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Golas v. Homeview, Inc.
106 F.3d 1
1st Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 Individually GOLAS, Tagan Charlene of Donald of the Estate

as Executrix Plaintiff, Appellant, Golas,

M. Paul Revere Life INC. and

HOMEVIEW Defendants, Company,

Insurance

Appellees.

No. 96-1696. Appeals, Court of

United States

First Circuit. 7, 1996.

Heard Nov. Feb.

Decided Weltman, Boston, MA, with whom

John J. brief, plaintiff- Lawson & Weitzen was on appellant. Vorster, Worcester, MA, O.

Joan Mirick, Joseph M. Hamilton and whom brief, O’Connell, Lougee were on DeMallie & defendani>-appellee Paul Revere Life In- Company. surance BOWNES, STAHL, Judge, Before Circuit LYNCH, Judge, Circuit Senior Circuit Judge.

LYNCH, Judge. Circuit plain- appeal denial of This is an from the complaint to add tiffs motion amend broker, as a de- Kaplan, an insurance Ellen arising Paul Revere in a suit out of fendant Company’s pay dis- Insurance refusal Life late ability insurance benefits final suffering from his when he was husband amend, plaintiff In her motion to illness. on a party defendant sought to add new district in an action which the state law claim *2 simultaneously dismissing against allegedly disability policy pur- court was due under the original bеing preempted defendants suant to ERISA. That case contin- by pending law. review the denial of federal We ues to be the District of Massa- for motion to amend abuse discretion and chusetts. Defendants removed the state law court, arguing conclude that there is no such abuse under suit to federal those governed by need not and do not the circumstances. We claims were also ERISA. The reach the issue of whether the state law two cases were not consolidated. misrepresentation preempted by claim is court, Once in federal Paul Revere moved Employee Security Retirement Income Act claims, arguing to dismiss the state law (“ERISA”). seq. 1001 et preempted by were ERISA.1 Plaintiff August husband moving ob- сountered for a remand to state disability policy through a pending, tained court. While these motions were employer, his HomeView Inc. One month moved to amend the diagnosed defendant, that, later Kaplan asserting he was with bone cancer and add as a sought disability action, request fifing benefits. His was since her initial she had “discov- being preexisting denied as related to a con- misrepresentations ered that critical upon during dition for which he treatment which her husband him relied were made to period. Kaplan.” the enrollment complaint alleged Ellen that, “[p]rior accepting disability coverage, death, plaintiff After her husband’s spoke Mr. Kaplan Golas to Ellen who made brought suit in Massaсhusetts state court regarding false statements to him his cover- against Paul Revere and HomeView based on age that, disability policy,” under the state law theories. The responsible “[a]s the broker overseeing for complaint alleged supplied that HomeView provision disability insurance from Golas, employees, including its Donald with a Paul employees, Revere to HomeView Ms. Revere, pamphlet, prepared by Paul explain- Kaplan duty owed Mr. Golas a to make sure ing rules governing preexisting condi- she nothing did to interfere with his obtain- tions. Plaintiff pamphlet contends that this ing coverage policy.” under the misleading. was It indicated that an insured disability individual could obtain benefits as oppоsed Defendants the motion to add long disability defendant, as the was not Kaplan caused arguing as a that amend- required sickness that him to consult a doc- ment would be futile because the claim during tor peri- the three month against Kaplan enrollment preempted by would also be that, od. Plaintiff claims reliance on argued this ERISA. Plaintiff that a claim statement, her husband visited a against Kaplan doctor dur- preempted by would not be ing period the enrollment for administrative agent was not an purposes only. However, he diag- Revere, was not HomeView or Paul indepen- but an nosed with bone cancer at that time. It was dent insurance broker. visit, plaintiff alleges, that made him The district court adoptеd magistrate’s ineligible to receive benefits. Plaintiff ar- grant recommendation to the motion to dis- that, gues information, absent the flawed miss the state law claims HomeView husband would have waited until after the and Paul Revere based on preemp- period enrollment ended to visit the doctor tion. The district court went on to consider and therefore eligible would have been adopt magistrate’s whether to recommen-

benefits. deny plaintiffs dation to motion to amend the sought damages in state court to add as a defendant. her late husband’s emotional distress Having already and for decided to dismiss the claims her own loss of consortium. HomeView, Plaintiff simul- Paul Revere and the dis- taneously brought suit in federal court trict court was faced with an anomalous situ- against the same two defendants for benefits ation. Plaintiff wished to add a defendant to 1. HomeView made its arguments own motion to dismiss support. ence Paul Revere’s later, incorporating by some three months refer- being which was dismissed as to case We note that at the time the mo addition, original denied, two defendants. original was the two defendants ERISA cause of action Paul Revere had been dismissed and there was no diversi pending in and HomeView was the same ty jurisdiction Kaplan.2 Furthermore, over in a court but different action from the one in parallel ERISA action pending against *3 which the motion to amend was filed. The HomeView and Paul Reverе in federal court. adopt district court’s ultimate decision the Federal traditionally courts have been more magistrate’s deny recommendation to jurisdiction reluctant to exercise pen over complaint motion to amend the must be parties See, dent than pendent over claims. practical procedural viewed in this con- Pointer, Inc., e.g., Lykins 645, 725 F.2d text. (11th Cir.1984).3 649 Under these circum stances, the district court could not have appeals only Golas from the denial of the abused its discretion when it plain denied complaint motion to Kap- amend to add tiffs motion to amend the to add lan as a defendant and not from the dismissal Kaplan as the sole defendant. Even if our underlying preemption action on novo, review were de as the concurrence grounds. Review is for abuse of discretion. suggests, we any could affirm on legal 332, Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 342 ground See, supported in the record. e.g., (1st Cir.1995); see also Carlo v. Reed Rolled States, Eagan (1st 13, v. United 80 F.3d (1st 790, Thread Die 49 F.3d Cir. Cir.1996); FDIC, Levy 1054, 7 F.3d 1995) (noting appeals court will (1st Cir.1993). “generally defer to district court’s decision deny leave to amend where the reason is We (internal uphold therefore apparent the denial of quotation or declared” amend, omitted)). motion to grounds albeit on different marks and citation It is well- court, than settled, those relied on the district concurring opinion as the from our express out, that, opinion thus we no respectеd colleague points preemp when opinion not, tion issue. district court This does makes an error of as the claims, However, uphold it concurrence definition abuses its discretion. the district preemption court’s is the issue that concerns us decision sub here. silentio. The facts and circumstances of decide to attempt Kap- the case nec to add essarily our lan as a pending influence evaluation of the denial defendant complaint, of the motion to ruling amend the action.4 The district any court’s here, they unnecessary make it reach the preempted issue. presents no precedential bar. It has no argues 2. The concurrence that the ERISA issue chise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation jurisdiction must be reached because Trust, issues of 1, 23-24, 2841, 463 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 2853- and, must be addressed first in the absence of 54, (1983); Policyhold- 77 L.Ed.2d 420 American diversity, juris there is no other basis for federal Prods., Inc., 1256, Nyacol ers Ins. Co. v. disagree diction. This is incorrect. We with the (1st Cir.1993). premise that the court could not address the addressing motion without first amend supplemental jurisdic 3. The codification of the Second, ERISA issue. Kaplan even if the claim 1990, tion doctrine in ERISA, which makes clear that preempted by were not the dis jurisdiction joinder supplemental trict such includes the jurisdiction court would have of addition claim, over the parties, because the other change § two state law al 28 U.S.C. does not properly claims had been before the district prudential analysis. court. civil action over which the district original jurisdiction, they courts have also have three-year 4. It is true that the statute of limita- supplemental ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍jurisdiction over all other claims misrepre- tions for a state law based fraudulent part that form controversy. of the same case or latest, expired, very sentation claim at the § juris 1367. The district court had However, early 1996. to the extent that diction over the state law claims Paul (on has a viable state law claim which we ex- complete pre Revere and HomeView under the press opinion), apparently no the claim could emption Metropolitan doctrine. Ins. Co. v. Life brought, year 58, 65, 1542, 1547, still be within a the date of Taylor, 481 U.S. 107 S.Ct. (1987). opinion, pursuant L.Ed.2d to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. This is sufficient to confer original jurisdiction on the district courts. Fran- States, U.S. —, —, If a motion is made United preclusive effect. issue action, (1996) (citation court Kaplan to the ERISA to add 135 L.Ed.2d 392 ability preemp to consider the will have the light facts that have anew in issue sure, case, ordinary To be the deci- discovery. developed in Boston been Cf. grant deny sion whether to a motion to Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Gi Children’s discretionary amend the is (1st Cir.1996) (ab nard, 429, 439-40 court, normally the trial and so is reviewed issue, closely related precedent sent discretion; for abuse of but the case before is inquiry whether state law as to ordinary respect. is not in this it us Here requires court to look the facts of the clear that the motion denied because of case).5 particular magistrate’s stated conclusion that of the district The decision *4 af- against Kaplan pre-empted claim was as a

firmed. apparent matter of and his but unstated that, corollary result, conclusion as a he was BOWNES, Judge, Senior Circuit deprived (by of discretion the doctrine of concurring. futility) grant to the motion. result, but, respect, I I concur in the with Thus, question before us is wheth- not disposed do not think that this case can be er the district court abused its discretion by conclusory assertion that the district denying plaintiffs motion to amend the com- denying its discretion in did abuse plaint, ruling but whether the basis for this plaintiffs complaint to amend her so motion legally was If correct. the district court’s Kaplan as defendant. In as to add Ellen erroneous, was, ruling was as I think it then recommendation, adopted by report his and the motion to amend was not “futile” and court, magistrate judge stat- district ground. should not have been denied on that denying following ed the reason for the mo- consequence, As a the district court lacks complaint: tion to amend the jurisdiction to decide the merits of the state- attempt I that to add El- Plaintiff[’s] find because, misrepresentation claim as the party Kaplan len defendant and to majority acknowledges inferentially, only misrepresen- her a assert claim jurisdiction pre- basis for federal is ERISA tation be futile such a claim think, therefore, emption. I do not that this by pre-empted would be ERISA. appeal can principled be decided on a It is clear that the district court’s denial of discussing without pre- discretion, the motion not an exercise of was emption. compelled by legal ruling but was its that the majority purports “express opin- to no Kaplan claim issue,” ion on the suggests and Accordingly, ERISA. the district court’s de- plaintiff subject pursue that the could nial of is to still her claim the motion review de novo, against Kaplan by seeking than for to amend rather abuse discretion. pending Kap- See Carlo v. Reed Rolled Thread Die so as to add Cir.1995). (1st lan majority F.3d as a defendant. The fails to however, unequivocally recognize, Court has stated that practical dis- that “[a] effect disposition trict court definition abuses its discretion uphold of its of the case is to when it makes an error of law.” Koon v. district pre-emption ruling court’s sub silen- argument being 5. At oral we were advised that employees. there was also offered to HomeView discovery was argument Kaplan taken on the issue of whether This undermines Golas’ that Kaplan agent, independent was an either of HomeView or of was an broker. The facts established, proffered Paul findings Revere. The amended now be but no are before us. issue, However, ambiguous although Kaplan agent on this the concur- if was an of either of the agent companies, assumption rence underly assumes that not an two the factual incorrect, Kaplan's deposition company. ing either testimo- concurrence and the result brief, Indeed, ny ing legal unjustified. Kap- attached to Golas' states that conclusions if HomeView, meeting agent she held an benefits for Home- lan is an the case would fall employees View explain squarely the Paul Revere dis- within the ambit Vartanian v. Mon ability policy (1st Cir.1994). policy and an Aetna insurance that santo 14 F.3d 697 beneficiaries_ tio, plaintiff and to leave the with no re- ment of Particular- ly A finding disruptive course in forum. of no potential is the for conflict in - emption results in dismissal of claim substantive law. It is foreseeable that jurisdiction courts, lack of federal exercising leaves the their common law powers, might free to seek redress in state court. develop different substan- contrast, majority’s refusal to applicable address tive standards to the same em- pre-emption ployer conduct, the merits of the district court’s requiring the tailoring of ruling unsound, analytically plans is not it employer also conduct pecu- plaintiff exactly leaves the where she start- jurisdiction. liarities the law of each subject ed—with her state-court action Such an fundamentally outcome is at odds removal to ground goal federal court on the with uniformity Congress that implement. as a bar recourse federal court. Ingersoll-Rand McClendon, Co. v. 498 U.S. 133, 142, 478, 484, follow, For the L.Ed.2d reasons conclude (1990) (citations omitted). not pre-empt plaintiffs ERISA does Kaplan and In Concluding misrepresen- that, therefore, proper disposition of this tation claims pre-empted, were magis- deny plaintiffs case would be to motion for judge trate relied on Carlo v. Reed Rolled *5 jurisdiction lack purport- of federal over the Co., Thread Die 49 F.3d 790. In Carlo we claim, leaving ed state-law free stated the doctrine as pursue claim in the state court.6 follows: Section 514 supersedes of ERISA “any

I. and all State they may laws insofar as now or any employee hereafter relate to benefit my analysis key start with the words of 1144(a) plan-” § 29 U.S.C. (emphasis bearing pre-emption: the statute on added). “The term ‘Statе Law' includes all (b) Except provided as in subsection of laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other section, subchap- of this law, having State action any effect of subchapter ter and III chapter of this shall 1144(c)(1). § State.” 29 U.S.C. The Su supersede any and all State laws insofar preme Court has established that “a law they may now any or relate to hereafter employee ‘relates to’ an benefit ... if plan .... benefit it has a connection with or reference to added). § (emphasis 29 U.S.C. plan.” such Ingersoll-Rand a Co. v. purposes For of this section: McClendon, 133, 139, 498 U.S. 111 S.Ct. (1) laws, The term “State law” all includes 478, 483, (1990) 112 (quoting L.Ed.2d 474 decisions, rules, regulations, or other State Lines, Inc., 85, Shaw v. Delta Air 463 U.S. having action the effect of 96-97, 103 2890, 2900, S.Ct. 77 L.Ed.2d 490 Statе. (1983)). “Under this ‘broad common-sense meaning,’ may a state law ‘relate to’ a 1144(c)(1). § plan, thereby benefit pre-empted, and be Court teaches that the specifically even if the law not designed emption 514(a), provision §of codified at 29 plans, to affect such or the effect is U.S.C. was intended (quoting indirect.” Id. Pilot Ins. Co. Life plans to ensure that plan sponsors Dedeaux, 41, 47, 107 1549, 481 U.S. subject a body uniform 1553, (1987)). 95 L.Ed.2d 39 law; goal benefits was to minimize the (footnote omitted). Id. at 793 administrative and financial burden of complying Carlo, with conflicting leading directives case in this circuit on among States or between States and preemption, Degnan the ERISA see v. Publicker ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍Otherwise, Indus., Inc., (1st Cir.1996), Federal Government. the inef- 83 F.3d 29 ficiencies created could work to the pre-empted detri- held that ERISA the state-law I, course, opinion 6. plaintiff's intimate no as to the merits of state-law claim.

6 evidence, may wheth- sibility determine they had claims at jury Id. 1131-32 trial is available.” to” an em- er reference with-or “a connection (citations Carlo, at 49 F.3d 794- plan. ployee benefit we reviewed into the Nadal-Ginard, 95. sweeps all state-law cluding Rolled Thread Die remote, Superintendent Zuniga v. Blue Cross Michigan, 52 F.3d ly lated covered benefit nied, merely requires a court to look ed Cordero v. U.S. applicability. applicability, L.Ed.2d 306 quotation marks clude n. In Boston Children’s ley Greater ance, state law “relates to” 1995). State the case But we ERISA, Towing [(1st [125] Carlo, problem, the 121 L.Ed.2d — that a state law ERISA. benefit Absent laws “tenuous, remote, Washington Board Cir.1995)] (citation at 130 n. however. See U.S. Crowley Towing & and concluded: based on the peripheral 123; have never (1994). See District plan exists. Transp. comer plan” precedent on Rosario-Cordero respect to laws of —, omitted). Such is normal of as such F.3d 429 misrepresentation claims Combined have Co., 1, 113 3 inquiry into whether the Bureau 1395, 1401 may an A court (1st Cir.), 115 S.Ct. and Blue Shield merely because an 49 F.3d at merely a connection with a [(1992)]; Rosario- at the facts of is one of ERISA held that Carlo S.Ct. at form or label of not be Carlo v. Found., Inc. v. or not (1st Cir.1996), Mgt., Inc. v. Columbia Transp. cannot con peripheral” Trade, closely cases, in of “tenuous, (6th preempt cert. [580] v. Crow 794 n. internal general general Insur [120,] Reed or [sic] Cir. de re 3; Ins. Blue Cross & mous brought actions in the United States emption. direct of ERISA’s three surers, associations L.Ed.2d of observations emption: Court worked And A recent was the clear and have never assumed have police powers of superseded traditional law is said to bar state has portunities for federal by express provision, Supremacy Congress. *6 a conflict between federal deed, in does not intend Our Co., administered, Court, derogated bearing on the hospital surcharge statutes. starting entail yet, despite addressed acting past cases have on cases Supreme Court decision Justice general New York State Cоnference of U.S. —, Blue Clause, as fiduciaries state at presumption state assumption like “[o]n claims Shield joined, supplant state law. Federal Souter made several regulation, we preemption provision” regulation, but officials scope of ERISA States were not to lightly manifest by implication, variety Writing for a recognized that 115 S.Ct. one, of state law Plans action in fields of claimed preeminence, with their trade Const., that the historic Act commercial in that and state that where federal ERISA, to invalidate of these v. Travelers purpose unless that Congress Congress authority Art. number District instead Id. unani has a either plans byor have with pre pre law. VI, op- In- we be at particular case. Sеe Rosario-Cordero (citations at —, at 1676 Id. S.Ct. Co., Transp. F.3d Crowley Towing & at quotation internal marks 125 n. 2. statutory pre-emp commented Court Found., 73 F.3d Boston at Children’s language § “all state laws 439-40. they ... insofar as relate Regulator plan,” pointing “[i]f out that ‘relate

In 63 benefit to’ Johnson Watts (1st Cir.1995), pointed out were taken to to the furthest we extend stretch F.3d may practical then for all consequences indeterminacy, that flow from ERISA of its potential purposes pre-emption would never run its pre-emption: “may It cause state- at —, vanish, may change Id. 1677. The or course.” remedies review, concluded: affect the admis- Court standard go beyond simply unhelpful ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍must means, We weeks course, Carlo. This after frustrating difficulty text аnd the of defin- that panel the Carlo did not have the benefit term, ing key and look its instead to the the Court’s latest views on pre- objectives emption. Second, guide of the ERISA statute as a none of the scope Congress emption of the state law that cases decided in this circuit subse- quent understood would survive. to Travelers have cited it.

Id. post-Travelers now turn to decisions other circuits. In a case the Fourth Circuit Court, analysis, the course of its described as a “gardenvariety professional stated: malpractice claim” the court held: Indeed, to read the provi- light Court’s recent displacing affecting sion as all state laws (and narrowing) interpretation of charges theory costs аnd that preemption in New York State indirectly plans pur- relate to ERISA that Blue Cross & Blue Shield Conference of policies chase insurance or HMO member- Travelers, Plans v. ships services, that would cover such 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 we hold effectively limiting read the language in Delany’s that malpractice claim is not statute, § out of the a conclusion preempted because it does not “relate to” principles that would violate basic of statu- an benefit within the mean tory interpretation, and could not be ing of preemption ERISA’s provision, 29 squared prior pronouncement with our 1144(a). U.S.C. [preemption does not occur ... if the Coyne Delany tenuous, remote, F.3d at state law has 1466-67. Quoting propositiоn Travelers for the peripheral connection plans, with covered courts ‘“address claims of many general is the case with laws of starting presumption Congress applicability. does ” law,’ supplant intend to 98 F.3d at (cita at —, Id. 115 S.Ct. at 1679-80 (citations omitted), the Fourth Circuit omitted) quotation tion and internal marks added, especially “[t]his is true in in- cases (alteration original). volving fields of regulation, traditional state In discussing sweep pre including liability,” common law tort id. emption pointed the Travelers Court to three opinion course of its the Fourth Circuit categories Congress of state laws that in plaintiffs malpractice noted that claim was *7 first, pre-empt: tended to “state laws that plan “not aimed at a administrator at all mandate[] benefit structures since the defendants [were] sued in their administration,” at —, their id. 115 S.Ct. at capacities professionals as insurance for ac- 1678; second, providing “state laws alternate capacity.” tions taken in that at Id. mechanisms,” id.; third, enforcement state analogous This case is to the one before us. laws that bind administrators “par to a Servs., Inc., Morstein v. National Ins. ticular regula choice and thus function as a (11th Cir.1996) (en banc), F.3d 715 cert. de itself,” tion of an at —, ERISA id. —nied, —, U.S. Coyne S.Ct. at 1679. Delany See also Co. (1997), L.Ed.2d 715 closely even more Selman, (4th 1468-69 Cir. analogous to the case at bar. Plaintiff Mor- 1996). It is obvious that none of these state- director, president, stein was and sole stock categories implicated are here. company. holder of a small She with an met The Court held that the New York statuto purpose insurance broker for obtaining of ry surcharges had “an indirect economic replacement policy major a medical insur effect on buyers, choices made company’s ance herself and the other including and, therefore, plans” ERISA there employee. policy was to be adminis pre-emption. was no Travelers at Services, tered National Insurance Inc. At — —,115 S.Ct. at 1679-80. broker, meeting plaintiff with the in Two other observations about any replacement policy Travelers formed him that First, must be made. it unacceptable was decided seven would be if it excluded from pro- prevents Nothing in ERISA medical preexist- related to coverage treatment submitting—and state alleged that from Plaintiff fessionals ing medical condition. enforcing—bills for replacement from services her that the courts assured the broker coverage as not covered welfare benefit provide the same that are policy year preempts state plans. Although a after ERISA existing policy. Over her issued, plaintiff plans, had to” policy was law that “relates replacement surgery. National In- that clause does not annul state hip replacement total claim for pay just to general applicability refused surance Services laws surgery was ground that the payment price on the of medical care. affect the which had condition preexisting for a (8th Anderson, Boyle v. In application. 93 F.3d on her not disclosed denied, Cir.1995), cert. 716-17. L.Ed.2d 214 a ease alleg- in filed an action involving challenge to certain malfeasance, misrepresenta- ing negligence, statute Minnesota health care reform tions, of contract. Defendants and breach MinnesotaCare, court relied on known court on the the case to federal removed holding in there was no Travelers at 717. pre-emption. Id. pre-emption, stating, “In the context Circuit, Morstein, legislation, sitting MinnesotaCare Travelers the Eleventh litiga banc, precedents cited Court’s and the other characterized en preempt a “essentially compel this court not to having in Travelers as decision ‘laboratory preemp- effort to serve as expansion state’s turned the tide holding democracy’ in the realm of health care.” Id. Id. at 721. The tion doctrine.” quoting: at 1109. Circuit bears the Eleventh Allowing preemption of a fraud claim also relied on Travel The Seventh Circuit agent an individual insurance will rejecting an ERISA ers Congress’s purpose for ERISA. not serve Musser, Ins. 65 F.3d 647 Co. Safeco Life discussed, Congress enacted As we have Cir.1995). (7th brought by a The case was employ- protect the interests of challenged who the fees as health insurer and other beneficiaries of ees provide sessed such insurers plans. To immunize insurance benefit physi whose health insurance individuals liability agents personal from for fraudu- prevented and mental conditions them cal misrepresentation regarding ERISA lent private obtaining insurance in the mar from objective. promote this If plans would not Circuit, case, ket. a similar the Second beneficiary’s potential preempts a alia, Travelers, relying on inter held that misrepresentation, em- cause of action for pre-empt ERISA did not a Connecticut stat beneficiaries, employers ployees, imposed surcharges hospital on ute that bills long- choosing among plans will no various patients private insurance to health rely representations er be able poor. subsidize medical care for the Con agent regarding the terms of the insurance Weltman, *8 Hosp. necticut Ass’n v. 66 F.3d employees, plan. These whom Con- (2d Cir.1995). also See Greenblatt protect, them- gress to will find Plumbing Heating Corp., & 68 F.3d Delta selves unable to make informed choices (2d Cir.1995) 561, (noting limiting 573-74 regarding plans where available benefit language ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍gloss put on the broad duty places agents to deal Travelers). honestly applicants. recognize, cases Travelers has As these (citation

Id. at 723-24 pre-emption. restricted the ERISA States, and South In Central Southeast Pathology Fund v. west Areas Health and Welfare II. Ark., P.A., bs. 71 F.3d La (7th Cir.1995), denied, I turn now to what I consider to be the cert. panel: before the whether 135 L.Ed.2d 172 sole issue Travelers, Circuit, ruling that citing district court erred in the Seventh held: plaintiffs bility requirements give plaintiffs mo that rise to rendered “futile” pre-emption proof cause of action. Plaintiffs burden of complaint to add Ellen to amend her goes thus to whether her question The husband Kaplan as a defendant. eligible join plan Kaplan if have been reviewed de novo. pre-emption is Inc., Indus., misrepresentations had not made as to his Degnan v. Publisher See eligibility. Coyne Delany See 98 F.3d recognize that the standard at 28-29. F.3d at 1462 n. 4. district court’s refusal to allow of review for a is abuse of an amendment markedly Carlo, This case is from different applicable This standard is not discretion. Carlo, 49 F.3d 790. awas however, here, the root issue—stat former of defendant Reed and a by the district court as the basis for its ed in participant plan. its retirement question pre-emption, decision—is early Carlo elected retirement on the v. Reed Rolled Thread Die of law. See Carlo monthly benefits he told was he would re Moreover, if at 792-93. there is monthly The actual ceive. benefits he re courts are bereft pre-emption, no the federal twenty percent ceived were less than the Thus, view, my in no jurisdiction. there is promised apolo amount him. Defendant

way avoiding issue. gized for the error and offered to let him working position. continue at the same Car Normally in a case the start- accept eаrly lo did not offer and took facts, ing point is an examination of the but protest. subsequently retirement under He way much in the of facts- here. there is not brought in suit Massachusetts state court for allegations All know is derived from the we negligent misrepre breach of contract and complaint, purported in the amended which sentation. Id. at 792. We found ERISA stage accepted must be as true at this of the pre-emption. allegations only be con- litigation. These can stating misrep- strued as made Carlo, plaintiff participant had in been husband, plaintiffs Donald resentations and one of the issues was Golas, give failed to him correct infor- monthly and/or pay amount of due him retirement eligibility the conditions of mation about provisions plan. under the of the substantive participation policy. in the Insurance Revere Here, contrast, was not a Donald Golas complaint alleges The amended covered and none of the issues an insurance broker. I take that implicate the substantive poli- insurance mean she “sold” Revere’s plan. allegations solely are cy Although Kaplan to HomeView. is linked misrepresentations regarding concerned with alleged to HomeView and Revere as to the eligibility to a covered em- Golas’s become misrepresentations, no claim that there is ployee. agent for on behalf of

Kaplan acted as analysis Children’s used Boston eithеr or both of the other two defendants. Found, has much v. Nadal-Ginard construed, broadly complaint, The amended it. In Boston Children’s Heart recommend alleges a common-law Found., brought suit was against Kaplan individually. defendant, who federal district disability plaintiff nonprofit corporation in- Strictly speaking, the ERISA worked for alleged that implicated is not an officer and director. The suit surance duty by fiduciary misrepresentation claim. Donald nev-- defendant breached his Golas instead, misappropriating plaintiffs funds. The basis employee; er became covered failure to disclose alleged misrepre- focuses on the of the suit was defendant’s *9 corporation im- plaintiff alleges which were the to the other directors of sentations portant concerning provisions of being excluded from insur- information cause Golas’s (the Plan) plan Banks he coverage. ance Neither the extent of insur- a severance-benefit plan was terminated coverage ance nor the amount of benefits is had devised. When the initiative, more eligibility requirements on defendant’s he received involved. Even the $4,000,000 On dispute; in than in severance benefits. themselves are not it is spe- that ERISA alleged misrepresentations eligi- appeal those defendant contended about (4) type cifically exempted the of severance ben tween ERISA entities. None of the three fiduciary duty categories from its of state laws that Travelers holds efits at issue Congress pre-empt implicat- pre-empted application intended to are and (5) misrepre- fiduciary law. 73 F.3d at 438. We ed. The common-law claim state general application. sentation is a state law of held: Moreover, traditionally general tort law in is Here, fiduciary duty alleged breach regulation. an area of state It is therefore action in to Nadal-Ginard’s estab- relates unlikely Congress intended to intrude disclosing lishing the Banks Plan without (6) by pre-emption. Congress into this area fiduciary information that a self-interested did not intend to shield tortfeasors from lia- required to reveal to his would be fellow bility misrepresentation for where ERISA Nadal-Ginard’s misсonduct directors. benefits, rights, obligations, and core con- preceded adoption plan. the formal (7) implicated. cerns are not State common legal determination Nadal-Gi- duty imposes repre- of care relative to fiduciary nard’s conduct constitutes professionals sentations made require not the resolution of breach does any way in depend upon which does not any dispute interpretation about (8) alleged misrepresentation ERISA. Further, plan. administration of the prior occurred to the time when the ERISA law in this instance application plan would have taken effect. underlying concern does not raise the core Indeed, preemption. the fаct that hold, therefore, I would the district chose an rather Nadal-Ginard denying court committed reversible error in compensation than other form of is some ground motion to amend on the underlying peripheral claim that that the claim raised therein “would be corporate his breached re- Nadal-Ginard empted by ERISA.”7 Because ERISA does sponsibilities. pre-empt the claim asserted El- ease, being Kaplan, diversity This it cannot be said len and because there is no fiduciary citizenship parties, that Massachusetts law must be between the nor jurisdiction, in this instance. other federal the mo- tion should have been denied for lack of added). (emphasis Id. at jurisdiction. federal Plaintiff should be left cases, upon Based our own circuit the re- pursue misrepresentation claim striction of the under against Kaplan in the Massachusetts state in of the statute established Travel- courts. ers, post-Travelers cases in other Although majority agree and I circuits, it is evident that ERISA does not result, disagree proper ultimate we as to the pre-empt claim path in reaching to take it. Because I think reasons, Kaplan. eight Ellen are There that this procedural case which the cases, gleaned from the cited for this conclu- concur, path important, respectfully I must (1) sion. No ERISA benefits are join majority opinion. rather than rights obligations no ERISA are asserted. (2) Kaplan personally Defendant

rеsponsible any money damages awarded (3) plaintiff. Defendant ‍​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‍is not an entity, alleged misrep- nor does the relationship

resentation claim affect the be- pre-empted by simply also that the would hold district court erred ERISA." He assumed recommendation, adopting magistrate's that, pre-empted if ERISA the claim Re- considering application without of ERISA to HomeView, pre-empt vere and it must likewise individual, light as an of the differ- against Kaplan. the claim Given the distinctions status ences between her vis-a-vis ERISA and Kaplan’s entity between status as an ERISA Instead, magis- that of the other defendants. defendants, that of the other this failure to con- said, merely trate “For the reason stated ... against Kaplan sider the claim on its own merit ...,” [regarding Paul and HomeView] Revere legal also constituted error. plaintiff's against Kaplan also “be

Case Details

Case Name: Golas v. Homeview, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date Published: Feb 10, 1997
Citation: 106 F.3d 1
Docket Number: 96-1696
Court Abbreviation: 1st Cir.
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