87 N.Y. 441 | NY | 1882
The range of argument in this case has extended over the general subject of the power of the legislature to enact laws which operate retrospectively, and the inherent and natural characteristics in that respect of statutes of limitation. Both sides, however, concede the very plain proposition that an act; capable of such construction, must be assumed to operate prospectively, unless its terms indicate a different intent; *444 and as our conclusion rests upon this admitted rule, we are spared the necessity of following the line of the arguments.
At the adoption of the Code in 1848-9, the title limiting the period for the commencement of actions was made prospective in its operation. This was effected by the enactment of one general section (§ 73) placed in the front of the changes made, and relieving from their effect causes of action already accrued. As to them, the section declared that the statutes "now in force" should be applicable. This provision, made broadly controlling over the range of the whole title, manifested with great clearness the legislative intent to confine the new provisions to causes of action accruing in the future. That intent spoke necessarily at that date, and dealt with an emergency then present; but itself originated in a prudence and wise justice, which was neither the product of a particular date, nor helplessly chained to it. The reason of the enactment had by no means spent its force when the date of its adoption was passed. Into this title, thus made prospective in its operation by the clearly expressed will of the legislature, an amendment was inserted in 1876, the effect of which was to reduce the limitation of actions to recover for certain personal injuries from six years to one. If it had been there at the original adoption of the Code, its prospective character and operation would have been undoubted; but because it came later, and speaks from a subsequent date, we are asked to infer that the original legislative intent is reversed, and to limit such intent, literally and rigorously, to the precise date of its first and formal expression, notwithstanding the fact that such expression retains its place and has never been repealed. The question has led to a collision of opinions in the Supreme Court. (Dubois v.The City of Kingston, 20 Hun, 500; Carpenter v. Shimer,
24 id. 464.) In the first of these cases the effect of section 73 seems not to have been considered. In the last, that section is made the substantial ground of the decision. It meets our approval. We think the words "already" and "now" in section 73 are to be taken distributively, and apply, not merely to the date of the original enactment, *445
but to any subsequent amendment, as of the date of such amendment; that causes of action "already accrued" are intended and saved, and the "statutes now in force" applied, as well at the date of the change effected by the amendment as at the date of the change accomplished by the original law. In a similar, though not identical case, and in construing another section of the Code, we gave such distributive character to the use of the word "hereafter." (Ely v. Holton,
The judgment should be reversed, and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
All concur, except MILLER, J., absent.
Judgment reversed.