Gold Mark 35 Associates v. Town of SomersGold Mark 35 Associates v. Town of Somers
Lead Opinion
—In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Planning Board of the Town of Somers, dated April 9, 1997, which, after a hearing, denied the petitioner’s application for a special exception use permit and an action, inter alia, to recover damages under 42 USC § 1983, the appeal, as limited by the petitioner’s brief, is from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Smith, J.), dated September 5, 1997, as, upon a determination that the denial of the petitioner’s application for a special exception use permit was proper, dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements and the petition is granted to the extent that the matter is remitted to the
The petitioner, Gold Mark 35 Associates (hereinafter Gold Mark), applied to the respondent Planning Board of the Town of Somers (hereinafter the Planning Board), for a “special exception use permit” to construct a supermarket of 40,000 square feet. In the zone where the petitioner intended to build, the local zoning ordinance of the Town of Somers limited any building to a maximum of 10,000 square feet except by “special exception use permit” which required a showing of a “special community need” (Somers Town Code § 170-20.3.E). The Planning Board denied the petitioner’s application on the ground that it did not establish the existence of a special community need. The petitioner then commenced the instant proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 78, which was dismissed, based in part upon the conclusion of the Supreme Court that there had been no showing of special community need.
A special exception use permit may be denied where there are reasonable grounds which are supported by “substantial evidence” (Matter of Carrol’s Dev. Corp. v Gibson,
Dissenting Opinion
dissents and votes to affirm the judgment insofar as appealed from, with the following memorandum: I believe that the criteria for demonstrating a special community need necessary to secure a special exception use permit under the Somers Town Code were both sufficiently discernible and not met by the petitioner and that, therefore, there should be an affirmance. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The petitioner sought to build a supermarket with a blueprint “footprint” of 40,000 square feet on a parcel of property known
The petitioner endeavored to address the concerns discussed and criteria set forth in the memorandum by the submission of, inter alia, a community needs analysis report, which concluded that (1) “in today’s market” a 40,000 square foot store was “the minimum rentable size for a supermarket” at the Whitehall Corners location; (2) a 40,000 square foot market
On April 9, 1997, the Planning Board, after numerous meetings and public hearings, denied the application for a special exception use permit. In doing so, the Planning Board noted that the petitioner had not demonstrated why its proposed building, which had four times the permitted “footprint”, was needed to serve “the local community” and how it would fit in with the master plan’s call for a neighborhood center with the “shape and appearance of a village with structures of small mass housing a range of uses including residences” (emphasis in original). The report relied upon by the petitioner, the Planning Board noted, considered “primarily data and analysis relative to economics, demographics and trade information in the context of the supermarket industry trends” and the “trade area identified in the report extends well outside Somers”. Indeed, the report identified 13 other supermarkets serving the needs of residents in the vicinity of Whitehall Corners. Further, the Planning Board found, although the report considered the underlying reasons why the supermarket industry pre
I would affirm the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the proceeding. The petitioner argues that the Planning Board’s decision must be annulled because, inter alia, it failed to adopt the only standard in the record (the memorandum supra), a standard, the petitioner notes, “which [the Board] commissioned its own expert to provide” and a standard which, by the petitioner’s estimation, the unrebutted evidence established was satisfied. However, the standard was both applied and not met.
Although the Planning Board stated that the phrase “special community need” was comprised of words which carry commonly understood meanings and that it was merely applying such common meanings, the difference between such a standard and the standard set forth in the memorandum is one of semantics. The memorandum did not purport to treat the phrase, “special community need” as a term of art, or as a phrase otherwise requiring expert analysis or interpretation. Rather, the memorandum merely cited and discussed the relevant provisions of the Town’s master plan and zoning code and thereby provided a framework within which the common meanings of the words in the phrase “special community need” might be construed. Indeed, everything in the memorandum could have been discerned by the petitioner itself by scrutiny of the same materials. Thus, a standard was both discerned and discernible. However, the petitioner wholly failed to address such specific concerns as to the permissible look and use of Whitehall Corners and as to what might constitute a need of the local community or neighborhood. Rather, the report, using nationwide statistics and trends and conclusions drawn from scrutiny of an area that cannot be fairly characterized as a local or neighborhood area within the meaning of the Town’s