Goins v. SaundersGoins v. Saunders
The record reflects that the district court properly articulated its reasoning for imposing its sentence. In light of Reid‘s alcohol problem, criminal history and conduct while on supervised release, we find that the district court‘s sentence is neither unreasonable nor plainly unreasonable. Additionally, we find that a remand to the district court for reconsideration in light of Reid‘s inability to attend the drug treatment program is unwarranted based on the reasonable, independent grounds for Reid‘s sentence that the district court clearly articulated on the record.
IV.
Appellant also contends that Booker applies to revocation proceedings, changing the standard of review from plainly unreasonable to reasonableness. In United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 817 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit recognized that Booker may impact the standard of review of parole revocation proceedings, but refrained from deciding the issue because in that case the sentence met both standards of review. Cases following Johnson have declined to decide the issue for the same reason. See Kirby, 418 F.3d at 625 n. 3; United States v. Brown, 163 Fed.Appx. 370, 372 n. 1 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished); United States v. Tugen, 157 Fed.Appx. 838, 840 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished); United States v. Chiles, 137 Fed.Appx. 870, 873 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished).
We also decline the invitation to consider whether Booker would change the standard of review from “plainly unreasonable” to “reasonable,” because in this case the district court‘s sentence satisfies both requirements.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Stuart W. Harris, Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Columbus, OH, for Respondent-Appellee.
BEFORE: BOGGS, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge; and MILLS, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM.
This case is about the importance of finality and, more particularly, about the strict limits on the availability of relief from a judgment under
I
On March 29, 1999, an Ohio state court sentenced Goins to fifteen years of imprisonment after he pled guilty to one count each of bribery, compelling prostitution, illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, and corruption of a minor. His right to appeal was explained both on the guilty plea form that he signed and by the sentencing judge. Goins alleges that he asked his court-appointed counsel to file an appeal, but no direct appeal ever was filed. Goins‘s conviction and sentence became final on April 28, 1999, the last day on which he could have filed a timely direct appeal.
Six hundred and fifty-nine days later, on February 5, 2001, Goins filed his federal habeas corpus petition. He raised six claims, including claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied his right to an appeal.1 Before the
In the district court, Goins filed what he called a “motion for reopening of petition for habeas corpus.” He argued that intervening decisions by this court and by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio changed the law governing the timeliness of his petition and would compel a finding that the petition was timely filed. The district court treated the motion as a motion for relief from the judgment under
II
We review the denial of a motion filed under
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party‘s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Because Goins‘s motion does not fit within any of the first five categories, he must rely on the catchall category of
Intervening changes of law generally do not qualify as “extraordinary circumstances.” Ibid. In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a procedural setting almost identical to this one. Based on its view that a state petition dismissed as procedurally barred could not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations, the district court in Gonzalez dismissed the petitioner‘s habeas petition as untimely. The Supreme Court then held in a different case
The Court assumed that the petitioner was correct that the district court‘s original timeliness holding was incorrect under Artuz. Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. at 2650, 125 S.Ct. 2641. It nevertheless concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to prevail on his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. “It is hardly extraordinary,” the Court explained, “that subsequently, after petitioner‘s case was no longer pending, this Court arrived at a different interpretation.” Ibid.
Goins offers us no reason to believe that the intervening decisions he cites are somehow more extraordinary than the intervening change in law in Gonzalez.2 Instead, he attempts to distinguish Gonzalez by arguing that, unlike in Gonzalez, the certificate of appealability issued in this case permits us to review the underlying determination that the petition was time-barred as well as the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. We doubt that the language used in the certificate of appealability supports this broad reading, but we need not determine whether it does. In an appeal taken from the denial of a
* The Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.