec- 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 101 S.Ct. 1983 for the 42 U.S.C. damages under § of action where provides tion 1983 cause City. by the “violation” alleged NLRA by laws of United rights are “secured” Supremacy Clause Second, while States). law, did not Gold- it entitle State preempted damages under 42 U.S.C. NLRA, spe- en argues State State Golden Third, had no district court amended, 8(d), as 29 U.S.C. cifically § seсtion dam- authority to award further rights” protected 158(d), grants inherent “secured § ages. City has and that the by 42 U.S.C. § entitling rights, thus Gold- these “violated” stayed trial on The district damages from section 1983 en State to monetary to certi- ancillary relief amount of disagree. City. We damage question compensatory fy the State, interlocutory appeal. Golden Redevelopmеnt Wright v. Roanoke In F.Supp. at 582. Housing, 479 U.S. 107 S.Ct. and (1987), Supreme Court L.Ed.2d 781 timely appeals. have We exceptions to there are “two noted that pursuant 28 U.S.C. jurisdiction remedy statu- of section 1983 application 1292(b). Congress has fore- where tory violations: the statute enforcement of closed such II the stat- itself[,] and where the enactment claims, first, State appeal, On rights, privi- create enforceable ute did not damages are available meaning of immunities within leges, or 1983, as a under 42 U.S.C. result at 770. Id. at section 1983.” under the City’s rights created denial backdrop Wright, and de- Against the Second, State claims that NLRA. court, no such it is clear that this cisions of it to an Supremacy Clause entitles by the immunity right, privilege secured damages award of under seсtion City in this “violated” NLRA was since conflict” there was “direct actual instance. and federal between the law. conduct Congress fact is the clear Equally Finally, Golden claims that federal State recovery field, limiting this preempted has courts have inherent to award spe- practices to remedies for unfair (2) cifically in the provided subject Even if the wеre to the

NLRA, directly actions “vio and the section 1983 lated” (1) unavailable, since en would be Apache Tribe preempted actment the NLRA has this Williams, (9th Cir.1984), F.2d 844 field. denied, cert. 479 U.S. Sea Clam test set out in Applying the “[sjection stated mers, at 453 U.S. S.Ct. interpreted in Thiboutot [citations approval in Wright, cited with we conclude enforces federal progeny, and its omitted] provided in that “the remedial devices [the rights only against direct viola statutory sufficiently comprehensive ... statute] question.” federal statute tions of the congressional pre intent to to demonstrate Pennhurst, 9; see also 851, n. 810 F.2d at remedy of clude the suits under 2630; Middle at 770. 1983.” v. Na Sewerage Authority County sex case, involving In a similar a cause of Ass’n, tional Sea Clammers *5 brought by employ- аction trustees for an 435 trust under 29 ment benefit U.S.C. (1981) (section requires that “a federal 1983 158(d), we noted: § violated”). ... statute [be] We do not reach the merits of the trust- question in is Here, statute the federal 8(d) 158(d)] theory, ees’ section [section at issue is sec- provision The the NLRA. however, recently we have held that 158(d). amended, 8(d), 29 U.S.C. jurisdiction tion to con- the federal courts lack sec- claims based on violations of sider imposes “mutual Generally, this statute 8(d) 158(d)] of the tion [section employer and the upon “the obligation[s]” 8(d) section over jurisdiction Exclusive employees” to “bar- representative 158(d) Na- claims rests with the ] [section good collectively” and “in faith.” gain Board. Arizona Labor Relations tional (b) 158(a) and Specifically, 29 U.S.C. §§ Laborers, & Masons Teamsters Cement employer” and obligations ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍on “an impose Trust Fund Health & Local 395 Welfare a organization.” Actions of “a labor on Co., Cartage F.2d Conquer v. 753 employer employee not labor party, third Cir.1985). (9th 1515-17 give not rise to a claim for organization, do Dallaire, v. 767 F.2d Waggoner under damages against party the third denied, Cir.1985), cert. (9th provisions. these (1986). L.Ed.2d 601 City рarty no time to was at Since a provision did not violate Since the bargaining agreement, the collective NLRA, Congress has limit- and since subject to a section 1983 City cannot be NLRA, an action to ed relief for such alleged viola- premised party’s on a action damages are that section we conclude do not believe of 29 U.S.C. 158. We tion here. not available intended to transform that the NLRA was B employer parties’, neither

actions of third into “vio- employee organization, nor that the district claims Golden State orga- employer” or “a labor by “an lations” concluding it had no in that court erred under the statute. nization” damages authority to section Supremacy Clause.1 based on the no “direct viоlation” of there is Since that, that there is no entitle- The district court we conclude Apache, expressly compensatory damages White Mountain ment to additional under of state law preemption held 1983. under section from tution, ... United States the Laws of the Supremacy States Clause of the United 1. The Constitution, VI, Supreme Law of the Land.” be the provides: "This Consti- shall Article 63 6 is support would not a We conclude Golden State not Supremacy Clause under 1983. Golden entitled to section 1983

cause of action section damages on the State, F.Supp. at Supremacy preemption. of basis Clause Apache, we held rights “is not a Supremacy Clause protects conferring provision that the indi- C government agаinst intrusion.” 810 vidual that, argues absent “preemp- F.2d 848. We also held right recovery to under section a Supremacy under tion of state law may damages federal court award on the occupa- on federal least if Clause—at based powers.” basis its “inherent conflict with tion the field or federal goals—will support not an action under powers Inherent the fеderal 1983_” Id. “Explicit at 850. are courts those essential to exercise of law” would need to be provisions of federal powers, conferred and outside the reach of trigger consideration of in order to issue must, They direct democratic control. Id. damages. section 1983 therefore, extraordinary be exercised with judice, Roadway Express,

In the сase sub Inc. See restraint. had Piper, Court concluded ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍that action U.S. permit (1980). intent to free

frustrated parties bargaining between labor con- sup by appellant cases cited tract. port the inherent of a district action was S.Ct. at 1399. award this instance preempted not it conflicted because Hood, Bell v. apposite. *6 Congress regulation, but because federal 678, 773, (1946), 90 66 S.Ct. L.Ed. 939 and unregulated preserve to create an intended Agents Bivens v. Six Unknown Named of labor-management negotiation. for free Narcotics, the Federal Bureau 403 U.S. of 614-15, at Id. at 106 S.Ct. 1399-1400. This 1999, (1971) 388, 91 S.Ct. 29 619 pronounced by Supreme the was conclusion right are cases in an individual was which thorough Court, analysis the after of guaran implicated, the Fourth Amendment languаge legislative history. and NLRA’s against sei tee unreasonable searches and 616-17, Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 1399-1400. Bell, See 679, 327 at 66 S.Ct. zures. U.S. City’s “destroyed actions the the Since 774; Bivens, 390-91, at 403 at 91 S.Ct. U.S. designed power by Congress, balance of Bell addition, implicated at and decision leave frustrated right under the Fifth Amend individual id. weapons,” open use of economic the 66 ment. 327 U.S. S.Ct. at 774. Supreme the Court 106 S.Ct. Here, рrovision the constitutional at issue action was in con- concluded that Clause, Supremacy is the which creates no goals by flict federal embraced Con- with See right. such individual constitutional NLRA, spe- of gress enactment upon Apache, 810 Mountain White F.2d at 848. goal cifically, the the center of the Accordingly, authority the inherent bargaining free of NLRA—collеctive grant relief in order to secure an individual government intervention. right under the inherent of the say cannot ac Since we may courts not be exercised here. federal directly “explicit pro tions conflict with an supple 1983 intended to vision” of the NLRA—the NLRA does not Section was provided by in explicitly prohibit acting from ment remedies the States. Educatiоn, However, McNeesev. Board the area of labor relations—and since of 668, 671, 1433, 1435, 83 10 Supreme only identified 373 U.S. S.Ct. conflict McCurry, (1963), Allen v. “goal” free collective L.Ed.2d the NLRA’s of (to injunction 66 L.Ed.2d 308 by U.S. be remedied Pape, relief), (1980), Monroe ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍v. and ancillary monetary do Moun holding 5 L.Ed.2d 492 White by bound our in own argued Apache, tain proposition, by support F.2d at Columbia, subjects, of authority exists in the District or causes inherent subjected, any to be citizen of the United compensatory dam- courts to award federal person jurisdic- States or other within the damages are un- ages where deprivation tion thereof to the Moreno, Toll v. available. rights, privileges, or immunities se- (1982), involved laws, by cured the Constitution and for stay preserving issues of a enforcеment injured party shall be liable to the in an guidance in provides no that case appeal; law, equity, action at suit in or other power question resolving the inherent proper proceeding redress. For the case, the facts in this here. On raised section, any Act purposes of this of Con- the exercise correctly declined gress applicable exclusively to the Dis- further to award powers” “inherent considered to trict of Columbia shall be damages. be a statute of the District of Columbia. added). (Emphasis month before the CONCLUSION One filed, Mountain in was White final decision to further not entitled State is Court, Wright, in 107 S.Ct. at damages under U.S.C. rulings, “if prior said that under its alleged either on basis ‘right’ deprivation of a there is a state or, alternatively, on NLRA violation statute, pro- secured a federal preemption. Supremacy Clause basis vides a remedial cause of action....” We the federal courts powers of The inherent Wright in discuss in our decision did not com- an award of allow do not otherwise Mountain. White damages. pensatory Wright not hold that a in did AFFIRMED. only if a federal actor would be liable state expressly forbids the state actor statute concurring. ALARCON, Judge, Circuit Instead, the Court interference. from such opinion under majority’s in I concur right protecting the secured focused on Moun our decision White compulsion of law, persons whether all and not on federal (White Apache Tribe v. Williams tain of the benefits might deprive another who Cir.), cert. (9th Mountain), 810 F.2d 844 by Con- statute are identified of such a denied, by the Court language used gress. The (1987). In L.Ed.2d 990 meaning plain Wright carries out the *7 prece Supreme Court held that under opinion in Our language of section 1983. dent, federal congressional 1983 “enforces U.S.C. Mountain frustrates White § only against direct viola statutory rights intent. question[,]” in the federal statute tions of (1982) 158(d) provides that U.S.C. Thus, added). the id. аt 851 (emphasis n. 9 em- employer and the obligation of the compels us to hold that circuit law of the bargain collec- representative is ployees’ be damages are not available section compel obligation does not tively “but such di Angeles did not City of Los cause the proposal or re- agree to a party to either Relatiоns the National Labor rectly violate concession....” making of a quire the (NLRA). separately on I write Act economic free use of provision allows 11(A)(1), in Rubric because discussed issues the collective parties to weapons by both Mountain is inconsist White Transit I believe State Golden process. bargaining (Golden Supreme reasoning Angeles Los ent with Cоrp. Redev. & Wright v. Roanoke State), U.S. (1986). Housing, L.Ed.2d 158(d) pro- as (1987). interpreted has interfering in from government hibiting the I inter- process and the collective weap- economic right to use fering as follows: 1983 reads Section 615-16, at 1399-1400. ‍​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍ons. Id. who, under color of Every person City of Los judice, custom, In the case sub ordinance, statute, regulation, of the statu- State Angeles deprived Golden Territory or any State or usage, of tory engage in the collective right to bar- third-party free from

gaining process inter- 158(d); ference. 29 U.S.C. Thus, 106 S.Ct. at 1401. Wright, Golden State would appear

under damages action a cause of have However,

under section because party expressly interference is not

third did not

prohibited Therefore,

directly statute. violate City interfered with

while White rights, compels us

State's damages are not

to hold that section there was no direct because viola-

available City.

tion of a statute

II opinion, majority discusses

whether section 1983 would be City directly if the violated the

available Maj. op. at 635. Because we find

no direct violation of the NLRA as is re- Mountain,

quired by it is not neces- Therefore,

sary question. reach this I join portion majority in that

do not

opinion opinion offer no to what if

ruling necessary be made it were would issue.

to reach the opinion.

I concur the remainder of the

Phillipe FARGO, Dell

Plaintiff-Appellant, *8 BAUTISTA, al.,

CITY OF SAN JUAN et

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-2165. Appeals, States Court of

United

Ninth Circuit. *.

Submitted Feb. Sept.

Decided Cal.,

Phillipe Fargo, Represa, pro Dell per.

* 34(a). panel appropriate Fed.R.App.P. finds this case for submis- Circuit Rule 34-4 and argument pursuant sion oral without to Ninth

Case Details

Case Name: Golden State Transit Corp., a California Corporation, D/B/A Yellow Cab of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, a Municipal Corporation
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 15, 1988
Citation: 857 F.2d 631
Docket Number: 87-6074
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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