Affirmed by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Senior Judge KISER joined.
OPINION
Golden and Zimmerman, LLC, a Virginia licensee under the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921
et seq.,
and Robert W. Privott, a North Carolina licensee under the Act, seek judicial review of the “Federal
Because we conclude that the Reference Guide is simply informational and that its publication is neither “agency action” nor “final agency action,” as necessary for judicial review under the APA, we affirm.
I
The Gun Control Act makes it unlawful for any person, except a licensed dealer, to engage in the business of selling firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). Licensed dealers, in turn, are prohibited generally from selling firearms “to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable cause to believe does not reside in ... the State in which the licensee’s place of business is located,” except if the transaction is with another licensee. Id. § 922(b) & (b)(3). The Act sets out detailed rules governing the licensing process, see id. § 923, among which is the requirement that an applicant have “premises from which he conducts business subject to license,” id. § 923(d)(1)(E). The Act also requires that a fee be paid for each “place in which the applicant is to do business.” Id. § 923(a). And the Act’s administration is dependent on the requirement that a licensed dealer have licensed business premises. See, e.g., id. § 923(h) (requiring licensees to post their license “on the premises covered by the license”); id. § 923(g)(1)(A) (requiring licensees to maintain records at their business premises and authorizing law enforcement officers to obtain a warrant to inspect the records and firearms kept at a licensee’s business premises during business hours). Regulations implementing the Gun Control Act similarly recognize the importance of a licensee’s licensed premises. They provide that a license issued under the Act entitles the licensee “to engage in the business specified by the license, at the location described on the license, and for the period stated on the license.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.41(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 478.50 (“The license covers the class of business or the activity specified in the license at the address specified therein”).
Although the Gun Control Act and its implementing regulations thus require generally that a licensed dealer sell guns only from the premises specified in its license, the Act also authorizes licensed dealers to “conduct business temporarily at a location other than the location specified on the license if such temporary location is the location for a gun show ... and such location is in the State which is specified on the license.” 18 U.S.C. § 923(j)-The implementing regulation explains that, for a gun show held in a licensee’s State of business, “[t]he premises of the gun show ... shall be considered part of the licensed premises,” and, “[a]ccordingly, no separate fee or license is required for the gun show.” 27 C.F.R. § 478.100.
In the questions and answers section, the Reference Guide has consistently explained to licensees that, based on statutes and regulations, a licensee is not authorized to transfer firearms at a gun show, even to other licensed dealers, unless the gun show is being held in the same State as the licensee’s business premises. In the most recent iteration, this explanation is contained in Frequently Asked Question (F13) (“FAQ F13”), which states:
(F13) What may a licensed dealer do at an out-of-State gun show?
A licensed dealer may sell and deliver curio or relic firearms to another licensee at an out-of-State gun show. With respect to other firearms transactions, a licensed dealer may only display and take orders for firearms at an out-of-State gun show. In filling any orders for firearms, the dealer must return the firearms to his or her licensed premises and deliver them from that location. Any firearm ordered by a nonlicensee must be delivered or shipped from the licensee’s premises to a licensee in the purchaser’s State of residence, and the purchaser must obtain the firearm from the licensee located in the purchaser’s State. Except for sales of curio or relic firearms to other licensees, sales of firearms and simultaneous deliveries at the gun show, whether to other licensees or to nonlicensees, violate the law because the dealer would be unlawfully engaging in business at an unlicensed location. [18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1), (b)(3), 923(a) and ©]•
While FAQ F13 is a summary of the relevant statutory provisions and regulations, it has its origins in Revenue Ruling 69-59 (1969), issued when the ATF was a division of the Internal Revenue Service. That ruling, published before the Gun Control Act was amended in 1986 to allow a licensed dealer to sell and deliver firearms at a gun show held in the same State as its licensed premises, stated that a licensee “may engage in the business covered by the license only at the specific business premises for which his license has been obtained” (emphasis added) and that, accordingly, “a licensee may not sell firearms ... at a gun show held on premises other than those covered by his license.” The ATF has published 13 editions of its Reference Guide containing the substance of Revenue Ruling 69-59. Moreover, FAQ F13 has remained textually identical since the 2000 edition of the Reference Guide and substantively identical since the 1988-89 edition, the first edition published after the Act’s 1986 amendment.
Additionally, in a letter to a licensee dated September 24, 2004, the ATF Deputy Assistant Director, Walfred A. Nelson, took the same position expressed in FAQ F13. The Nelson letter cautioned that off-premises dealing violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and that “[l]icensees who engage in such transactions are subject to license revocation, forfeiture of the firearms involved in the transaction, and criminal prosecution.” But it also advised that a licensee may lawfully transfer firearms from its premises to a licensee with prem
II
Golden and Zimmerman, LLC, obtained a federal license in July 2008 that authorizes it to deal in firearms from its business premises in Ivor, Virginia. Robert W. Privott obtained a federal license in September 2008 that authorizes him to deal in firearms from his business premises in Powells Point, North Carolina. A few months after obtaining their licenses, Golden & Zimmerman and Privott commenced this action against the ATF for a judgment declaring that Privott, the North Carolina licensee, can lawfully transfer firearms at gun shows in Virginia to Golden & Zimmerman, the Virginia licensee, for subsequent transfer at the shows to Virginia residents. In their complaint, Golden & Zimmerman and Privott alleged that they attend gun shows in Virginia but that Privott has refrained from selling firearms at the Virginia gun shows and that Golden & Zimmerman has refrained from receiving firearms at such gun shows from licensed dealers with business premises outside of Virginia, such as Privott, because the ATF has taken the position in FAQ F13 of the Reference Guide that such conduct violates the Gun Control Act.
On the ATF’s motion, the district court dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Golden & Zimmerman, L.L.C. v. Domenech,
From the district court’s order of dismissal dated February 27, 2009, Golden & Zimmerman and Privott filed this appeal.
Ill
Golden & Zimmerman and Privott contend that the district court erred in concluding that FAQ F13 is not final agency action subject to judicial review under the APA.
1
They argue that FAQ F13 consti
The ATF contends that FAQ F13 is not agency action, let alone final agency action. Citing for support
Independent Equipment Dealers Ass’n v. EPA,
The parties thus agree that our jurisdiction depends on whether FAQ F13 is final agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. And the answer to this question requires us to determine first whether FAQ F13 is “agency action,” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), and second whether it is “final,” as defined in Bennett.
The APA defines “agency action” as including “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added), and “rule” is in turn defined to include “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (emphasis added). Thus, we first address whether FAQ F13 is designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law.
The ATF’s Reference Guide on its face purports to provide only “information” to help new licensees “comply” with the applicable laws and regulations. In reprinting the relevant statutes, regulations, and rulings, the Reference Guide undoubtedly did not “implement, interpret, or prescribe law.”
See
5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The Reference Guide also contains frequently asked questions and answers, which, it says, are intended “to give [licensees] further
guidance
on the Federal firearms laws.” (Emphasis added). The questions and answers
As then Judge John Roberts explained in
Independent Equipment Dealers,
a statement by an agency that simply restates an established interpretation “tread[s] no new ground” and “le[aves] the world just as it found it, and thus cannot be fairly described as implementing, interpreting, or prescribing law or policy.”
Finding this reasoning of Independent Equipment Dealers persuasive, we likewise hold that the ATF’s Reference Guide, including FAQ F13, is not “agency action,” as defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 551(4).
In addition, we reject the argument that FAQ F13 is
“final
agency action.” To be “final,” two requirements must be satisfied: “First, the action must mark
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process
— it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which
rights or obligations have been determined
or from which legal consequences will flow.”
Bennett,
In this case, there was simply no decisionmaking process that culminated in the publication of the Reference Guide and FAQ F13. Even if FAQ F13 does anything other than simply restate the requirements of the Gun Control Act, any decisionmaking process that produced the ATF’s interpretation about what a licensed dealer may lawfully do at an out-of-State gun show culminated some 40 years ago with the publication of Revenue Ruling 69-59 (1969). The 2005 Reference Guide merely restates for the thirteenth time the product of that prior decisionmaking, and it does so only to “provide[] information designed to help [licensees] comply with all of the laws and regulations.”
FAQ F13 also does not represent final agency action because it is not an action “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”
Bennett,
Golden & Zimmerman and Privott insist that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Frozen Food Express v. United States,
Consequently, we hold that the ATF’s publication of the 2005 edition of the Reference Guide and FAQ F13 did not constitute final agency action reviewable in court, and, accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2
AFFIRMED
Notes
. While Golden & Zimmerman and Privott contend that the Nelson letter also represents reviewable final agency action giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction, their complaint makes no mention of the Nelson letter. Inasmuch as counsel for Golden & Zimmerman and Privott conceded at oral argument that FAQ FI3 articulates essentially the same position taken in the Nelson letter, we will ad
. As an additional argument to support the district court's order, the ATF contends that Golden & Zimmerman and Privott lack standing in that they have neither suffered legal wrong nor been adversely affected or aggrieved by the publication of FAQ F13. In response, Golden & Zimmerman and Privott argue that in refraining from engaging in activity by reason of FAQ F13, they were sufficiently harmed to satisfy the elements of standing. Because we have concluded that the district court was correct in finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction based on the absence of any final agency action, we need not address the ATF's alternative argument.
