*1 not, (1985). Federally insured banks are. Un- case, the counselors where formulation, virtually ev- majority’s der a bank who entered
ery criminal defendant stir,” intimidating, however
and “created motive, other than claim a
could later take, actions. Be- for his or her
intent to result was agree that such a I cannot
cause majority’s
intended, I find the and because sense and ex-
holding contrary to common
perience, I dissent. CORP., a TRANSIT STATE
GOLDEN corporation, Yellow d/b/a
California Plaintiff-Appel Angeles, Los Cab
lant, ANGELES, municipal LOS
CITY OF Defendant-Appellee.
corporation,
No. Appeals, States Court
United
Ninth Circuit. 2, 1988.
Argued and Submitted Feb. Sept.
Decided *2 Fasman, Paul, Hastings,
Zachary Ja- D. Walker, D.C., Washington, for nofsky & plaintiff-appellant. Atty., Haggerty, City Los
John F.
Asst.
Cal.,
defendant-appellee.
Angeles,
WALLACE, ALARCON and
Before
BEEZER,
Judges.
Circuit
BEEZER,
Judge:
Circuit
Corp. City
State Transit
608, 618, 106 S.Ct.
Angeles, 475 U.S.
Los
1395, 1401,
the Su-
City
of Los
preme Court held
(“City”) could not condition
Angeles
renew-
company’s franchise on settle-
a taxi
al of
The
ob-
dispute.
a labor
ment of
“destroyed the
an action
served that such
by Congress
power designed
[in
balance
Act], and
Relations
the National Labor
open
leave
Congress’ decision to
frustrated
weapons.” Id. at
the use of economic
The Court
preempted
Congress
intrusion
had
into the
government”
collective
“a local
enacting
process by
amеnded,
8(d), 29 U.S.C.
158(d).
remanded
The case was
proceedings.
further
court for
district
remand,
State Tran-
appellant Golden
On
State”)
sought
(“Golden
Corporation
sit
damages from
for nonrenewal
district court concluded
franchise. The
injunctive
grant
it had the
relief,
monetary
ancillary
and also
relief
authority to
have the
it did
but that
under
alleged
on an
NLRA
based
U.S.C. §
Supremaсy
preemption.
Clause
violation
not have
that it did
also found
damages under
authority to award
possessed.
it
power
inherent
question for interlocu-
certified the
(C.D.Cal.1987).
extend
franchise was its
F.Supp. 671
tory appeal,
[Golden States]
drivers,”
appealed.
dispute with its ...
has
(C.D.Cal.1981).
F.Supp.
The court
affirm.
We
had
also found
“threatened]”
*3
the
unless Golden
terminate
frаnchise
I
to
194,
id.
dispute,
at
State settled its labor
1986,
1,
Supreme
the
April
On
that the
had denied Golden State
and
to condi-
City’s
the
decision
that
weapon
an
“essential
economic
of a labor
of the settlement
tion renewal
strength
ability to wait out a strike.”
the Nation-
enjoined under
—the
dispute could be
State, 475 U.S.
611-12, 106
Golden
S.Ct.
at
(“NLRA”). Golden
Relations Act
al Labor
1397.
at
Statе,
619-20,
at
475 U.S. at
Supreme
preceding the
The facts
1401-02.
the basis of Golden State’s claim that
On
follows:
are as
Court decision
preempted
City’s
the
intrusion
NLRA
the
1980,
State,
oper-
which
early
In
Golden
bargaining process, the
the collective
into
applied to the
company,
ated a taxicab
granted
State’s mo-
court
district
Golden
operating franchise.
оf an
renewal
preliminary injunction.
for a
tion
The fran-
operated 400 cabs.
Golden State
“ample
appeal by
City,
the
we found
On
31, 1981.
expire
to
on March
chise was due
support
injunction,
to
the
but
evidence”
1980,
deci-
the renewal
In
before
October
concluding
it after
that Golden
dissolved
City, a labor
up by the
taken
sion was
prevail-
only a small likelihood of
State had
drivers ex-
State’s
contract with Golden
State,
F.2d
Golden
ing
the merits.
on
contract was
A short-term labor
pired.
(9th
758,
Cir.1982).
State’s
761-62
Golden
and its
State
negotiated between Golden
denied
the
for certiorari
petition
was
10,
February
1981.
drivers,
on
to end
State, 459 U.S.
Supreme Court. Golden
11, 1981,
February
Golden State’s
On
729,
(1983).
1105,
strike, the
struck.
view
drivers
granted
Thereafter,
court
the district
renewal of Golden
City postponed action on
City.
af
judgment for the
We
summary
17,
February
franchise until
State’s
decision, holding
this
firmed
1981,
17,
City Council
February
the
On
preempted
intrusion was
franchise
extend
State’s
decided to
Golden
State,
of the NLRA. Golden
enactment
1981,
30,
April
on
1981 to
from March
Cir.1985).
(9th
The Su
F.2d
that,
prior March
condition
to
and remanded.
preme Court reversed
extension was
that
decided
such
Council
that, under Interna
held
Supreme Court
City.
On March
interests of
in the best
Aerospace
and
Machinists
tional Ass’n of
hearing
public
the Council held
Employ
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin
The dom-
question.
the “best interests”
on
Comm’n, 427 U.S.
ment Relations
hearing was
at the
discussed
inant
issue
2548,
NLRA, directly actions “vio and the section 1983 lated” (1) unavailable, since en would be Apache Tribe preempted actment the NLRA has this Williams, (9th Cir.1984), F.2d 844 field. denied, cert. 479 U.S. Sea Clam test set out in Applying the “[sjection stated mers, at 453 U.S. S.Ct. interpreted in Thiboutot [citations approval in Wright, cited with we conclude enforces federal progeny, and its omitted] provided in that “the remedial devices [the rights only against direct viola statutory sufficiently comprehensive ... statute] question.” federal statute tions of the congressional pre intent to to demonstrate Pennhurst, 9; see also 851, n. 810 F.2d at remedy of clude the suits under 2630; Middle at 770. 1983.” v. Na Sewerage Authority County sex case, involving In a similar a cause of Ass’n, tional Sea Clammers *5 brought by employ- аction trustees for an 435 trust under 29 ment benefit U.S.C. (1981) (section requires that “a federal 1983 158(d), we noted: § violated”). ... statute [be] We do not reach the merits of the trust- question in is Here, statute the federal 8(d) 158(d)] theory, ees’ section [section at issue is sec- provision The the NLRA. however, recently we have held that 158(d). amended, 8(d), 29 U.S.C. jurisdiction tion to con- the federal courts lack sec- claims based on violations of sider imposes “mutual Generally, this statute 8(d) 158(d)] of the tion [section employer and the upon “the obligation[s]” 8(d) section over jurisdiction Exclusive employees” to “bar- representative 158(d) Na- claims rests with the ] [section good collectively” and “in faith.” gain Board. Arizona Labor Relations tional (b) 158(a) and Specifically, 29 U.S.C. §§ Laborers, & Masons Teamsters Cement employer” and obligations on “an impose Trust Fund Health & Local 395 Welfare a organization.” Actions of “a labor on Co., Cartage F.2d Conquer v. 753 employer employee not labor party, third Cir.1985). (9th 1515-17 give not rise to a claim for organization, do Dallaire, v. 767 F.2d Waggoner under damages against party the third denied, Cir.1985), cert. (9th provisions. these (1986). L.Ed.2d 601 City рarty no time to was at Since a provision did not violate Since the bargaining agreement, the collective NLRA, Congress has limit- and since subject to a section 1983 City cannot be NLRA, an action to ed relief for such alleged viola- premised party’s on a action damages are that section we conclude do not believe of 29 U.S.C. 158. We tion here. not available intended to transform that the NLRA was B employer parties’, neither
actions of third into “vio- employee organization, nor that the district claims Golden State orga- employer” or “a labor by “an lations” concluding it had no in that court erred under the statute. nization” damages authority to section Supremacy Clause.1 based on the no “direct viоlation” of there is Since that, that there is no entitle- The district court we conclude Apache, expressly compensatory damages White Mountain ment to additional under of state law preemption held 1983. under section from tution, ... United States the Laws of the Supremacy States Clause of the United 1. The Constitution, VI, Supreme Law of the Land.” be the provides: "This Consti- shall Article 63 6 is support would not a We conclude Golden State not Supremacy Clause under 1983. Golden entitled to section 1983
cause of action section damages on the State, F.Supp. at Supremacy preemption. of basis Clause Apache, we held rights “is not a Supremacy Clause protects conferring provision that the indi- C government agаinst intrusion.” 810 vidual that, argues absent “preemp- F.2d 848. We also held right recovery to under section a Supremacy under tion of state law may damages federal court award on the occupa- on federal least if Clause—at based powers.” basis its “inherent conflict with tion the field or federal goals—will support not an action under powers Inherent the fеderal 1983_” Id. “Explicit at 850. are courts those essential to exercise of law” would need to be provisions of federal powers, conferred and outside the reach of trigger consideration of in order to issue must, They direct democratic control. Id. damages. section 1983 therefore, extraordinary be exercised with judice, Roadway Express,
In the сase sub Inc. See restraint. had Piper, Court concluded that action U.S. permit (1980). intent to free
frustrated
parties
bargaining between
labor con-
sup
by appellant
cases
cited
tract.
port
the inherent
of a district
action was
S.Ct. at 1399.
award
this instance
preempted not
it conflicted
because
Hood,
Bell v.
apposite.
*6
Congress
regulation, but because
federal
678,
773,
(1946),
90
66 S.Ct.
L.Ed. 939
and
unregulated preserve
to create an
intended
Agents
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
of
labor-management
negotiation.
for
free
Narcotics,
the Federal Bureau
403 U.S.
of
614-15,
at
Id.
at
106 S.Ct.
1399-1400. This
1999,
(1971)
388, 91
S.Ct.
29
619
pronounced by
Supreme
the
was
conclusion
right
are cases in
an individual
was
which
thorough
Court,
analysis
the
after
of
guaran
implicated, the Fourth Amendment
languаge
legislative history.
and
NLRA’s
against
sei
tee
unreasonable searches and
616-17,
Id.
at
gaining process
inter-
158(d);
ference. 29 U.S.C.
Thus,
under damages action a cause of have However,
under section because party expressly interference is not
third did not
prohibited Therefore,
directly statute. violate City interfered with
while White rights, compels us
State's damages are not
to hold that section there was no direct because viola-
available City.
tion of a statute
II opinion, majority discusses
whether section 1983 would be City directly if the violated the
available Maj. op. at 635. Because we find
no direct violation of the NLRA as is re- Mountain,
quired by it is not neces- Therefore,
sary question. reach this I join portion majority in that
do not
opinion opinion offer no to what if
ruling necessary be made it were would issue.
to reach the opinion.
I concur the remainder of the
Phillipe FARGO, Dell
Plaintiff-Appellant, *8 BAUTISTA, al.,
CITY OF SAN JUAN et
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 87-2165. Appeals, States Court of
United
Ninth Circuit. *.
Submitted Feb. Sept.
Decided Cal.,
Phillipe Fargo, Represa, pro Dell per.
* 34(a). panel appropriate Fed.R.App.P. finds this case for submis- Circuit Rule 34-4 and argument pursuant sion oral without to Ninth
