MEMORANDUM DECISION
{1 This appeal and Golden Meadows Properties, LC v. Strand,
I. Motion to Disqualify Judge Dawson
T2 Three months after entry of the summary judgment, Strand moved to disqualify the trial judge under rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Strand argued that Judge Cen R. Dawson should have re-cused himself because he had, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, represented the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in an action against one of Strand's businesses. Strand contends that he had forgotten this previous brush with Judge Dawson until, two months after summary judgment was entered, he discovered a legal document at his parents' house. The document related to the IRS litigation and was signed by then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Dawson. Strand also alleged various ex parte communications between Judge Daw
183 We review a rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Birch v. Birch, 77l P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Because Judge Dawson's denial of Strand's rule 60(b) motion incorporated Judge Kay's denial of Strand's rule 63 motion, we first examine Judge Kay's ruling. "Determining whether a trial judge committed error by failing to recuse himself ... is a question of law, and we review such questions for correctness." Lunt v. Lance,
T4 We agree with Judge Kay that Strand's motion was untimely. A motion to disqualify a judge must be filed within twenty days of "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah R. Civ. P. 683(b)(1)(B)(ii). Strand's own affidavit alleges that he learned of the conflict on September 17, 2008. He filed his motion to disqualify on October 14, twenty-seven days later. It was thus untimely.
T5 Strand contends that Judge Kay had the discretion to find his motion timely. He points to rule 68(b)(8)(C): "The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner." Id. R. 68(b)@)(C) (emphasis added). He suggests that the permissive language of this rule "contemplates that there may be cases with extenuating cireum-stances, filed outside of the 20 days." As extenuating cireumstances, he alleges that neither Judge Dawson nor anyone else informed him of Judge Dawson's alleged prior involvement in the subject matter of this case twenty years earlier.
16 Assuming without deciding that a movant's cireumstances might be so compelling as to require a trial court to exeuse the motion's untimeliness under rule 63(b)8)(C), Strand has not alleged such cireumstances here. At most, Strand's allegations explain why he did not discover Judge Dawson's alleged conflict until September 17; they do not explain why he failed to file his motion within twenty days of that date as required by rule 68(b)(1)(B)(iii). Accordingly, we see no error in Judge Kay's denial of the motion as untimely. See State v. Hawley,
T7 Although we affirm on the ground that Strand's recusal motion was untimely, we note our agreement with Judge Kay that Strand has not demonstrated that Judge Dawson was biased or prejudiced in any degree. "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including [where the judge] served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy...." Code of Jud. Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(6)(a). Then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Dawson did not serve. as a lawyer in the matter in controversy. Decades earlier, he had minimal contacts with Strand in a matter unrelated to the property at issue here. The record establishes only that he signed an agreement concerning office furniture and fixtures belonging to one of Strand's companies. Thus, Judge Dawson's prior legal involvement with Strand falls far short of the
18 Strand also alleges in passing that Judge Dawson had ex parte communications with Golden Meadows. This claim is inadequately briefed, see Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9), and we decline to address it. Strand has not shown that any communications between Judge Dawson and Golden Meadows violated rule 2.9 of the Code of Judicial Conduct or otherwise required recusal.
T9 In sum, we agree with Judge Kay's conclusion that Strand's rule 68 motion to disqualify Judge Dawson was untimely. We also agree that it lacked merit. We therefore affirm Judge Dawson's determination that Strand is not entitled to a new trial under rule 60(b).
II. Motion to Quash or Stay the Execution of Judgment
110 Following Judge Dawson's grant of summary judgment, Golden Meadows served a writ of execution on Strand, purporting to levy on Strand's claims against Neuman Petty, including
[alny and all currently existing and potential claims, suits (whether at law or in equity), and causes of action of Strand against Neuman Petty (aka Neuman C. Petty), Nupetco Associates (aka Nupetco Associates, LLC), Kameo Wyoming Corporation, Kameo Limited Liability Company, and other "Neuman Petty Entities," including all claims asserted or which could have been asserted in Strand v. Petty, et al., Civil No. 070915796, pending in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Strand filed a motion to quash the writ or, in the alternative, to stay execution of judgment on the ground that the "writ of execution is subject to overturn on appeal." He also offered a property bond. The district court denied Strand's motions and rejected his property bond. The court set the amount for a supersedeas bond at $168,404, stating that "no stay of enforcement of the judgment herein shall become effective until such time as the Court has approved a supersedeas bond." Strand did not file the required su-persedeas bond, and his claims were sold at sheriff's sale for $10,000. Strand challenges the district court's denial of his motion to quash or stay, as well as the rejection of his property bond.
11 Strand does not contend that choses in action are generally immune from execution. See Applied Med. Techs. v. Hames,
112 However, in the companion case also decided today, we affirm the judgment in question. That decision moots this issue. See Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm'n,
113 Golden Meadows seeks attorney fees on appeal. "[When a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
1 14 Affirmed.
Notes
. This is Strand's second attempt to appeal Judge Kay's ruling. See Golden Meadows Props. v. Strand, 2009 UT App 38U,